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Executive Summary
The February 27, 2010 Maule, Chile earthquake (Mw = 8.8) is the fifth largest earthquake to occur
since 1900. Its effects were felt along 600 km of the central Chile coast. Initial field observations suggest 
that tectonic displacement of the hanging wall produced both uplift of over 2 m and subsidence of up to 1 
m in coastal regions. The tsunami initiated by the rupture devastated parts of the coast and killed hundreds 
of people. Strong shaking lasted for over a minute in some areas, and widespread damage occurred in
some cities. A large number of significant aftershocks contributed additional damage to an already fragile 
infrastructure. 
The earthquake tested numerous modern structures and facilities. Most of these systems 
performed well, although some did not. Most often, poor performance resulted from construction 
deficiencies or oversights in the design process related to structural detailing or recognition of
geotechnical effects, such as liquefaction. 
This major earthquake was the subject of several post-earthquake reconnaissance efforts. This 
report presents the observations of the NSF-sponsored Geo-engineering Extreme Events Reconnaissance 
(GEER) team. GEER team members included engineers, geologists, and scientists from Chile and the 
United States. The GEER team worked closely with other reconnaissance teams, including EERI, USGS,
NIST, FEMA, TOSG, PEER, and ASCE, amongst others, to document the geotechnical effects of this 
significant event so that our understanding of earthquakes can be improved and we may turn disasters 
such as this one into knowledge for advancing societal resilience.
In this report, key observations were carefully documented and geo-referenced with the use of
GPS and other geospatial tools such as Google Earth. A selected number of critical sites were further 
characterized using advanced tools, such as LiDAR, SASW, and DCPT. Reconnaissance was performed
remotely using satellite imagery, efficiently through aerial reconnaissance, and in detail through 
coordinated ground-based reconnaissance studies.  
This report includes a brief summary of engineering seismology and earthquake ground motions
for this event, a description of the use of remote sensing to provide insight into damage patterns, and an
in-depth discussion of the important role of coastal uplift and subsidence resulting from the underlying 
tectonic movement. Localized damage patterns observed during the 2010 Chile earthquake and findings
from previous earthquake studies indicate that seismic site effects were also important in this earthquake.  
Soil liquefaction occurred at many sites, and often led to ground failure and lateral spreading. Of 
special interest are the effects of liquefaction on the built environment. Several buildings were damaged
significantly due to foundation movements resulting from liquefaction. Liquefaction-induced ground 
failure displaced and distorted waterfront structures, which adversely impacted the operation of some of
Chile’s key port facilities. Critical lifeline structures, such as bridges, railroads, and road embankments,
were damaged by ground shaking and ground failure. The damage to some sections of Ruta 5, the primary
North-South highway in Chile, was pervasive, which disrupted the flow of supplies and traffic following 
the event. 
Most dams, levees, and mine tailings dams performed well. However, several key earth structures 
experienced some distress, and in one case a liquefaction-induced tailings dam failure produced a flow 
slide that killed a family of four. Most earth retention systems, such as retaining walls and basement 
walls, proved to be inherently robust. Landsliding was not pervasive, which appears to have resulted from 
native slopes that are generally composed of competent earth materials and the relatively low 
groundwater levels present at the end of the dry season.  
All of these consequences impact how society responds to, plans for, and rebuilds after a major 
earthquake, which will occur again in this region and other regions such as the Pacific Northwest. GEER 
team urban planners, geologists, and engineers documented the impacts of the geologic and tsunami 
hazards and identified the challenges and opportunities that will confront Chile as it rebuilds and 
addresses these hazards in the future. Careful documentation of the geotechnical effects of the 2010 Chile
earthquake will enable advancements in the art and science of engineering that will save lives during the 
next major event. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF RECONNAISSANCE 
On February 27, 2010, a magnitude Mw 8.8 earthquake occurred off the coast of Maule, Chile. The 
epicenter was located 35.909oS 72.733oW at a depth of about 35 km. The earthquake took place at the 
boundary of the Nazca and South American plates where they converge at a rate of about 80 mm per year 
as the Nazca plate is moves below the South American plate. The effects of the earthquake were observed
over a wide area from Valparaiso to the North to the Araucania region around Temuco to the South. Apart 
from the immediate consequences of the earthquake, the subduction of the Nazca plate resulted in a 
tsunami that affected a significant portion of the Chile coast from Iloca to the North to Tirua to the South. 
GEER deployed a multi-phase team to Chile following the event with support from NSF. As is GEER 
practice, reconnaissance teams include both US based personnel as well as “in country” based personnel 
from academia and practice. This approach ensures complete sensitivity to local issues and concerns as 
well as the benefit of local experience and contacts to enable robust well coordinated reconnaissance 
activities to be undertaken. 
GEER Team A was on the ground from Friday March 5th through Saturday March 13th. The focus of 
activities for Team A was to define the extent of geotechnical damage resulting from the strong ground 
motion. Team activities consisted of both aerial reconnaissance flights (conducted with assistance of
Chilean Air Force) as well private fixed and rotary wing operators as well as extensive ground
reconnaissance efforts that extended from the Santiago-Valparaiso region at the North to the Lebu-
Collipuli region to the South, a distance of some 550 km and from the coast to East of Highway 5, a 
distance of some 120 km. The ground reconnaissance activities ranged from both regional level 
assessments of ground failure as well as earthquake and tsunami consequences to more detailed studies of 
specific failures of geotechnical interest including liquefaction and lateral spreading, embankment
settlements and failures, geologic uplift/subsidence, tsunami scour, dam/tailings impoundment
performance and landslide/slope failures. 
Team A was led by GEER Co-Chair David Frost (Georgia Tech) and included US members Robb Moss 
(Cal Poly San Luis Obispo), Keith Kelson (Fugro William Lettis & Associates), Nick Sitar (UC
Berkeley), Alfredo Urzua (Boston College), Gonzalo Montalvo (Washington State University and 
University of Concepcion). The US members were joined by Chilean colleagues Ramon Verdugo 
(Universidad de Chile), Christian Ledezma (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile), Terry Eldridge
(Golder Associates Santiago), Lenart Gonzalez (Golder Associates Santiago), Gabriel Ferrer (Pontificia 
Universidad Catolica de Chile) and Claudia Welker, (Golder Associates Santiago). 
GEER Team B was on the ground from Saturday March 13th through Thursday March 18th. The focus of 
activities for Team B was to conduct extensive ground studies in some of the more heavily damaged areas
such as Concepcion and the surrounding area as well as continue studies along the coast with a focus on 
both geologic uplift/subsidence as well as relationships between geologic hazards and urban 
planning/reconstruction. Additional efforts focused on the effects of ground failure on bridges, highways, 
railroads and lifeline systems. Specific studies focused on examining damage to bridge foundations due to
lateral spreading, liquefaction and slope failures as well as building foundations due to liquefaction, 
settlement and slop failures. Observations made during both Team A and Team B ground reconnaissance 
efforts were also used to identify possible candidate sites for subsequent testing and study by Team C as 
noted below. 
Team B was led by GEER Chair Jon Bray (UC Berkeley) and included US members Pedro Arduino 
(University of Washington), Scott Ashford (Oregon State University), Dominic Assimaki (Georgia Tech),
Gabriel Candia (UC Berkeley), Tara Hutchinson (UC San Diego), Laurie Johnson (LJC Inc.), George 
Mylonakis (University of Patras), Kyle Rollins (Brigham Young University), John Stewart (UCLA) and 
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Rob Witter (DOGAMI, State of Oregon). The US members were joined by Chilean colleagues Ruben
Boroschek (Universidad de Chile) and Sebastian Maureira (Universidad de Chile).  
GEER Team C was on the ground from Tuesday March 23rd through Monday March 29th. Team C visited
a series of sites identified by Teams A and B and conducted LiDAR, SASW and DCPT tests to
characterize subsurface conditions and/or infrastructure geometry. To the extent possible, these studies
focused on perishable data that could not be guaranteed to remain in the immediate post-event geometry
or condition. The team worked predominantly on sites in the Concepcion area including bridge, 
embankment and structure failure case histories. They also conducted measurements at a tailings dam 
failure and at several highway embankments between Talca and Curico as well as at several bridge sites 
in Santiago. 
Team C was led by Rob Kayen (USGS) and included US member Scott Olson (University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champaign). They were joined by Chilean colleagues Valentina Peredo (Universidad de Chile), 
Sabastian Maureira (Universidad de Chile) and Lenart Gonzalez (Golder Associates Santiago).   
GEER Team D was on the ground from Monday April 12th through Saturday April 17th. Team D was 
tasked with visiting a number of sites where additional measurements were considered desirable based on 
observations of the earlier GEER teams as well as to make additional SASW measurements at selected
sites. Additional emphasis on the performance of fill soils in some port facilities as well as transportation 
infrastructure was a focus of this Team.
Team D was led by Youssef Hashash (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) and included US 
member Jim Bay (Utah State University). They were joined by Chilean colleague Gabriel Ferrer 
(Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile). 
Home base logistical and technical support for all phases of the GEER team deployment was provided by
Katherine Jones (UC Berkeley) and Mesut Turel (Georgia Tech). Coordination with other organizations 
was facilitated by scheduled teleconferences arranged by the USGS Earthquake Hazards Program as well
as directly with other organizations including Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), the 
Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER), the Ocean Sciences Tsunami Group and the
Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAE).  
This report summarizes the observations from the initial reconnaissance conducted by all phases of the 
GEER team. Given the potential importance of the findings of this event to similar tectonic settings in the
US and around the world, it is expected that additional information and interpretations will be made
available as they are collected.  
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2.0 ENGINEERING SEISMOLOGY AND EARTHQUAKE GROUND MOTIONS 
2.1 Tectonic Setting
The information presented in this section is derived from the USGS “Earthquake Summary” web 
site (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/#summary). 
Additional information on the geology in the region affected by the 2010 Mw=8.8 Chile earthquake is
presented in Section 3 of this report.
The Mw = 8.8 Offshore Maule, Chile earthquake occurred in a subduction zone in which the Nazca 
plate passes eastward and downward beneath the South American plate. The rate of convergence
of the two plates is 70 mm/year. 
Human inhabitants of the Chilean coast report numerous major prior events in this region. One of
the first recorded events was a shock near Concepción in 1562. Another earthquake in 1570 
triggered a tsunami that led Spaniards to rebuild Concepción on higher ground. Earthquakes in 
1730 (apparently near Valparaíso) and 1751 (Concepción) generated tsunamis that caused 
flooding and damage in Japan. The effects of an 1835 earthquake near Concepción were 
observed by Charles Darwin and Robert FitzRoy. A 1906 earthquake near Valparaíso of 
magnitude 8.2 generated a tsunami that produced run up heights in Hawaii as great as 3.5 m. The 
southern extent of that earthquake overlaps with the northern extent of the 2010 event. To the 
south of the 2010 earthquake zone is the source of the giant 1960 earthquake of magnitude 9.5, 
which was the largest 20th earthquake world-wide. Since 1960, the largest event prior to the 2010 
earthquake was a magnitude 8.0 earthquake north of Valparaíso in 1985. That event generated a 
Pacific Ocean tsunami that reached heights of 9 m on the Chilean coast near Coquimbo and 
affected boats in Hawaii.
Ruegg et al. (2009) identified the Concepción–Constitución area (S35o–S37o) as a “mature 
seismic gap, since no large subduction earthquake has occurred there since 1835.” They noted 
that the convergence of about 68 mm/year since the last large interpolate subduction earthquake
of 1935 would have accumulated more than 10 m of displacement. Ruegg et al. (2009) warn, 
“Therefore, in a worst case scenario, the area already has a potential for an earthquake of 
magnitude as large as 8–8.5, should it happen in the near future.” Thus, earth scientists were 
aware of the potential for a large earthquake in the south central Chile area.
2.2 Earthquake of February 27 2010
The mainshock occurred at 3:34 am local time on February 27, 2010. Its epicenter is located at 
S36.027° W72.834°
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/neic_tfan_cmt.php). The USGS 
moment tensor solution indicates a seismic moment of 1.8×1022 N⋅m, moment magnitude of MW 
= 8.8, and hypocentral depth of 30 km. Based on the regional tectonics, the critical nodal plane 
from the moment tensor solution strikes 14° west of due north and dips at 19° to the east.  
Figure 2.1 shows a Google Earth image superimposed with the mainshock location and 
aftershock locations segregated by date (those within the first 48 hours of the event and those 
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occurring subsequently). Aftershocks within the first 48 hours are often assumed to result from 
redistribution of the stress in the mainshock rupture zone (Benioff, 1985; Kiratzi et al. 1985). 
Aftershock locations were obtained from the USGS server. Most of the aftershocks occur in a
region approximately 530 km long (along strike) by 180 km wide. Figure 2.2 shows the 
aftershock distribution color-coded by depth along with a section of the aftershock pattern, which 
shows the dipping fault surface. The closest distance from the fault to the coastal areas of Chile
was approximately 25 km.  
The surface projection of a finite fault model of the mainshock is also shown in Figure 2.1. This 
finite fault model was generated by Gaven Hayes based on waveform inversion (image from 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/finite_fault.php). The 
rectangular model strikes at 17.5° west of north and dips at 18.0° to the east. The seismic
moment release based upon this plane is 2.39×1029+029 dyne⋅cm. There are two zones of high
slip, with the maximum slip being approximately 14.5 m.  
Figure 2.1. Google Earth image superimposed with aftershock distribution (locations 

from USGS) and fault plane solution from G. Hayes (obtained from USGS web page)  
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Figure 2.2. Aftershock distribution by depth. Star indicates hypocenter of mainshock. 
Figure from USGS web page 
(http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eq_depot/2010/eq_100227_tfan/neic_tfan_c.html). 
 
 
2.3 Ground Motions 
 
Seismograph networks in the portions of Chile that experienced strong ground motion from the 
Offshore Maule earthquake are maintained by RENADIC (Red National de Acelerografos 
Departamento de Ingenieria Civil, Universidad de Chile = National Network of Seismic 
Monitoring Devices – Department of Civil Engineering, University of Chile), RENASIS (Red 
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National de Acelerografos Departamento de Sismológica, Universidad de Chile = National 
Network of Seismic Monitoring Devices – Seismology Department, University of Chile), and 
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (Catholic University of Chile). 
As of this writing, preliminary results from the portions of the RENADIC and RENASIS
networks have been released in a series of web reports (http://www.terremotosuchile.cl/). These 
reports contain plots of acceleration waveforms and response spectra for selected stations. Table 
2.1 lists stations that recorded the earthquake in the RENADIC and RENASIS networks based 
on personal communication with C. Ledezma (April 21 2010). The locations of those stations are 
shown in Figure 2.3. Also shown in the table are the peak horizontal acceleration (maximum of 
the two horizontal components) for stations described in the available web reports. Data for 
stations without a reported PHA or “Data Report Reference” in Table 2.1 is not available in the 
web reports.  
With the exception of the four RENASIS stations, the data released to date does not include 
digital acceleration files, or response spectra. An example of the type of records that are 
currently available in the Boroschek et al. (2010) preliminary reports is shown in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.3. Locations of stations maintained by RENADIC and RENASIS that recorded 
mainshock
We understand that the Pontificia Universidad Católica array is concentrated in Concepción, 
which was strongly shaken by this event. There are unconfirmed reports that these stations did 
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not record the mainshock or its principal aftershocks due to maintenance problems. However, no 
official reports on station locations or data availability are available as of this writing.
Table 2.1. Information on RENADIC and RENASIS strong motion data released in plots 
within PDF files (as of 18 May 2010)
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 BEA=Boroschek et al.; UC = Universidad de Chile 
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Figure 2.4. Acceleration-time series recorded at the Hospital in Curico during the 2010 Mw=8.8 Chile 
Earhquake  
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3.0 REMOTE SENSING AND PRE/POST IMAGERY
Imagery from remote sensing activities has become a readily available and critical resource in all phases
of post-disaster response including initial reconnaissance planning, in-field logistics and information
logging. The response to the February 27, 2010 Chile earthquake was no exception with a USGS
coordinated collaboration whereby individuals and organizations responding to the event could participate
in regularly scheduled teleconferences and receive updates of both available imagery from NASA and 
other organizations as well as information on the status of acquiring data over priority areas of interest in
the earthquake zone. An example of the typical output shared amongst this group is shown in Figure 3.1.
GEER team members further analyzed this data to produce summaries of pre and post imagery by
imagery type as shown in Figure 3.2 to 3.15.  
Figure 3.1. Satellite Coverage (source USGS EROS Center)
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Figures 3.2 to 3.15 show the tracks of the areas in which much of the ground reconnaissance of Team A
was conducted. This effectively reflects the entire area over which strong ground motion effects produced
geotechnical distress and/or failures. The activities of Teams B, C and D were generally contained within
this same area. For detailed geotechnical reconnaissance activities, it is critical to have high resolution pre
and post event image pairs. In general, the areas where high resolution imagery is available do not include
many of the areas where significant geotechnical impacts were observed. 
Apart from the image data of the type referenced in Figures 3.1 through 3.15, the emergence of Google
Earth and indeed the full suite of Google geospatial data and tools has become a central element of many 
reconnaissance activities including those of GEER. The ability to view pre and post images of areas of
possible interest, even at moderate resolution, can greatly enhance decisions on where to send ground
teams as well as serve as a valuable base layer for subsequent spatial data information as shown in
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 below. Figures 3.18 to 3.29 shows selected image pairs of pre/post earthquake used 
by the GEER team in supporting ground reconnaissance efforts. Other examples of the usage of Google
Earth images as base layers for GEER team member activities are presented throughout the report. 
Figure 3.16. Google Earth based image of Team A reconnaissance tracks. 
Figure 3.17. Google Earth based pre-event image of Las Palmas Tailings Dam that failed.
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Figure 3.18. Pre/Post Imagery of Iloca (34.924° S, 72.179° W)
Tsunami 
Damage
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Figure 3.19. Pre/Post Imagery of Iloca (34.936° S, 72.181° W)
Tsunami 
Damage
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Figure 3.20. Pre/Post Imagery of Talcahuano (36.729° S, 73.104° W)
Levee 
Breach
 
    
 
 
 
27 
Figure 3.21. Pre/Post Imagery of Talcahuano (36.738° S, 73.097° W)
Tsunami 
Damage
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Figure 3.22. Pre/Post Imagery of Talcahuano (36.739° S, 73.094° W)
Tsunami 
Damage
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Scour
Figure 3.23. Pre/Post Imagery of Talcahuano (36.734° S, 73.079° W)
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Figure 3.24. Pre/Post Imagery of Talcahuano (36.731° S, 73.097° W)
Failed/Repaired
Roadway
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Figure 3.25. Pre/Post Imagery of Concepcion (36.815° S, 73.066° W)
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Figure 3.26. Pre/Post Imagery of Concepcion (36.819° S, 73.066° W)
Failed Highway
Bridge
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Figure 3.27. Pre/Post Imagery of Concepcion (36.828° S, 73.062° W)
Collapsed 
Building
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Figure 3.28. Pre/Post Imagery of Constitucion (35.326° S, 72.409° W)
Tsunami
Damage
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Figure 3.29. Pre/Post Imagery of Constitucion (35.337° S, 72.403° W)
Tsunami
Damage
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4.0 REGIONAL GEOLOGIC SETTING AND TECTONIC DEFORMATION 
Tectonic deformation caused by the Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake influenced the pattern and amount of
geotechnical damage, structural damage, and loss of life.  The observed pattern deformation along the 
coast and inland is consistent with regional fault deformation models for the Nazca-South America Plate 
interface. The tectonic deformation from the February 27 Chile earthquake and its effects on the built 
environment provide useful information from which to evaluate possible patterns of deformation and 
damage from a large earthquake along the Cascadia subduction zone in the Pacific Northwest of North 
America.  One of the most noticeable aspects of this earthquake is the vast distance over which ground
shaking, surface deformation, and consequent damage occurred.  Ground-surface effects of this 
earthquake occurred over a north-south length of more than 600 km (375 mi), including damage to port 
facilities in Valparaiso on the north, to coastal uplift observed as far south as Tirua.  By comparison with
the Cascadia subduction zone in the northwestern United States, this is roughly equivalent to the entire 
coastline for the states of Washington and Oregon.  Long-term tectonic subsidence in the Central Valley
of Chile has resulted in a north-south structural basin containing young sediments that probably influence 
strong ground motions; the long-term development of the Central Valley probably reflects the cumulative 
effects of multiple episodes of earthquake-related subsidence similar to that from the February 27 
earthquake. The purpose of the geologic reconnaissance of areas affected by the Chile earthquake was to
document the pattern and amount of tectonic deformation, and provide a basis for understanding patterns 
of structural damage related to strong ground shaking, liquefaction, landsliding, and tsunami waves.  A 
reconnaissance evaluation of possible surface-fault rupture following a large aftershock on March 11 also 
provides information on possible tectonic deformation from related non-subduction earthquakes. 
Field efforts included several aerial reconnaissance flights, and visits to many sites within the extensive
area affected by this earthquake.  The aerial reconnaissance program included two high-altitude flights 
with the Chilean Air Force Aerial Photogrammetric Survey (SAF), during SAF’s photo-documentation of 
damaged regions.  These flights occurred on Sunday March 3 (from Constitución south to Arauco) and 
Wednesday March 10 (from San Antonio to Concepción and Isla Santa María).  A low-altitude flight was 
conducted on March 9 with a privately operated, low-wing Cessna aircraft, and included observations
along the coast from Curanipe south to the latitude of Cañete (including reconnaissance over Isla Santa 
María), along the Andean foothills from Curicó to Digua, and several traverses across the Central Valley
and the Coast Ranges between the latitudes of Curicó and Lebu.  A fourth flight was completed on March
12 with a high-wing Cessna 172, and included observations and in the area between Pichilemu, Navidad,
and Litueche. Collectively, these flights covered the coastline of central Chile with a linear distance of 
approximately 460 km, within the central part of the earthquake rupture area. Ground reconnaissance was 
conducted between March 3 and 18 in several traverses that included coastal observations, as well as site 
visits in the coastal mountains and the central valley.  Coastal field reconnaissance covered approximately
380 km of the central Chilean coastline between Lebu and Pichilemu, and focused on collecting 
information on the amount of vertical deformation (uplift versus subsidence) produced by the earthquake. 
4.1 Regional Tectonic and Geologic Setting 
South-central Chile is one of the most seismically active areas on Earth (Lomnitz, 2004), largely because 
it overlies the plate boundary between the Nazca and South America tectonic plates (Figure 4.1).  Along 
the Chile plate margin, the oceanic Nazca plate is subbducting beneath the South American continent at a
rate of about 66 to 68 mm/yr (Ruegg et al., 2009; Melnick et al., 2009).  For comparison, this rate of 
convergence is substantially greater than the rate along the Cascadia subduction zone in the Pacific 
Northwest of North America (about 36 mm/yr; Atwater et al., 2005), which is reflected by more frequent 
large to great earthquakes within the historical record along the Chile margin. In the area of the February 
27, 2010 Chile earthquake, the plate convergence is slightly oblique, and has a secondary component of 
dextral slip. The plate margin also is associated with a primary dextral slip fault zone, the Liquiñe-Ofquí 
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fault zone (LOFZ), which is located near the western margin of the high-altitude Andean foreland 
mountain range (Figure 4.1) and has a long-term geologic slip rate of about 13 mm/yr (Melnick et al., 
2009).
Of particular interest to the occurrence and effects of the recent earthquake along the south-central Chile 
margin is a simplification of the regional tectonic processes provided by Atwater et al. (2005) (Figure
4.2). As described by Atwater et al. (2005), the process of plate subduction involves the descent of the 
oceanic plate (in this case, the Nazca plate, west of the coastline) beneath the South American continent, 
in a “stick-slip” fashion.  Between large-magnitude earthquakes, these plates are coupled at relatively 
shallow depths, and as convergence continues the continental plate undergoes contraction and aseismic 
tectonic subsidence, while onshore areas undergo tectonic uplift (Figure 4.2).  As described on Figure 4.2, 
coseismic energy release during a large earthquake often results in sudden uplift of the edge of the
continental plate, production of tsunami, and subsidence in the area inboard from the trench.  This model 
has been developed based on geologic, seismologic, and geophysical observations before and after several 
historical earthquakes, and provides a framework for understanding surface deformation and tsunami
effects observed after the recent earthquake.  In particular, an important physical feature that can be 
identified following a large subduction zone earthquake is termed the “hingeline”, or the line that
separates areas of coseismic uplift and subsidence. This line of no net permanent land-level change can 
be identified via geologic observation (e.g., Plafker and Savage, 1970), Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)
measurements, InSAR data, and/or seismologic models.  As applied to geotechnical engineering along 
coastlines, the hingeline delineates areas that can experience substantially different processes immediately
following the coseismic deformation (e.g., submergence or emergence); in non-coastal areas of
deformation, differences in geotechnical effects on either side of the hingeline may be subtle (e.g., minor
changes in slope gradients, differences in ground motion parameters in areas of long-term subsidence and 
sediment accumulation).   
In south-central Chile, the overall geologic setting is largely controlled by the long-term, repeated
occurrence of aseismic uplift of the continent, punctuated by sudden, coseismic coastal uplift and inland 
subsidence. These processes affect the geologic characteristics of onshore regions, and thus affect the 
geotechnical responses to strong ground motion and permanent ground deformation.  South-central Chile
consists of four primary geologic domains (Melnick et al., 2009): (1) the Coastal Platform, consisting of 
Cenozoic marine deposits and terraces, (2) the Coastal ranges, consisting of Permo-Triassic metamorphic 
rocks and older granitic rocks, (3) the Central Depression, including Cenozoic volcanic rocks overlain by
semi-consolidated and unconsolidated alluvial sediments in the central valley, and (4) the Main Cordillera 
(Patagonian Andes), consisting of Mesozoic and Cenozoic volcanic rocks. These rock types and 
sedimentary basins influence the pattern of site-specific strong ground motions, and thus affect 
geotechnical responses to earthquake shaking.  As a rough generalization, the Coastal Platform is
underlain by variable materials that are comparable (at a first approximation) with NEHRP soil classes 
ranging from type B to C to D; the Coast ranges probably are underlain by NEHRP soil classes B and BC; 
the Central valley is underlain by classes C and D; and the Patagonian Andes are underlain mostly by
classes B and perhaps BC. These relationships suggest that the Central valley, which is an area of long-
term sediment accumulation, likely experiences substantial amplification of strong ground motions with
respect to the adjacent areas (see Section 5, below). As more data from this earthquake are processed, it 
will be of interest to compare the geotechnical responses amongst the primary geologic domains.   
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Figure 4.1. (from Melnick et al., 2009)  A: Major seismotectonic features along the Chilean 
coastline of South America, including rupture segments of large historical earthquakes; LOFZ: 
Liquiñe-Ofquí fault zone; B: Major Quaternary faults within south-central Chile, seismotectonic 
segments, rupture zones of large historical earthquakes, and main tectonic features of the south-
central Andean convergent margin. 
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Figure 4.2. (after Atwater et al., 2005) Schematic illustration of (left) typical subduction zone; 
(middle) surface deformation during aseismic intervals; and (right) surface deformation during 
coseismic rupture, and schematic location of the “hingeline”, or line separating the areas of net 
uplift and net subsidence.
4.2 Earthquake Surface Deformation 
4.2.1 Previous Historical Observations
The historical record of large earthquakes in central Chile extends back approximately 500 years, as 
summarized recently by Barrientos (1987), Cisternas et al. (2005) and Melnick et al. (2009).  These 
workers use the historical record to delineate three rupture segments in the region, including the
Valparaiso segment (which ruptured most recently in 1985), the Concepción segment (which ruptured in 
1835), and the Valdivia segment (which ruptured in 1960).  All of these earthquakes produced substantial 
vertical deformation of the coastal and inland valley regions. Coseismic uplift during the 1835 
earthquake, as measured from uplifted tidal organisms by Darwin and FitzRoy (Darwin, 1851), included a 
maximum uplift of 3.0 m at Isla Santa María, 2.4 m at Isla Quiriquina in the Bay of Concepción, 1.8 m at
Tubul, 1.5 m at the harbor of Talcahuano, and 0.6 m at Isla Mocha.  This pattern of uplift is distinctly
different from that produced by the 1960 M9.5 Valdivia earthquake and its primary foreshock, as reported
by Plafker and Savage (1970) and Nelson and Manley (1992).  Uplift in 1960 occurred only at the 
northern end of the Valdivia rupture; the town of Lebu was uplifted approximately 1.3 m, and both the 
town of Tirua and Isla Mocha uplifted about 1 m. Observations of little or no uplift in Arauco and Lota 
from this earthquake (Plafker and Savage, 1970) would be consistent with northeastward tilting of the 
nearshore and coastal areas at the northern end of the 1960 surface-deformation field.  The majority of
vertical surface deformation from the 1960 earthquake was net subsidence of the coastline south of Tirua. 
Tectonic subsidence of the region east of the coastline in 1960 was as much as 2 m, based on pre- and
post-earthquake surveys (Plafker and Savage, 1970).  The pattern of surface deformation produced by the
2010 earthquake will likely be known with excellent resolution as a result of spatially extensive and
precise GPS and InSAR technological advancements. Collectively, the 1835, 1960, 1985, and 2010
earthquake will provide an assessment of surface deformation during the most-recent earthquake cycle 
over a distance of about 1500 km along the Chilean coast.    
4.2.2 Surface Deformation Models
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Seismological and GPS data also have provided preliminary models of expected surface deformation, 
which were available at the time of this initial field reconnaissance and helped guide field traverses 
(http://tectonics.caltech.edu/slip_history/2010_chile/prelim-gps.html; 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/finite_fault.php). 
The model of regional surface deformation used to guide field reconnaissance used initial fault slip 
estimates from the U.S. Geological Survey, which is based on seismological data (Figure 4.3, left panel). 
Preliminary fault dislocation model by K. Wang (personal comm.., 2010) predicts both horizontal and 
vertical coseismic displacements (Figure 4.3, right panel).  Wang’s model suggests that the coastline 
adjacent to the rupture plane could have a variable pattern of uplift and subsidence, as a result of different
amounts of slip along the fault rupture plane.  The level of detail available from this model far exceeds the 
accuracy of measurements of vertical deformation produced by past ruptures, but will be refined by
InSAR and GPS data sets from the 2010 earthquake.  Notably, the surface deformation model shown in 
Figure 4.3 depicts a sinuous hingeline that crosses the coastline in the central part of the rupture area. 
Overall, this model predicts a maximum of about 2 m of vertical uplift of the coast adjacent to the initial
epicenter, near the town of Cobquecura, and from about 1 to 2 m of uplift of the coast between the towns
of Tirua and Constitución. The model predicts as much as 1 m of subsidence between Constitución and 
Bucalemu, and minor uplift near Pichilemu.  In addition, the model predicts as much as1 m of subsidence 
in the entire Central Valley, from Santiago on the north to Los Angeles on the south (Figure 4.3, right 
panel). 
� 
Figure 4.3. Left: fault slip (color in m) model by Gavin Hayes (USGS) inverted from seismic data. 
Right: coseismic vertical deformation (color in m) and horizontal displacements (arrows) 
predicted by a uniform half-space dislocation model (personal communication, K. Wang, March 
2010). 
4.2.3 GEER Team Coastal Field Observations 
Field observations were made along the coastline in the central part of earthquake rupture zone, primarily
between the towns of Lebu in the south and Pichilemu in the north (Figure 4.4).  The objective of this 
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reconnaissance was to compare field observations with preliminary geophysical models of earthquake 
surface deformation that predicted regions of coastal uplift and subsidence along the length of the rupture 
area (e.g., Figure 4.3). The field effort included interviews of local residents, fishermen and public 
officials to gather anecdotal accounts of changes in sea level, noticeable shifts in the shoreline and erosion 
that may reflect earthquake-related vertical deformation. At selected coastal sites, the amount of uplift or
subsidence was estimated from the upper growth limits of marine intertidal organisms, such as algae,
mussels, and barnacles, whose growth is strongly influenced by tidal variation. Measurements of 
estimated uplift based on these features have uncertainties of ± 0.5 m, but nevertheless define broad
spatial variations in the magnitude of vertical deformation along the coast. 
Figure 4.4.  Map from GoogleEarth showing tracks of aerial (orange) and ground reconnaissance 

traverses (green) related to assessment of regional geology and tectonic deformation (red). 
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4.2.4 Araco Peninsula and Lebu
Aerial reconnaissance on March 9 included observation of the Arauco Peninsula and the town of Lebu on
the southwestern side of the peninsula, and demonstrated the presence of uplifted (formerly active) wave-
cut bedrock platforms (Figure 4.5). From the air, these platforms appear white where covered by bleached 
intertidal marine organisms, and brown where covered by kelp.  It is notable that kelp debris on these
platforms was preserved, rather than being removed by tsunami waves. A lighthouse northwest of the 
Lebu Harbor inlet is on an island that was uplifted enough to nearly form a peninsula (Figure 4.6); the 
lighthouse appeared to be undamaged by subsequent tsunami waves.  
Figure 4.5.  Oblique aerial photograph looking south along the western coastline of the Arauco 

Peninsula, showing uplifted (formerly) modern wave-cut platform and exposed tidal zone. 

(S37.540303° W73.623628°; 1701 hrs on 03/09/2010).�
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Figure 4.6.  Uplifted island with lighthouse, north of Lebu Harbor inlet. Areas with whitish colors 
were uplifted during earthquake. (S37.591897° W73.668353°; 1714 hrs on 03/09/2010). 
Ground reconnaissance near the town of Lebu documents approximately 1.5 to 2.0 m of uplift of the
coastline. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show uplifted tidal organisms attached to sandstone bedrock.  Local 
fishermen contacted at this site indicated that sea level went down (i.e., the coast was uplifted) 
approximately 1.8 m as a result of the February 27 earthquake.  Evidence of coastal uplift is also present 
on the eastern side of the Lebu harbor inlet, where fishing boats were stranded above the high-tide 
elevation and a wooden jetty now is above tidal level (Figure 4.9).  The area east of the jetty is now
emergent as a result of earthquake-related uplift (Figure 4.10).  Local fishermen in this area noted that the 
“water level went down” about 1.5 to 2.0 m as a result of the earthquake, suggesting uplift of about 1.5 to 
2.0 m.  Measurement of the former high-tide level on the harbor wall indicates an uplift of about 1.8 m
(Figure 4.10). Almost all of the boats in the Lebu Harbor, including a large ferry, were grounded as result
of the uplift. North of the Lebu Harbor inlet, the former wave-cut platform is now emergent and about 2 
m above high tide (Figure 4.11). Several observations indicate that seawater drained from this platform
without high flow velocities expected during tsunami surge, including the presence of attached kelp 
draped on the wave-cut platform, scattered buoyant trash, and several species of mobile tidal organisms 
(e.g., crabs, starfish) preserved in a “life assemblage”. These relationships, as well as a lack of damage to 
waterfront residences adjacent to the Lebu harbor, indicate that tsunami waves did not inundate areas 
outside of the harbor channel and that the uplift raised the wave-cut platform above the inundation level. 
The measurements of uplift of about 1.5 to 2.0 m are consistent with (but lower than) measurements 
provided by Tassara (2010). 
43 
 
   
 
 �
Figure 4.7. Uplifted tidal organisms northeast of Lebu Harbor, looking west; distinct bands of 
white organic material and brown kelp are at comparable elevations (respectively) throughout this 
area.  Top of kelp band about 2 m above tidal level when photo was taken (5:34 pm local time, 1.5 
hr prior to daily high tide). (S37.580447° W73.642911°; 1734 hrs on 03/10/2010). 
Figure 4.8.  Close-up photograph of uplifted intertidal organisms, northeast of Lebu Harbor. (S37.580447° 

W73.642911°; 1743 hrs on 03/10/2010). 
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Figure 4.9.  Eastern margin of Lebu Harbor, with stranded fishing boat and emergent wooden 
jetty; area to right was former tidal flat adjacent to harbor channel. Present high tide water level to 
left of boats. (S37.600789° W73.656317°; 1800 hrs on 03/10/2010). 
Figure 4.10. Fishing boats in Lebu harbor, stranded along uplifted western margin of harbor 
channel. Former high tide mark on harbor quay wall was indicated by local fishermen; 
measurement from high tide level on March 10 indicates uplift of 1.8 m + 0.2 m of the harbor
quay wall. (S37.603694° W73.654372°; 1832 hrs on 03/10/2010). 
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Figure 4.11. Wave-cut platform north of Lebu Harbor inlet, as also shown on Figure 4-6.  Kelp 
draped on the platform, presence of “life assemblage” of mobile tidal organisms (e.g., crabs, 
starfish), and buoyant trash on the platform all suggest that seawater drained from the platform
without high flow velocities expected during a tsunami surge. (S37.593958° W73.668225°; 1910
hrs on 03/10/2010). 
4.2.5 Isla Santa María and the Golfo de Arauco
Isla Santa María is along the northern projection of the Arauco Peninsula, and has a gentle eastward
slope, with steep cliffs along its western margin and a low-lying sand deposit on its eastern side.  Aerial 
reconnaissance on March 9 shows that fresh emergent wave-cut platforms are present on the southern, 
western, and northern margins of the island (Figure 4.12).  The geometry of the wave-cut platform 
suggests that the island may have been tilted eastward during the earthquake. Coastal bluffs on the
western margin of Isla Santa María are freshly exposed, possibly related to shaking-induced landsliding 
and/or tsunami wave erosion (Figure 4.12). 
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Figure 4.12. Northern end of Isla Santa Maria, looking south toward wave-cut platforms on 
uplifted coastline and islands. (S37.593958° W73.668225°; 1910 hrs on 03/9/2010). 
The coastline of Golfo de Arauco exhibits evidence of considerably less uplift than along the western side 
of the Arauco Peninsula.  The town of Arauco lies at an elevation of about 10 m, about 500 m south of the
north-facing coastline, and was not affected by tsunami inundation.  On the eastern shore of the Golfo de 
Arauco, the similarly low-lying village of Laraquete experienced tsunami damage only along houses 
fronting the beach. Field observations and local anecdotal evidence indicates that active tidal channel in
Laraquete was uplifted such that the channel floor is now exposed and small boats were stranded (Figure
4.13). This uplift was estimated by locals to be about 0.5 m, which is consistent with the evidence that
the tsunami wave progressed upstream up the tidal channel without damage to residences on the channel
banks. Similarly, at Playa Blanca in the town of Lota on the eastern shore of the Golfo de Arauco, raised
mussel colonies inhabiting rocky intertidal habitats suggest uplift of about 0.9 m, and a local witness 
indicated that the shoreline shifted westward by 15 to 25 m (as a result of uplift).  These results are 
consistent with observations by Tassara (2010).  The difference in amounts of uplift between Lota and 
Isla Santa María may reflect a gentle eastward tilting from the earthquake, or simply variability in uplift 
within the deformed region. The coastline from Lota northward to the towns of Coronel, San Pedro de La 
Paz, and Hualpen, and to the mouth of Rio Bio Bio (a reach of approximately 25 km) experienced
relatively little uplift, on the basis of our observations during aerial reconnaissance.  Along this reach,
low-lying shore-parallel beach dunes remained relatively intact, nearby residences and engineered 
structures appeared to show no substantial damage, tsunami runup appeared to be relatively limited.  The 
relatively small amount of tsunami damage in this area contrasts with the substantial damage from
tsunami on the northern side of the city of Concepción and in Golfo de Talcahuano (see below). 
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Figure 4.13.  Ground view looking north in village of Laraquete, from the highway bridge toward 
the estuary outlet.  Fishing boats stranded on left bank; tsunami high water mark approximately at 
the bank crest.  Light, wooden-frame residences on both banks were unaffected by tsunami waves 
confined within existing tidal channel.  Local witness indicated that the sea level went down about 
0.5 m after the earthquake, and that the estuary bottom had not been exposed before (i.e., uplift of 
about 0.5 m). (S37.166661° W73.184481°; 1238 hrs on 03/10/2010)  
� 
Figure 4.14. Raised mussel colonies inhabiting rocky intertidal habitats at Playa Blanca in Lota 
suggest the earthquake uplifted this area by about 0.9 m. A local witness attests to uplift at this site 
saying the shoreline has shifted westward by 15 to 25 m. (S37.058390° W73.142323°; 1701 
hrs on 03/16/2010).
4.2.6 Concepción, Talcahuano, and Dichato 
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The city of Talcahuano, which experienced some of the most spectacular tsunami-related damage, borders
the southern end of the Bahia Talcahuano and is on the southeastern end of the Tumbes Peninsula. Aerial
reconnaissance of the area including Talcahuano, Penco, and Dichato showed an absence of evidence of 
substantial uplift or subsidence. Tsunami runup (and damage) was variable within the Bahia Talcahuano,
with some areas experiencing very large runup and damage (Figures 4.15 and 4.16), but others having 
little damage.  In particular, the overall damage pattern based on the aerial reconnaissance was a result of
south-directed tsunami waves entering the Bahia and developing locally high run-up on north-facing 
shorelines, and locally on east-facing shorelines (see Section 13 below). For example, the east-facing
shore of Isla Quiriquina experienced substantial damage, although low-lying areas along its southern and 
western shores showed very little tsunami effects.  The town of Tome also may have had less tsunami
damage because of its position on the southern side of a shielding peninsular land mass.  Similarly, the
naval port of Talcahuano was strongly affected by tsunami waves but the town of Hualpen and other 
locales on the south- and west-facing parts of the Tumbes Peninsula, outside of the Bahia Talcahuano, 
experienced relatively little tsunami damage apparently as result of shielding by the Tumbes Peninsula 
landmass from south-directed waves.   
Figure 4.15.  Aerial view of village on the eastern shoreline of Punta Tumbes, on western side of 

Bahia Talcahuano; substantial tsunami damage from runup into urbanized valleys. (S36.639522° 

W73.093267°; 1312 hrs on 03/09/2010)  
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Figure 4.16.  Aerial view looking west of town of Dichato, showing tsunami damage focused on 
north-facing shoreline in Bahia Talcahuano. (S36.548022° W72.922225°; 1301 hrs on
03/09/2010)
4.2.7 Dichato to Constitución 
North along the coastline from Dichato, aerial reconnaissance indicates substantial tsunami runup in this 
sparsely populated area (Figures 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19). North of Curanipe, field observations suggest 
substantial uplift.  Near the town of Pelluhue, measurement of the upper growth limit of tidal marine 
organisms (adjusted for hourly tidal changes) suggests the earthquake raised the shoreline by 2.0 ± 0.5 m.
Local fishermen interviewed in Pelluhue corroborate that the earthquake caused the shoreline to move
west and sea level to drop by about 2 m (Figure 4.20).  Similarly, rocky intertidal areas exposed just after 
low tide at Los Pellines appear to be uplifted about 1.6 m based on upper growth limits of mussels and 
algae (also adjusted for local tidal level). Therefore, in the epicentral area surrounding Cobquecura, the 
initial reconnaissance observations suggest that the coastline may have been uplifted about 2 m, but 
nevertheless was inundated locally by substantial tsunami waves.  
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Figure 4.17.  Aerial view looking north at village of Vegas de Itata, showing substantial tsunami
 
damage.  No evidence was observed of substantial uplift of this area. (S36.429192° W72.871433°; 

1255 hrs on 03/09/2010)

Figure 4.18. Aerial view looking southwest of shoreline at latitude of town of Cobquecura, near 
the Feb 27 epicenter.  The tsunami extended up the tributary valley but apparently did not produce
damage of residential structures close to the west-facing shore. (S36.172950° W72.808775°; 1242 
hrs on 03/09/2010)  
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Figure 4.19.  Aerial view looking south at village of Curanipe, including evidence of tsunami
damage (i.e., red truck beneath bridge).  Field observations of wave-cut platforms in this area 
indicate earthquake-related uplift of approximately 2 m. (S35.843297° W72.631214°; 1225 hrs on 
03/09/2010)
� 
Figure 4.20. Intertidal mussels and algae exposed on rocky reefs south of Pelluhue suggest as 
much as 2.0 m of uplift. (S35.821915° W72.602106°, 1706 hrs on 03/17/2010).
4.2.8 Constitución to Bucalemu
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The area from Constitución north to the village of Bucalemu was characterized by substantial tsunami 
inundation and vertical subsidence. Along the sparsely inhabited section of coastline between Putú and 
Iloca, the area of tsunami inundation was the greatest observed during our reconnaissance, with evidence 
of tsunami scour and erosion present across the entire, 1- to 2-km-wide northwest-facing coastal plain 
(Figure 4.21).  Prior to the earthquake, this coastal plain contained a well-developed set of active beach
dunes similar to those along much of the central Chilean coast (e.g., near Arauco or Cañete); however, the 
dune sand was removed by the tsunami here but remains intact in areas of demonstrated uplift (e.g., 
Arauco and Cañete). The extensive area affected by inundation between Putú and Iloca, coupled with 
observations of tectonic subsidence at Iloca and Bucalemu (see below), suggest that this area was affected
by substantial tectonic subsidence.  
Figure 4.21. Ground photograph of area inundated and scoured by tsunami between Rio 
Mataquito and the town of Putú.  Sections of concrete pipe were exposed and highway asphalt was 
eroded by tsunami flow, suggesting very high velocities; the extensive inundation in this area 
suggests possible land subsidence. (S35.115414° W72.203106°; 1500 hrs on 03/08/2010) 
The barrier spit at the mouth of Rio Mataquito was breached by the tsunami and suffered extensive 
erosion and possibly coseismic subsidence. Field observations show that ocean waves now break over the 
remains of the sand barrier. Evidence of ocean flooding along the shoreline during higher tides, formerly 
the bank of the Rio Mataquito, suggests the area may have subsided during the earthquake.  Near the 
village of Iloca, which was strongly affected by tsunami inundation, waves now regularly wash the lower 
part of pasture fields that were not inundated prior to the earthquake (Figure 4.22).  These relationships 
suggest the occurrence of local coastal subsidence during the earthquake.  
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Figure 4.22. Ground photograph looking south from near Iloca, along the present coastline.  Inundated 
grassy area in middle ground suggests substantial subsidence to as far north as the town of Iloca. The 
amount of subsidence at this location was not determined. (S34.982047° W72.181792°; 1354 hrs on 
03/08/2010)
Evidence for coseismic subsidence at Bucalemu includes a dramatic eastward (landward) shift in the
shoreline, extensive erosion of the beach, and a previously protected lagoon that is now inundated by 
ocean waves. Pre-earthquake images of Bucalemu show a 25-m-wide sandy beach that is now submerged
(Figures 4.23 and 4.24). Field observation suggests that the present shoreline is located about 150 m east
of the pre-earthquake shoreline (Figure 4.25). These changes may be related to both tsunami scour and
tectonic subsidence. The field observations favor the interpretation that the beach at Bucalemu was 
lowered about 0.5 m during the earthquake. 
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Figure 4.23. Photograph from Panoramio website. View of Playa Bucalemu in 2007, showing the 
bridge and statue visible in post-earthquake photographs. Photo available at: 
http://www.panoramio.com/photo/3369082. Before the 2010 earthquake, the bridge at Bucalemu
was located ~25 m east of the shoreline. 
� 
Figure 4.24. Erosion by tsunami waves and, possibly, an undetermined amount of coseismic 
subsidence has shifted the shoreline approximately 150 m eastward into an area formerly occupied 
by a shallow lagoon. (S34.641883° W72.042919°, 1012 hrs on 03/15/2010).� 
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Figure 4.25. The shoreline at Bucalemu has shifted over 25 m east as a result of tsunami erosion 
and, possibly, coseismic subsidence. Pre-earthquake imagery shows a 25-m-wide sandy beach 
west of the boat ramp and sea wall that is now under attack by ocean waves. Where waves now 
crash on rocks in this photo taken two weeks after the earthquake, once was a wide sandy beach 
before tsunami flooding.  (S34.639916° W72.044664°, 1142 hrs on 03/15/2010). 
4.2.9 Pichilemu to Navidad 
In general, the post-earthquake reconnaissance suggests an absence of substantial uplift or subsidence in 
the area from Pichilemu north to the town of Navidad, and possibly to Valparaiso.  Ground and aerial 
reconnaissance around Pichilemu provided no conclusive evidence for vertical deformation; the present-
day wave-cut platform at and near Pichilemu is still occupied (Figure 4.26).  Comparison of pre-and post-
earthquake images shows no substantial change in the position of the shoreline (Figure 4.27).  Similarly, 
aerial reconnaissance along the coastline from Pichilemu to Navidad suggests that there are no fresh,
emergent marine platforms along the coastline, and that there are no post-earthquake areas of new 
submergence (Figures 4.28 and 4.29). On the basis of these regional observations, it appears that the 
coastline between the towns of Pichilemu and Navidad (and perhaps as far north as Valparaiso) 
experienced little or no vertical land-level changes within the resolution of reconnaissance-level field 
observation. 
56 
 
 
 
  
 
 
� 
�
Figure 4.26.  Aerial view looking northwest of shoreline in town of Pichilemu, showing bedrock 
underlying low-elevation marine terrace.  The town of Pichilemu sustained local tsunami damage 
at elevations lower than this marine terrace or areas not protected by beach dunes. (S34.389619° 
W72.016661°; 1552 hrs on 03/12/2010)  
� 
� 
� 
Figure 4.27. (A) Pre-earthquake satellite image of Pichilemu. (B) The same site after the February 
27, 2010 earthquake shows no discernible evidence of changes in the shoreline that could be 
attributed to tectonic vertical land-level change. 
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Figure 4.28. Aerial view looking southeast at shoreline on remote coastline between Pichilemu
and Navidad, showing low-elevation marine terrace on far right, and thick marine deposits 
underlying high marine terrace in background.  No evidence of earthquake-related uplift or 
subsidence was observed in this area. (S34.233969° W71.992883°; 1457 hrs on 03/12/2010) 
Figure 4.29. Aerial view looking east at shoreline at mouth of Rio Rapel near town of Navidad, 
showing low-elevation bedrock marine terrace in center, and thick marine deposits underlying 
high marine terrace.  No evidence of earthquake-related uplift or subsidence was observed in this 
area. (S34.898536° W71.844794°; 1511 hrs on 03/12/2010) 
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4.2.10 Summary of Tectonic Deformation 
The February 27 earthquake produced uplift and subsidence along the central Chile coastline and this 
pattern of deformation may have influenced the effects of tsunami on coastal communities.  The Arauco
Peninsula and Isla Santa María experienced substantial uplift, and may have been tilted eastward.  The 
coastline from about Arauco north to about the latitude of the epicenter (near Cobquecura), or perhaps as
far north as Curanipe, appears also to have experienced uplift.  The apparently lesser amount of coastal 
uplift in this area may be related to distance eastward from the fault tip in the offshore trench, rather than 
north-south variations in deformation.  Field geologic evidence suggests that the area north of Curanipe,
from at least the town of Constitucion north to the village of Bucalemu may have experienced net 
subsidence during the earthquake. The area north of Pichilemu to Navidad appears to have experienced
little or no change in elevation. Overall, the area characterized by tectonic subsidence (e.g., between 
Constitución and Bucalemu) experienced substantial tsunami damage.  Areas characterized by substantial 
uplift (i.e., more than about 2 m) experienced comparatively lesser amounts of tsunami damage, with run-
up commonly taking advantage of existing river channels rather than broad inundation of coastal 
lowlands. Substantial tsunami damage in areas of lesser coastal uplift (e.g., Dichato and Talcahuano) may 
be related to factors other than tectonic deformation (e.g., tsunami wave generation or dynamics).   
4.3 Investigation of Possible Surface Fault Rupture from M6.9 Aftershock of March 11 
On March 11 at 11:39 am (local time), a large aftershock beneath the Coast Ranges, in the area between
the towns of Pichilemu and Litueche.  The USGS assigned a magnitude M6.9 to this rupture, which has 
an epicenter is approximately 120 km northeast of the mainshock.  The depth of the event is given by the
USGS at 11 km, although this depth was set by the location program and has not been calculated
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tsa6/).   
Focal mechanism solutions provided on the USGS website 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tsa6/#scitech) indicate normal-fault 
displacement along moderately dipping, northeast- or northwest-striking fault planes.  These parameters 
raise the possibility that the earthquake could be associated surface-fault rupture on a relatively shallow 
crustal fault. The GEER team completed a limited field reconnaissance to address this possibility.
At the time of the aftershock, several members of the GEER team were on a damaged bridge on Ruta 5
south of Chillan (about 275 km south of the epicenter). The shock was not strong or long-lasting, and the 
team resumed assessment of the bridge damage. Upon returning to the vehicle, we logged onto the USGS 
website and considered the possibility that this was a shallow crustal event, and developed a plan to 
address the possibility of surface rupture. In Santiago that night, the team reviewed Google Earth and 
noticed many geomorphic features that could be related to a shallow crustal fault reaching the ground 
surface, including several northwest-trending escarpments and linear features in the epicentral area, and a 
prominent escarpment near Estero Topocalma.  
The following morning (March 12), the team split into two sorties to assess possible surface rupture, with 
one group driving immediately to Pichilemu to make field observations along northwest-trending 
geomorphic features between Pichilemu and Litueche. A second team consisting arranged for a high-wing 
aerial reconnaissance flight, although cloudy weather on the coast that morning precluded an immediate 
departure from Santiago. This second team then left Santiago by car and followed the first team to the 
epicentral region and the town of Pichilemu, with the intent of flying from the Pichilemu “airstrip” when
the weather was more favorable for aerial reconnaissance. The first team arrived in Pichilemu at about 
11:00 am and conducted a field reconnaissance of the area including some of the northwest-trending
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geomorphic features. Although this team observed several cracks along and across roadways and adjacent
fields, none was judged consistent with normal faulting as suggested by the focal mechanism solution 
published on the USGS website. 
The second team approached the epicentral area from the north, driving from Embalse Rapel (Rapel Dam) 
through the town of Litueche. No ground cracks were encountered along the asphalt highway from 
Embalse Rapel to Litueche, and then to Pichilemu. The second team arrived in Pichilemu at about 2 pm
and immediately boarded a high-wing Cessna 172 at the Pichilemu airstrip for a recon of the epicentral
area and possible northwest-trending lineaments.  The flight circled the area directly northwest of
Pichilemu, which was interpreted to be a possible up-dip projection of a northeast-dipping normal fault 
plane from the epicentral area; no recent potentially fault-related features were observed in barren and 
cropped fields on the valley floors, as well as on high, grass-covered emergent marine terraces. The flight 
continued north along the coastline from Pichilemu to Navidad to assess sea cliff exposures and the 
along-strike projections of possible northwest-trending faults; the epicentral area was not accessible by
airplane at that time because of low cloud cover and the irregular topography. No recent potentially fault-
related features were observed along the coastal bluffs, or across a well-developed series of emergent 
marine terraces. Upon reaching the Rio Rapel near Navidad, the flight turned back southeastward in an
attempt to pass over the epicentral area from the north. Again, low cloud cover precluded traversing the
actual epicentral location; although the up-dip projection of a possible southwest-dipping normal fault 
plane was traversed in the hills between Navidad and Litueche. Again, no evidence of recent potentially
fault-related features was observed in the alluviated valleys or on the wooded hillslopes. The recon also
included a traverse along the Estero Topocalma near the village of Topocalma (about 32 km north of 
Pichilemu), focusing on viewing a prominent west-facing escarpment on the northern side of the estero. 
No evidence of surface rupture was observed on stabilized sand dunes and alluvial fans flanking this 
escarpment. The flight returned to the coastline for a second review of the coastal bluffs and emergent
marine terrace sequence from Estero Topocalma south to Pichilemu, again finding no evidence of surface 
rupture from the previous day’s earthquake. 
Coupled with the field observations made by the field team near Pichilemu, no evidence of recent surface 
rupture was observed in the area between Pichilemu, Navidad, and Litueche.  We acknowledge that 
neither the flight nor the ground reconnaissance traversed the actual epicentral area, which is remote and 
difficult to access. However, the ground and aerial traverses criss-crossed the area that would include 
reasonable up-dip projections of either northeast-dipping or southwest-dipping faults, as well as along-
strike projections of such faults to both the northwest and the southeast. Lighting conditions during the
aerial overflight were not ideal, and we did not canvass the entire epicentral area, but the amount of effort 
led to the conclusion that observations were adequate to indicate an absence of surface rupture related to 
the March 11 aftershock.  In conclusion, this reconnaissance strongly suggests that there was no 
substantial surface rupture associated with the M6.9 aftershock. 
4.4 Summary and Recommendations 
In summary, an important aspect of this earthquake is the pattern of coastal uplift and subsidence, which
varied from north to south.  At the southern end of the rupture zone, the Arauco Peninsula experienced 
uplift and gentle eastward tilting, as exemplified by approximately 2 m of coastal uplift on Isla Santa 
Maria and at the town of Lebu.  The uplift affected harbor facilities, produced an emergent marine 
platform, and exposed the intertidal zone.  In the central part of the rupture zone, coastal subsidence 
occurred over a distance of about 50 km between the towns of Constitucion and Bucalemu, resulting in
drowned tidal flats and local areas of significant tsunami scour erosion.  The coastline adjacent to the 
northern part of the rupture, from about the town of Pichilemu to Valparaiso, appears to have experienced 
little or no uplift/subsidence. Importantly, the areas of coastal subsidence were exposed to the greatest 
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tsunami runup and scour, and experienced significant damage from tsunami waves, while the areas of 
substantial uplift, in general, experienced relatively little damage from tsunami waves.  In some cases
(i.e., the towns of Arauco and Pichilemu), continuous beach dunes provided sufficient protection from the 
incoming tsunami wave.  In others (i.e., the well-publicized damage in Concepcion and Dichato), damage 
was related to both strong ground motions and tsunami runup.  These cities experienced only slight
coseismic (but pre-tsunami) uplift, but might have been inundated to a greater degree if the coastline had
instead subsided. 
4.5 References 
Atwater, B. F., Musumi-Rokkaku, S., Satake, K., Tsuji, Y., Ueda, K. & Yamaguchi, D. K. 2005. The 
Orphan Tsunami of 1700. Japanese clues to a parent earthquake in North America: United States 
Geological Survey and University of Washington Press, 133 pp., ISBN 0 295 98535 6. 
Barrientos,�S.,�1987,�Is�the�Pichilemu�Talcahuano�(Chile)�a�seismic�gap?�Seismological�Research�Letters,� 
61,�43–�48.
Cisternas, M., et al.,2005, Predecessors of the giant 1960 Chile earthquake, Nature, 437, 404– 407, 
doi:10.1038/nature03943.
Darwin, C.,1851, Geological Observations of South America, Smith and Elder, London, 279 pp.
Lomnitz, C., 2004, Major earthquakes of Chile: A historical survey, 1535-1960: Seis. Res. Let.; 75 (3); p. 
368-378; DOI: 10.1785/gssrl.75.3.368 
Melnick, D., B. Bookhagen, M. R. Strecker, and H. P. Echtler, 2009, Segmentation of megathrust rupture 
zones from fore-arc deformation patterns over hundreds to millions of years, Arauco peninsula, Chile, 
J. Geophys. Res., 114, B01407, doi:10.1029/2008JB005788.
Nelson, R., and W. Manley, 1992, Holocene coseismic and aseismic uplift of the Isla Mocha, south-
central Chile, Quat. Int., 15–16, 61–76, doi:10.1016/1040-6182(92)90036-2.
Plafker, G., and J. C. Savage, 1970, Mechanism of the Chilean earthquake of May 21 and 22, 1960, Geol. 
Soc. Am. Bull., 81, 1001 – 1030, doi:10.1130/0016-7606(1970)81[1001:MOTCEO]2.0.CO;2. 
Ruegg, J.C., et al., 2009, Interseismic strain accumulation measured by GPS in the seismic gap between
Constitución and Concepción in Chile, Physics of the Earth and Planetary Interiors, 175, 78-85. 
Tassara, A. 2010, Preliminary estimates of coastal uplift at the southern limit of the Mw 8.8 Maule 
earthquake, unpublished report. 
61 
  
 
5.0 SITE EFFECTS AND DAMAGE PATTERNS  
Site effects were investigated with respect to the structural damage variability within regions 
characterized by non-uniform soil conditions and/or subsurface geology. The towns of Santiago, 
Vina del Mar and Talca observations are summarized below.
5.1 The City of Santiago 
The city of Santiago de Chile is located in the so-called Central Depression, a basin surrounded 
by the Main and Coastal ranges of the Andes (western 70 and southern 33). This basin spans 80 
km long and 30 km wide, and it is mainly elongated in the N-S direction, and is characterized by 
three main alluvial cones that drain the Andean Cordillera: cones of Colina, Mapocho and Maipo. 
Due to the geomorphological setting, the basin is filled with alluvial sediments (Valenzuela 
1978), primarily composed by pebbles, gravels, clays and volcanic ashes (Morales-Jerez, 2002). 
The pebbles and gravels are mainly located in the eastern and southern part of the basin. Clayey 
material is mostly present in the north; whereas a transition zone is found in the centre of the 
valley. In the Pudahuel district, a 40-m-thick layer of ashes (Pudahuel ignimbrite, also known as 
pumices) is known to seat at the top of the sedimentary column. The stiff pumice probably comes 
from a major eruption of the Maipo volcano, located at around 120 km to the southeast, at the 
head of the Maipo valley. According to Bravo (1992) and Gueguen (1994), the mechanical 
properties of soil deposits in the Santiago basin are listed in Table 5.1. 
� 
Figure 5.1. Satellite image and geology map of the Santiago basin 
The city was shown to be prone to site effects during the Valparaiso earthquake in 1985 (Monge 
1986), when the seismic intensities (MSK) derived from observed damage to one-storey adobe 
and one storey un-reinforced masonry houses were reported locally much higher (up to IX) than 
expected (VI) according to regional intensity attenuation relations (Astroza & Monge 1987; 
Astroza et al. 1993). The highest intensities were concentrated in areas with poor soils conditions, 
in the fine-grained alluvial deposit and in the ashes deposits (Astroza & Monge 1991). Despite 
this first-order correlation between soil conditions and damage, however, some parts of the most 
damaged areas are not built on soft sediments, and some soft sediment areas did not show strong 
damage during the 1985 earthquake (Fernandez Mariscal 2003); these effects were attributed to 
the geometry of the basin and the geology of deep sediments.  
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 Table 5.1 Mechanical properties (P- andS-waves velocity, density) at various depths of the three 
main formations observed in the basin of Santiago (gravels, clays and ashes; after Bravo 
1992; Gueguen 1994). Modified from Bonnefy et al (2008) 
Gravels 

Clays 

Ashes 

 Depth [m] Vs [m/sec] Density [g/cm3] 
0-20 480-720 2-2.3 
200 1300 2.1 
0-20 120-350 1.2-1.8 
50 550 2.1 
0-20 180-450 1.15-1.7 
5.2 Americo Vespucio Norte Ring Road 
During the reconnaissance, four bridge sites were inspected along the road Americo Vespucio 
Norte, the Northern section of Santiago’s ring road. Their locations are depicted in Figure 5.2. 
The damage intensity was highly variable, with two bridges fully collapsed (DA008a, DA009) 
and two showing minor structural damage such as shear key cracking (DA008, RL001). 
Figure 5.2. Four Americo Vespucio Ring Road bridges visited during the reconnaissance.
Investigating potential correlation between the bridge damage patterns and the underlying soil 
conditions, the locations of the four inspected bridges are depicted on a geology map of the 
Santiago Metropolitan Area in Figure 5.3. The soil conditions at the four bridge sites appear to be 
similar, characterized as Finos del Noroeste which are silts and clays of high plasticity 
horizontally stratified as thin interchangeable layers. The site conditions at the locations of the 
four bridge sites are characteristic of Class C/D sites according to the NEHRP soil classification 
system. 
Figure 5.4 depicts the locations of the bridge sites on the geological map by Iriarte-Diaz (2003), 
along with typical N-S cross section of the valley geology. The depth to bedrock-basement at the 
bridge sites as approximately interpreted from the cross-section does not show clear correlation 
with the damage states.  
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Figure 5.3. Location of the four bridge sites on the geology map of Santiago Metropolitan Area (Dr. 
Christian Ledezma, personal communication; approximate map overlay on Google Earth)
 
 
Figure 5.4. Location of the four bridge sites on the map of geological cross-sections in the North-Western 
part of Santiago de Chile; and Geological cross-section along profile 6NS (Iriarte-Diaz, 2003). 
Site DA008 (minor damage) is located on clay/silty clay, DA008a (collapsed) on clay/silty sand, 
and sites RL001 (minor damage) and DA009 (damaged) on sandy silt or silt. 
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 Site DA008 (S33.3660°S W70.6891°) – Paso San Martin 
The bridge suffered repairable structural damage, characterized by shear key failure as shown in 
Figures 5.5a and 5.5b below. Longitudinal and transverse deck movement was also documented, 
leading to joint damage between the deck segments (Figure 5.5c). The two pile-diameter-deep 
excavation shown in Figure 5.5d, revealed no foundation failure. According to the local geology 
map, the soil profile at the site is clay and silty clay. 
����� ����� 
���� ����� 
Figure 5.5. Paso San Martin (S33.3660° W70.6891°, 1122 hrs on 03/14/2010). Shear key failure and 
longitudinal, transverse deck displacement. 
Site DA008a (S33.3759° W70.7476°) – Paso Superior Lo Echevers 
The bridge suffered collapse of the east direction deck of the highway (see Figure 5.6). According 
to the local geology map, the soil profile at the site is clayey/silty sand.  
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Figure 5.6. Paso Superior Lo Echevers (S33.3759° W70.7476°). Collapse of the eastbound deck of the 
Americo Vespucio Norte ring road (Source: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/consulta_recorridos/). 
Site RL001 (S33.3865° W70.7601°) – Paso Lo Boza 
The bridge suffered minor damage,  primarily shear key failure and subsequent displacement of 
the deck in the transverse direction (see Figure 5.7). According to the local geology map, the soil 
profile at the site is sandy silt. 
� 
Figure 5.7. Paso Lo Boza (S33.3865° W70.7601°). Minor structural damage of shear keys (Source: Dr. 
Roberto Leon, personal communication). 
Site DA009 (S33.3945° W70.7700°)– Paso Miraflores 
The bridge suffered collapse of the east direction deck of the highway (see Figure 5.8). According 
to the local geology map, the soil profile at the site is sandy silt. 
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 Figure 5.8. Paso Miraflores (S33.3945° W70.7700°). Deck collapse detail (Source: Dr. Roberto Leon, 
personal communication). 
5.3 Ciudad Empresiarial 
Ciudad Empresarial is located NE of Santiago downtown. 155 acres were used for the 
development of a Business Park in a concentric urban layout that hosts multiple corporate 
headquarters. The soil profile comprises primarily eroded slope material with a shallow water 
table; the geologic map classification of the site conditions is Finos del Noroeste (Qfno), 
horizontally stratified thin interchangeable layers of silts and clays of high plasticity. The park 
comprises highrise buildings that suffered extensive damage during the earthquake. Macroseismic 
observations at the site were associated with possible site effects. Figure 5.9 shows an aerial view
of the business part, Figure 5.10 shows the site conditions prevailing at the site, and Figures 5.11­
5.16 depict the sites visited during the reconnaissance.  
Figure 5.9. Aerial view of Ciudad Empresiarial, depicting the structures that were inspected during 
reconnaissance. 
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Figure 5.10. Geologic map of Santiago, zoom in Ciudad Empresiarial business park. The geologic material 
at the site is Finos del Noroeste (Qfno), horizontally stratified thin interchangeable layers of 
silts and clays of high plasticity. 
�  �����  
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Figure 5.11 (continued) 
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Figure 5.11. Site DA003 (S33.387985° W70.618815°, 1015 hrs on 03/14/2010) 6-story commercial 
building. Damage of non-structural elements (glass windows, red brick façade) (Figures 11a,b) 
and emergency staircase (Figures 11c,d). Evidence of ground deformation (Figure 11e).
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Figure 5.12. Site DA004 (S33.387652° W70.617122°, 1047 hrs on 03/14/2010) Identical 7-story buildings 
connected; damage was observed in only one of the two. 
� 
Figure 5.13. Site DA005 (S33.387652° W70.617123°, 1053 hrs on 03/14/2010) Overtopped art. 
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Figure 5.14. Site DA005 (S33.387652° W70.617123°, 1054 hrs on 03/14/2010) 12-story building with 
severe structural damage. 
� � 
Figure 5.15. Site DA006 (S33.389586° W70.618349°, 1056 hrs on 03/14/2010) 5-story building, structural 
damage. 
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Figure 5.16. Site DA007 (S33.391163° W70.619502°, 1057 hrs on 03/14/2010) Minor external damage – 
non-structural. Overtopped art. 
Overall, the business park was severely damaged, with 7 buildings that failed and were closed to 
the public. No total collapse was documented and no casualties were reported at the site, while 
the only evidence of soil deformation is shown in Figure 11e. The damaged structures ranged 
from a 5- to 12-stories, which to first approximation corresponds to 0.5-1.2 sec resonant periods 
(0.8-2 Hz).   
Bonnefoy et al (2008) conducted extensive ambient vibration measurements in the basin of 
Santiago de Chile (Chile), evaluating the reliability of the horizontal-to-vertical amplitude spectra 
ratio method (H/V) as a tool to provide qualitative and quantitative information of site conditions 
in complex geological media. Results from this study showing the spatial distribution of the H/V 
peaks according to their frequencies are depicted in Figure 5.17: (red) 0.3–0.5, (blue) 0.51–1.2, 
(yellow) 1.21–5 and (green) 5.1–10 Hz. Circles display frequencies for clear peaked H/V curves, 
whereas squares depict frequencies for peaks of low amplitude. The surface geology is shown in 
background, while the green circle corresponds to the location of Ciudad Empresiarial. As can be 
readily seen, the resonant frequencies at the site of the business park as identified by means of 
H/V ratios range from 0.5-5Hz, consistent with the structural resonant periods of the damaged 
structures. This is an indication that site effects may have contributed to the concentrated 
structural damage at the site. 
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Figure 5.17. Spatial distribution of H/V peaks from ambient noise measurements in NE Santiago, denoted 
according to their frequencies: (red) 0.3–0.5, (blue) 0.51–1.2, (yellow) 1.21–5 and (green) 5.1– 
10 Hz (after Bonnefoy et al, 2008). Green circle corresponds to Ciudad Empresiarial. 
5.4 Viña del Mar 
The municipality of Viña del Mar is located in central Chile (33°02' S, 71°34' W), adjacent to the 
city of Valparaiso and 120 km (75 mi) northwest of Santiago. The topography of Vina del Mar is 
typical of a receding coastline whose most notable features are marine terraces and sedimentary 
deposits (Figure 5.18). Viña del Mar is founded on the marine-alluvial deposits at the mouth of 
the Marga-Marga River, and the site conditions can be divided into five main categories: (i) rock; 
(ii) weathered rock; (iii) cemented sand and gravel; (iv) uncemented sand and gravel; and (v) 
artificial fill. Weathered rock covers approximately 80% of the Vina del Mar region (Moehle et 
al, 1986), and the water table is located approximately 4m below the ground surface. 
Viña del Mar was severely damaged during the 1985 Valparaiso earthquake; extensive study on 
the structural damage observations can be found in Moehle et al (1986). Strong motion recordings 
were obtained at the time both in Vina del Mar and the adjacent town of Valparaiso. Celebi 
(1991) studied the spectral ratios of the recorded motions and showed amplification by as much 
as a factor of 12 in the North-South direction within the frequency band 0.5-2 Hz (Figure 5.19). 
This is consistent to a first approximation with the resonant frequencies of 5-20 story structures, 
typical of the structures in the town of Viña del Mar that were severely damaged. 
Immediately following the 1985 Earthquake, a microzonation study was conducted by the 
municipality of Viña del Mar, leading to the development of maps that identified the location of 
all existing buildings during the 1985 event, the damage distribution, and the location of 
demolished structures. Results from this study showed that, if an earthquake causes an intensity I 
in the surrounding marine terraces, the intensity is likely to be I+1 and I+2 on the slopes leading 
down to the city and I+3 in the alluvial, fluvial, and colluvial deposits along the Marga-Marga 
River (Figure 5.20). 
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Indeed, the same damage pattern was observed during reconnaissance of the 2010 event. Five 
severely damaged buildings were inspected, all located in the vicinity of the Marga-Marga river 
mouth and thus founded on soft soil conditions. Note that during the microzonation study 
following the 1985 Earthquake, the Municipality of Viña del Mar mapped the location of 
buildings with 5 or more stories (Figure 5.21). The buildings inspected during reconnaissance 
after the 2010 Earthquake are also shown on this map (also depicted on the aerial view of Google 
Earth), and are clearly located in the immediate vicinity of the river. Figures 5.22-5.26 depict the 
structural damage observations of the reconnaissance team. 
Figure 5.18. Geology of the Viña del Mar/Valparaiso region. Site conditions are described as 
weathered rock. 
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Figure 5.19. Acceleration seismograms of 3 March 1985 Central Chile earthquake (MS = 7.8) recorded at 
the strong-motion stations VINA (Viña del Mar) and VAL (UTFSM-Valparaiso) and their 
corresponding spectral ratios (after Celebi, 2003). 
� 
Figure 5.20. Anticipated Modified Mercalli Intensity in the town of Viña Del Mar (Moehle et al, 1986). 
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Figure 5.21. Buildings inspected during reconnaissance in Viña del Mar. Bottom figure depicts the location 
of buildings of 5-stories or higher, as mapped during microzonation study that followed the 
1985 Valparaiso Earthquake (from Moehle et al, 1986). 
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Figure 5.22 Site DA017 (S 33.018904° W 71.559206°, 1714 hrs on 03/14/2010) Damaged 9-story building. 
�� � 
Figure 5.23. (continued) 
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Figure 5.23. Site DA018 (S 33.017386° W 71.557107°, 18:48 hrs on 03/14/2010) Damaged 6-story 
building. Evidence of ground settlement. 
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Figure 5.24. (continued) 
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Figure 5.24. Site DA019 (S33.016045° W 71.551990°, 1916 hrs on 03/14/2010). Damaged 10-story 
building. Lack of confinement beam-column joints and low quality concrete. 
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Figure 5.25. Site DA020 (S 33.018678° W 71.556288°, 1953 hrs on 03/14/2010). Diagonal cracks of 
columns in all the floors of 19-story building�� 
 
Figure 5.26. (continued) 
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Figure 5.26. Site DA027 (S 33.020074° W 71.544055°, 1945 hrs on 03/15/2010).  Heavily damaged 20­
story building, lack of confinement at beam-column joints. 
5.5 The city of Talca 
The city of Talca, with a population of 200,000 people, is approximately 250 km south of 
Santiago, 60 km northwest of the epicenter of the 2010 Earthquake. The typical construction type 
is adobe and unreinforced masonry, which is primarily used for older buildings with 2-4 stories 
(dating back to before the 1960s-70s). Modern buildings that were designed according to current 
codes suffered minor, repairable damage, while a large number of adobe and unreinforced 
masonry constructions suffered significant damage, including disintegration of walls and 
subsequent collapse. 
Figure 5.27. (continued) 
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Figure 5.27. Aerial Google earth view and regional geology for the city of Talca.
The aerial view and geology of downtown Talca are shown in Figure 5.27. Alluvial and marine 
deposits prevail in the region. Structures with major damage or collapsed structures were 
primarily located near and around the downtown region while the modern (including the tallest, 
20-story residential) buildings in the same region suffered minor damage 
(http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/Reconnaissance/Chile227-10/City_Talca/default.asp). Four 
overpasses were inspected along the Maule river with no or minor structural damage. The uneven 
distribution of damaged adobe structures in the area is potentially indicative of site effects. Figure
5.28 depicts a few pictures from damaged structures located within a few building blocks from 
the river, and Figure 5.29 depicts modern structures within the same distance from the river with 
minor damage. 
Figure 5.28. Adobe and unreinforced concrete damage concentrated adjacent to the Maule river across 
Talca (pictures shot from passenger seat while driving). 
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Figure 5.29. (continued) 
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Figure 5.29. Modern (engineered) structures adjacent to the river that showed no or minor damage (S 
35.437897° W 71.660151°, 1249 hrs on 03/18/2010). 
5.6 The City of Concepción 
The city of Concepción is built on Tertiary sediments in a valley created by a graben, with 
metamorphic and granitic formations to the north, east, south, and beneath these Tertiary 
sediments. A typical geological NW-SE cross section is shown in Figure 5.30, where the 
sedimentary valley is depicted along with the 3 major faults that run through the area.  
Concepción was severely hit by the earthquake of February 27, 2010, and the extensive damage 
in the downtown area has been associated with site and/or basin effects. In fact, the damage 
pattern observed during the 2010 event was very similar to the distribution during the 1960 
earthquake, for the most part concentrated in the downtown; in both events, the bridges across the 
Bio-Bio river collapsed. Focusing on the 2010 event, Concepción had seven distinct zones in 
which buildings and/or bridges collapsed catastrophically.  Six of these seven zones are 
longitudinal in shape and shown in Figure 5.31. The damage is primarily correlated with the 
location of La Pólvora Fault (see Figure 5.32), which defines the NW edge of the basin; the rest 
of the damage in Concepción is in the Tertiary sediments between the La Pólvora Fault on the 
north, the Chacabuco Fault to the south and the Lo Pequén Fault to the east.  
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Figure 5.30. Geologic cross-section of Concepción, depicting a sedimentary valley and the major faults 
running through the region. 
� 
Figure 5.31. Damaged sections in downtown Concepción; 6 out of 7 are parallel to La Polvora fault. 
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Figure 5.32. Inspected buildings and damage level in downtown Concepción, superimposed on geology 
map of the region. 
Two adjacent 20-story structures were inspected during reconnaissance close to the Llacolen 
bridge in downtown Concepción (see location in Figure 5.32), one fully collapsed during the 
2010 event and the other suffered minor damage and is currently being repaired. The collapsed 
building was designed using Site Type II (Chilean design code) and the one that did not collapse 
using Site Type III, which implies different design spectra. While there is no evidence that the 
soil conditions are indeed different at the locations of the two structures (distance between 
approximately 20m), the difference in design spectra likely played an important role in the failure 
of the building. The locations of the two buildings are depicted in Figure 5.33 below.  
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Figure 5.33. Locations of two adjacent buildings designed with using different site conditions in 
Conception (map and aerial view). 
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Figure 5.34. Collapsed structure (S 36.828067° W73.061639°, 1900 hrs on 03/16/2010) designed using Soil 
Type II conditions. 
 
Figure 5.35. 20-story structure adjacent to collapsed (S 36.828083° W 73.060600°, 1910 hrs on 
03/16/2010) designed using Soil Type III conditions, and suffering only minor damage. 
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6.0 LIQUEFACTION AND LATERAL SPREADING 

6.1 Overview 
This section of the report summarizes some of the observations of the GEER team with respect to seismic 
soil liquefaction and lateral spreading deformations.  Other observations are summarized throughout the 
report, particularly where the effects of liquefaction and/or lateral spreading impacted various 
infrastructure systems. The information was collected from aerial and ground reconnaissance conducted
by various members of the team starting on 3/6/2010.  The region affected by the M8.8 event was on the 
order of 600 km long and 150 km wide.  This covers a large geographic area consisting of coastal areas 
adjacent to inland river valleys that flow from the Andes to the coast in a roughly east-west direction.
The Pan American highway runs north-south along the central valley agricultural region that relies on the 
river systems for water.  A coastal range of low mountains separates the central valley from the ocean but 
the river systems are geologically older than the mountain building and have incised through the uplift to 
continue relatively unimpeded to the coast in a westerly direction.  This presence of a large number of 
rivers contributed to the widespread observations of liquefaction of loose saturated river sediments.
Liquefaction and subsequent deformations primarily had an engineering impact on the transportation 
corridors, causing consistent damage to highways and bridges crossing the river systems.   
6.2 Occurrence of Liquefaction 
Liquefaction herein is defined as significant strength loss in loose saturated granular soils due to seismic 
induced excess pore pressures. The contractive behavior of loose granular soils leads to the generation of
excess pore pressures when these saturated soils are sheared.  The shearing is caused by seismic ground 
motions strong enough to strain the soil in a plastic manner.  As strength is reduced, deformations can 
occur due to a driving static shear stress such as sloping ground, embankment loads, and building loads 
amongst others.  These deformations are often referred to as lateral spreading deformations and are 
primarily co-seismic.  As the strong ground motions causing the excess pore pressures cease, the excess 
pore pressures will dissipate and strength will be regained thereby limiting deformations.  The static 
strength will again exceed the static stress. This is opposed to flow failures where even after strong 
ground shaking ceases the static strength remains less than the static stress and deformations continue 
until a balance is achieved.  Excess pore pressures can be seismically generated in fined grained soils as 
well but are generally limited and unless the fine grained soil is sensitive (large peak to residual strength) 
then the strength loss and deformations are generally much smaller than in loose granular soils
undergoing liquefaction.  
Liquefaction was observed to have occurred over a large area of Chile affected by the earthquake.  The 
widespread presence of river sediments and the long duration of the event most likely contributed to the
large number of observations of liquefaction.  Based on strong motion records processed to date, ground
shaking in the Santiago area lasted for upwards of 1.5 minutes (Figure 6.1).  Anecdotal reports of even 
longer durations were heard for areas closer to the epicenter.  Long duration events subject loose saturated 
granular soils to a significant number of strain cycles/strain reversals and subsequent generation of excess
pore pressure. Liquefaction was observed in areas as far north as Vina Del Mar and Valparaiso, and as 
far south as Arauco and Lebu. The eastern observations are bounded by the area just east of the Pan
American highway.  Figure 6.2 shows estimated extents of liquefaction and the relative spatial density. 
Because of the widespread nature of liquefaction from this event the spatial density is shown as zones of
low, medium, and high occurrence.  In areas of high spatial density soils that were susceptible to 
liquefaction were observed to have liquefied. In areas of low spatial density there was intermittent 
liquefaction of susceptible soils. The liquefaction observations may indicate that the central region east of 
the epicenter experienced less intense ground shaking, which agrees with the lesser amount of damage to 
adobe structures in this region. 
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Figure 6.1.  Typical ground motion from the Santiago area showing the long duration which can produce a large 

number of strain cycles in liquefiable sediments.
 
The particle size and relative density of granular soils played an important role in the occurrence of 
liquefaction in this event. As the rivers travel from east to west the slope and therefore the energy for 
transporting particles decreases.  The rivers begin on the steep flanks of the Andes and travel downstream
to the coast with lessening gradient.  The soils in the Santiago are primarily composed of gravels because 
of the proximity to the Andes and the high transport force of the rivers systems there.  As the rivers
approach the coast downstream “fining” or a decrease in the median particle size is observed as a function 
of the decreasing sediment transport capacity.  Excess pore pressures that result in strength loss and
deformations can be sustained much more readily in finer granular material than coarser granular material
because the permeability of the material with respect to the rate of loading; excess pore pressures will
dissipate more slowly in a fine sand than a coarse gravel.  
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Figure 6.2.  Spatial distribution of observed liquefaction.  Because of the widespread nature of liquefaction it is 
shown here in terms of zones of low, median, and high spatial density.  Observations include surface evidence of 
liquefied ejecta and lateral spreading. 
A higher energy depositional environment will also result in denser material, material less susceptible to 
contractive behavior that produces excess pore pressures.  Gravels are large particles that require a large 
amount of energy to deposit.  This high energy tends to deposit the gravels in a dense state, less 
susceptible to the contractive behavior needed to generate excess pore pressures.  Dune and beach sands 
are the same in this respect. Dune and beach sands were subjected to the same strong ground shaking as 
the river sands in this event but showed almost no evidence of liquefaction.  The higher energy 
environment that deposits dune and beach sands results in a denser state, less susceptible to contractive 
behavior that can lead to excess pore pressure generation when subjected to cyclic strains.
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6.3 Aerial and Ground Observations 
During aerial reconnaissance, ground surface manifestation of liquefaction was observed in the following 
watersheds from north to south; Rio Maipo, Rio Rapel, Estero Nilahue, Lago Vichuquen, Rio Mataquito,
Rio Maule, Rio Itata, Rio Bio Bio, Rio Carampangue, and others.  Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show what these 
manifestations look like from altitudes of 1000-2000 m.  Lower altitude flyovers show closer detail of 
these features in Figures 6.5 with ejecta coming from the ground fissures. Lateral deformations were
widely observed along the edges of river banks.  Disassembled blocks that translate and rotate, often 
called lateral spreading, are the most common evidence of subsurface layers that experienced strength 
loss via liquefaction. When observed on the ground the size and scale of these lateral spreading features 
can be readily seen (Figures 6.6).  Similar lateral spreading features were found in many other locations,
one of which is discussed in the next section. 
Figure 6.3.  Lateral spreading feature observed along Rio Maipo towards the northern extents of damage (S33.9913o 

W71.5316 o, 12:30, 3/6/2010). 
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Figure 6.4.  Liquefaction ejected and lateral spreading features observed along Carampangue River towards the 
southern extents of damage (~S37.2780o , ~W73.2541 o, 17:00, 3/6/2010). 
Figure 6.5.  Lower elevation view of fissures and liquefaction ejecta.  This was taken along the lower Rio Bio Bio 
near Concepcion (~S36.8239o , ~W73.0944 o, 15:00, 3/6/2010).  The dark surface sediment is from the Rio Laja that 
intersects the Bio Bio approximately 20-30 km upstream from this point. The light ejected sediment is supplied by 
the main stem of the Rio Bio Bio upstream of the Rio Laja. 
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Figure 6.6.  Lateral spreading blocks translated and rotated towards the river.  This picture shows Keith Kelson 
standing on the north bank of the Mataquito River downstream of the coastal highway bridge (S3505078 o, 
W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/8/2010). 
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Section 6.4 Liquefaction and Lateral Spread in Central Conception 
A large liquefaction-induced lateral spread was observed along the southwestern edge of the shoreline of 
the Tres Pascuales lagoon in Concepcion, just south of Universidad San Sebastian (S36.8152°, 
W73.0459°). The spread extended approximately 85 m west of the lagoon and along shore for about 100 
m. Evidence of liquefaction boils was noted within the undeveloped land area (Figure 6.7). The lateral 
spreading occurred in a small park along the lake shown in Figure 6.8a, and continued through an open 
space to the south of the park (Figure 6.8b) into an area further south that was undergoing construction 
(Figure 6.8c). The lateral spread continued southward where the extension of the ground pulled apart 
modest homes in a poor neighborhood (Figure 6.8d). Severe separation and distortion of fences between
properties within the spread zone were observed, and both underground and above ground structures were 
observed to be impacted. It was believed that an underground tank uplifted at the affected gas station
(S36.8156°, W73.0464°) at the west end of the extent of ground failure as shown in Figure 6.9. 
Figure 6.7. Liquefaction boils in undeveloped land area along west shore of Tres Pasquales lagoon in Concepcion 

(S36.8155°, W73.0460°; 3/14/2010) 
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Figure 6.8. Effects of the lateral spread in Concepcion at the southwest edge of Laguna Las Tres Pascualas 

(S36.8153°, W73.0458°; 1700 hrs on 3/14/2010). 

Figure 6.9. Tank uplift in park along west shore of Tres Pasquales lagoon in Concepcion (S36.8152°, W73.0460°; 
3/14/2010) 
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6.5 Impact on Bridges 
The following is a brief synopsis of the impact of liquefaction and lateral spreading on bridge
performance. As noted earlier, further details of specific cases can be found elsewhere in this report.  By
and large bridge decks/superstructures were observed to have performed well seismically; the approach 
fills however almost uniformly exhibited poor seismic performance.  The most common observation was 
settlement of fill due to seismic shaking.  The second most common observation was the impact of 
liquefied foundations soils on the approach fills.  Several bridges were observed to have experienced
liquefaction under the approach fills that contributed to deformations.  Mataquito Bridge (Figures 6.10­
6.15) exhibited this type of performance and is used here for illustrative purposes.  The north approach 
was founded on river sediments that liquefied and spread towards the river causing medium to large 
transverse and longitudinal deformations in the approach fill.  The south approach however was founded 
on dune sands over possibly shallow bedrock and exhibited better seismic performance.  Lateral
spreading occurred around both north and south bridge bents but the deformations appear to have been 
“pinned” by the pile foundation.  Liquefaction and lateral spreading associated with bridges were 
observed in many locations from the air and at the following locations on the ground; the Rio Itata River 
bridge, Juan Pablo II bridge, and LLacolen bridge, Concepcion bridge, Lota bridge, Tupul bridge, and 
others. 
Figure 6.10.  Lateral spreading on the north bank of the Mataquito Bridge along the coastal highway (S3505078 o, 

W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/10/10). 
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Figure 6.11.  Ground based image of the previous photo (S3505078 o, W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/8/2010). 
Figure 6.12.  Impact of liquefaction and lateral spreading on the north approach fill of Mataquito Bridge  
(S3505078 o, W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/8./2010). 
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Figure 6.13.  Lateral spreading at the south landing of the Mataquito bridge along the coastal highway (S3505078 o, 

W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/8/2010). 

Figure 6.14.  Typical liquefaction ejecta found at Mataquito bridge (S3505078 o, W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/8/2010). 

The ejecta consisted of medium to fine sand with some fines. 
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Figure 6.15.  Ejecta in the foreground and lateral spreading cracks in the back ground along the south landing of the 
Mataquito bridge (S3505078 o, W72.16240o, 11:00, 3/8/2010). 
6.6 Impact on Pan American Highway 
The Pan American highway crosses many rivers, water ways, canals, and ditches in the central region of
Chile; this being an agricultural region with east-west trending water ways at 30-50 km spacing and the 
highway trending north-south.  Most bridges at river crossings along the highway performed reasonably 
well, similar to what was described in the previous section.  Surface evidence of liquefaction was 
observed and deformations had some impact on the approach fills.  The most frequent damage along the 
Pan American was observed to correlate with relatively un-engineered water crossings such as canals and 
ditches. Systematic failures of the road foundation was seen where culverts, box sections, and other 
minor water conduits intersected the highway (e.g. Figures 6.16 and 6.17).  
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Figure 6.16. Typical road base failure along Pan American highway.  Line of trees show where the water crossing 
intersects the highway. These type of road failures were observed at regular intervals corresponding to the minor 
water crossings. This picture is from near the town of Curico (~S34.7794o, ~W71.1599o, 17:30, 3/6/2010).
Figure 6.17.  Lateral deformations in an agricultural ditch along the Pan American highway.  Along the highway 
these non-engineered features performed very poorly in comparison with the engineered water crossings that fared 
much better (~S34.7794o, ~W71.1599o, 17:30, 3/6/2010). 
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6.7 Impacts on Tank Structures 
Many silos and tanks were observed to have suffered damage due to the earthquake.  Whereas some of 
these tanks and silos failed due to the strong ground shaking with high long period motion content, there 
were several documented to have failed due to liquefied foundation conditions.  Figure 6.18 shows an 
example of this near Arauco.  Other liquefaction effects include tanks that became buoyant when the
higher unit weight soil fluidized.  This was observed in San Fernando (Figure 6.19), Chillan, Aruaco and 
Lebu, for example. 
Figure 6.18.  Leaning tank due to liquefaction of the foundation soil, near Arauco (S37.2458o, W73.3197o).
Figure 6.19. Tanks buoyed above the ground surface when the higher unit weight soil fluidized due to excess pore
pressure generation.  This occurred near San Fernando (~S34.5898o, ~W70.9890o) 
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6.8 Summary 
In summary, evidence of liquefaction was widespread throughout the large geographic region affected by 
the earthquake. Liquefaction was observed to occur mainly in the loose saturated river sediments found in
the many rivers through central Chile. A large amount of free field liquefaction evidence was observed
from the air. From an engineering perspective, liquefaction impacted bridge approach fills by
exacerbating the deformations that most fills experienced due to ground shaking.  Bridge superstructures 
were found to have performed well even when subjected to lateral spreading deformations.  Building 
foundations, buried structures, tailings dams, port facilities, and roadways were also damaged by
liquefaction. The most significant impact of liquefaction in this earthquake may be the large cost required
to refurbish the approach fills and highway sections that were affected. As in most earthquakes, 
liquefaction did not necessarily result in large concentrated damage but did result in widely distributed 
damage.  
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7.0 EFFECTS OF GROUND FAILURE ON BUILDINGS  

7.1 General 
Several urbanized areas were strongly shaken by the February 27, 2010 Mw=8.8 Chile earthquake. Most 
buildings within the affected areas performed well, especially modern buildings. However, many older 
buildings performed poorly particularly in areas with a large concentration of unreinforced masonry and 
low-rise adobe construction, such as in the cities of Curico and Talca. In contrast to other regions affected 
by the earthquake where shaking has been initially reported to have strongest energy content within the
0.8-2.0 second range, regions such as Curico may have observed high acceleration levels within the low 
period range (e.g., in the period range of 0.1-0.2 s, spectral demands greater than 1.4 g were measured at 
one station in Curico).1 Within the city center of Curico, where many historic adobe structures are 
located, nearly 90% of the structures were destroyed. Similarly, in the city of Talca, 67km WSW of
Curico, nearly every home in the city’s center was severely damaged and most historic structures were 
flattened, whereas taller, well-designed structures appeared to perform relatively well with the exception 
of damage to nonstructural elements (Figure 7.1a). Nonetheless, given the widespread construction type
and earthquake characteristics across the broad extent of this event, there certainly were a number of 
cases in which modern buildings performed poorly, such as the high-rise office building located in
downtown Concepción that is shown in Figure 7.1b.
The structural performance of buildings is being documented by the EERI LFE team as well as by other
post-earthquake reconnaissance teams, so the reader should consult their reports for comprehensive 
documentation of the structural performance of buildings during this earthquake. The GEER team focused
on those buildings whose seismic performance appeared to be affected by ground failure. Therefore, in 
this section of the report, several important cases that provide insight regarding the effects of ground 
failure on buildings are documented. There are other cases described in this report that involve building 
performance affected by ground failure. For example, the reader is referred to Section 8.4 which describes 
the performance of several buildings at the fish packing industrial facility near the Port of San Vicente.  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.1. (a) Typical construction type and observed damage within the city of Talca (S36.8323°,W73.0554°; 
1230 hrs on 3/18/2010) and (b) Significant structural damage, including partial collapse of a floor, of a modern high-
rise building in downtown Concepción (S36.8296° W73.0550°; 2000 hrs on 03/17/2010). 
1 Boroschek, R., Soto, P., Leon, R., and Comte, D. (2010). Informe Preliminar Red Nacional De Acelerografos Terremoto Centro
Sur Chile 27 de Febrero de 2010 – Informe Preliminar No. 4. Departmento de Ingenieria Civil & Departmento de Geofisica. (in
Spanish). 
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7.2 Hospital Provincial in Curanilahue 
Liquefaction-induced ground deformations affected the seismic performance of the new hospital facility 
built in the City of Curanilahue, which is about 80 km southwest of Concepción. The new hospital facility 
and the reported site conditions will be described first. Information on the hospital facility was shared by 
Mr. Aldo A. Faúndez Contreras, the architect of record of the new hospital design. Observations made by 
the initial GEER team that visited the site will then follow. This site was also characterized by a follow-
on GEER team, and the details of their characterization are described in Section 15 of this report. 
The modern hospital facility was opened in 2008. It replaced older one-story structures. GoogleEarth 
images of the site on April 15, 2005 and November 15, 2009 are shown in Figure 7.2. Construction in
Curanilahue is generally of one to two stories, except for a few buildings that are taller.  The new hospital 
facility has 10 structurally isolated wings with heights ranging from one to six stories, with the taller ones 
being amongst the tallest buildings in the city. Elevation and plan views of the hospital are shown in 
Figure 7.3. A map denoting the wing numbering and number of stories, which will be referred to in
subsequent discussions, is shown in Figure 7.4.  An exterior image of the hospital is shown in Figure 7.5. 
A soil mechanics report dated September 23, 2003 that was prepared by Mr Ricardo Valdebenito V. of 
VST Ingenieros, Ltda. of Santiago was shared with us. The project’s soil mechanics report states that the 
natural soils present at the site are heterogeneous. The top soil layer is an artificial fill of thickness 0.7 m 
that contains silt, debris, and coal. Directly below the fill there is a clayey silt/sandy silt/silty clay material
with a thickness of about 1.6 m, medium to high water content, low consistency, and medium to high PI.
Below this layer, between depths of 2.3 m and 3.4 m, there is a silty sand and clayey gravel stratum with a 
thickness of about 1.1 m, high water content, low plasticity with presence of subrounded gravel particles 
(d=3.8 cm max.), followed by a 0.8 m thick stratum of medium to high PI clayey gravel with high water 
content (stones with max size 23 cm). The last stratum identified through SPT sampling (at a depth
greater than 3.4 m) is composed of clayey silt with high water content, medium consistency, and high 
plasticity. Groundwater was measured at an average depth of 0.87 m, varying between 0.65 m and 1.60 m 
throughout the site. 
There is lateral variability across the site, and the report indicates that an old channel of the adjacent
channelized river was found running through the site under Wings 1A to 1F. Based on a second phase 
study that included an electrical resistivity survey, Mr. Valdebenito concluded that at depths between 4 m 
and 8 m there is large grain sediment and sand in a fine soil matrix and that there is a low resistivity
stratum, typical of clayey soils, between depths of 8 m and 10 m. The matrix of the river deposit that is 
between depths of 4 m and 8 m appeared to be silty sands to sandy silts of low to moderate plasticity. The
study shows that there is no evidence of organic silt layers, which are commonly found in Curanilahue. 
Additionally, compacted earth fill was placed on the north side of the hospital to raise the grade so that
entrance on the north side was into the hospital’s second floor, whereas the entrances into the hospital 
from the south side of the hospital and interior courtyards was at the first floor. 
Mr. Valdebenito classified this site as Class III according to the Chilean Seismic Code NCh433 
(equivalent to Soil class D in IBC 2006). The characteristics of soil Class III in NCh433 are defined as: 
�	 Non-saturated sand, with relative density 55%<Dr<75% or NSPT>20 (without overburden pressure 
correction of 0.10MPa), or
�	 Gravel or non saturated sand, with relative compaction less than 95% of the modified proctor, or 
�	 Cohesive soil, with undrained shear strength between 0.025 MPa to 0.10MPa regardless of the 
water table, or
� Saturated sand with N between 20 to 40 (normalized to overburden pressure of 0.10MPa) 
The PGA at this site according to NCh433 is 0.4g (coastal regions).  
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Figure 7.2. (a) April 15, 2005 image and (b) November 15, 2009 image of Curanilahue hospital site (GoogleEarth;
 
S37.47355° W73.34799°) 
Figure 7.3. Front elevation looking to the south and plan drawings of the hospital (courtesy of Mr. Aldo A. Faúndez 

Contreras) 
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Figure 7.4.Hospital wing locator map (left) and typical seismic isolation detail (right; image taken from S37.47370°, 

W73.34848°; 03/16/10). 

Figure 7.5. View of front of Wings 1A and 1B looking south (S37.47355° W73.34799°; 1900 hrs on 03/16/10) 
The penetration testing that was conducted at the site by Mr. Valdebenito appeared to be performed using 
a donut hammer. The testing procedures are not described in sufficient detail to calculate (N1)60 values.
The reported N-values are relatively high given the amount of fines reported in the soils, especially 
considering that much of the fines were reported to be plastic. Additionally, observations of widespread
liquefaction at the site suggest that the underlying soils were not dense. On March 16, 2010, the 
groundwater was observed in several pits by GEER team members to be at a depth of 0.8 m below the 
ground surface in the vicinity of Wings 1C to 1F. 
The ten wings of the hospital are of common concrete construction. Lateral loading is predominantly
resisted by structural concrete pier shear walls linked via deep spandrel beams. For the taller structures 
(wings 1A, 1B, 1C) where one axis of the building is much shorter than the other, structural shear walls
are used in isolation along the (sparser window) transverse axis. Interior concrete columns are used to
carry gravity loads with a slab-girder style diaphragm. The diaphragm appeared to be conventional cast­
in-place construction. Infill masonry walls are used at ground floor locations at select lower floors and the 
foundation is a likely common to that observed in the two-story wings, namely shallow spread and strip-
type construction with interconnecting grade-beams (Figure 7.6). 
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Figure 7.6. General configuration of the foundation, perimeter structural shear walls and interior gravity columns 
(view at ground floor of wing 2I looking east) (S37.47366°, W73.34761°; 1625 hrs on 3/16/2010) 
Clear evidence of soil liquefaction was observed throughout the hospital grounds adjacent to the
structures. Sediment ejecta was observed along the west side of the hospital (Figure 7.7a), inside the two 
interior courtyards (Figure 7.7b), along the south side of the hospital (Figure 7.7c), within the walkway 
separating Wings 1B and 1F from Wing 2G (Figure 7.7d), and in other locations. Several samples of the 
ejecta were taken at this site, and grain size analysis and Atterberg limit testing is being performed and
the results of this testing will be included in later versions of this report. The collected ejecta samples
appeared to range from plastic silts to low plasticity silty sands. 
Figure 7.7. Sediment ejecta observed around hospital wings; (a) ejecta observed along exterior staircase of Wing 1D 
(S37.47358°, W73.34890°), (b) ejecta observed along exterior of Wing 1C (S37.47342°, W73.34829°), (c) ejecta 
observed along south side of Wing 1D(S37.47375°, W73.34851°), and ejecta observed along east side of Wing 2G 
(S37.47343°, W73.34788°).  
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Measurements of relative building movement and tilt are provided on Figure 7.8. Wing 1C is the tallest
wing and it contains the primary elevator shaft. It displaced downward the most relative to the other 
wings of the hospital. Wing 1C displaced downward around 11 cm relative to 1A. Wing 1C displaced
downward about 9.5 cm relative to the southwest corner of Wing 1B, and Wing 1C displaced downward 1 
cm relative to Wing 1D. The northeast side of Wing 1D was pulled down locally with respect to Wing 1C 
and a tilt of 1.5o downward toward Wing 1C was measured on the ground floor of Wing 1D in this area. 
As no tilt was measured in Wings 1A and 1D, the non-uniform downward displacement of Wing 1C 
indicated that it tilted somewhat back towards Wing 1A.  
There was also evidence of internal distortion of these structures and their foundations. Bulging of the
ground slab in front of the elevator shaft in Wing 1C is shown in Figure. 7.9a. The slab raised up about 19 
cm relative the undeformed slab in the foreground of the picture. There was also evidence of floor bulging 
up or distorting in other wings of the hospital, such as the extensive warping of the slab-on-grade in Wing 
1B as shown in Figure 7.9b. 
Figure 7.8. Measurements of relative building movement (Bray, Hutchinson, Arduino, and Maureira).
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Figure 7.9. Distortion of the slab-on-grade: (a) floor bulging in front of elevator shaft inWing 1C (S37.47345°,
 
W73.34835°), and (b) floor distortion in eastern hallway of Wing 1B (S37.4733°, W73.3478°).  

Relative movement between Wings 1B and 2G was apparent at the connection of these two wings as 
shown in Figure 7.10. At the northeast corner of the Wing 1B extension adjacent to the northwest corner 
of Wing 2G, Wing 1B displaced 4.5 cm downward and 4 cm southward relative to Wing 2G. The 
downward movement of Wing 1B relative to Wing 2G at the location of the photograph shown in Figure 
7.10 was 14 cm. The measured relative offset between these two wings, however, was non-uniform,
which suggested that Wing 1B tilted with respect to Wing 2G, which appeared not to tilt. The tilt of Wing 
1B was reliably measured to be 1.5o with its top displacing to the south relative to its base. The southeast 
corner of Wing 1B displaced downward 8 cm relative to Wing 1F.The northwest corner of Wing 1B 
displaced downward 4 cm relative to Wing 1A. Wing 1B also displaced laterally to the south about 4 cm 
relative to Wing 2G. 
Wing 1F and Wing 1D did not have noticeable tilt, and although sediment ejecta were found along its 
southern sides, no significant relative downward movement with respect to the surrounding walkway was 
observed. However, the walkway pavement indicated that these wings displaced laterally to the south. At 
the location of the photograph in Figure 7.7c, Wing 1D displaced southward 8 cm. Wing 1D displaced 2.5 
cm southward relative to Wing 1F.  The southeast corner of Wing 1F displaced southward 5 cm. Wing 1F 
displaced southward 7 cm relative to the southwest extension of Wing 2G. 
� 
Figure 7.10. Relative movement between Wing 1B (in the background) and Wing 2G (in the foreground)
 
(S37.47335°, W73.34786°; 03/16/10). 
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Wings 2G, 2H, 2I, and 2J, which are 2-story structures, did not appear to undergo significant movement. 
Ejecta were found adjacent to these wings, and some hairline fractures were observed in its brick facing 
on its south side and on the north side aligned with the concrete frame outline. However, no tilt or relative
ground movements were observed. There was settlement of the earth fill placed on its north side.  
Wing 1E is separated from Wing 1D by a walkway. The horizontal separation of the northwest corner of 
Wing 1E from Wing 1D was measured to be 2.785 m. Compression of the sidewalk separating these two 
wings was observed but could not be measured reliably. Wing 1E did translate to the south 2 cm as 
indicated by compression of its adjacent curb on its south side. A tilt of the top of Wing 1E toward the 
south of 1o was measured in its southern side. The northern side of Wing 1E only appeared to tilt toward 
the south 0.5o. There was no significant downward movement of Wing 1E relative to the surrounding 
ground.
Structural and nonstructural damage was observed throughout the hospital; however, the extent of 
structural damage was minimal due to the isolation gap provided between the wings. The most
pronounced damage was associated with closure of the seismic gap and resulting contact between wings, 
and in particular, Wing 1C and its neighboring structures (1A, 1B, and 1F). Select locations of shear wall
damage were noted; however the extent of this was minimal. Figure 7.11 provides a map of the more 
pronounced structural damage observed, with photographic documentation associated with the map
provided in Figure 7.12.
Nonstructural damage was largely confined to partition walls and ceiling systems. Due to the isolation of 
the various wings, the building services were designed with significant flexibility in mechanical, electrical
and plumbing systems crossing the various wings. Engineers on site at the time of the team’s visit noted
no disruption to the mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems within the wings. An example of the 
flexibility of the design connections and resulting good performance is shown in Figure 7.13. Detailed 
review of the immediate post-event nonstructural damage was conducted by Professor Eduardo Miranda
of Stanford University and interested readers should consult his findings. 
Figure 7.11. Damage map denoting select locations of observed perimeter damage; refer to Figure 7.12 for
 
photographs and description of observation associated with letter annotations in this figure. 
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(a) (b) (c) 

(d1) (d2) (e) 
(f) (g) 
Figure 7.12 Most pronounced structural damage observations. (a) approach ramp to entrance bay at wing 1A 
(S37.473084°,W73.348712°), (b) pounding damage and resulting permanent gap developed between wings 1A-1C 
due to the easterly rocking of wing 1C (note the gap was measured by hospital staff as 37 cm after the main event on 
February 27, 2010) (S37.473376°, W73.348452°), (c) damage to shear wall of wing 1C due to contact with wing 1D
(S37.473537°, W73.348488°), (d1) elevation view of the interface between wing 1B-1C and (d2) local view at the 
roof line of wing 1B observing the pounding between these two wings (S37.473406°,W73.348304°), (e) vertical 
cracks in masonry in-fill of wing 2H (S37.473713°, W73.347839°), (f) fallen masonry façade and spalling of
structural wall of wing 1F due to impact with wing 1B (S37.473494°, W73.347948°), and (g) cracking damage at in-
fill and structural shear wall interface at front of wing 2I-2J (S37.473528°, W73.347363°). Images taken at 1430, 
1715, 1415, 1725, 1725, 1350, 1625, and 1645 hrs, respectively, on 3/16/2010. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 7.13. Generally good performance of building services equipment in the hospital building (note the blue tank 
in the background of the image of part (a) was unanchored and slide laterally, resulting in the lateral shift of the 
lower pipe run in the foreground). All connections were intact and operational for these service equipment. (images 
taken in wing 1F, approximately S37.473577°, W73.348042°; 1345 hrs on 3/16/2010). 
Slight evidence of liquefaction was observed to the north of the hospital in the parking lot area of a
market (Figure 7.14a). Minor pavement distress and minor uplift of manholes in this area were observed. 
However, the pervasive liquefaction that was observed at the hospital was not observed here or at other 
locations in the city. Lastly, ground failure was observed near the river that is located south of the hospital 
(Figure 7.14b); however, the street that ran along the north side of the river showed no damage to its 
north, which indicates that the ground failure near the river was localized and did not extend to the 
hospital grounds. 
(a) (b) 

Figure 7.14. (a) Curled sidewalk north across the street from the hospital (S37.4727°,W73.3477°) and (b) ground 

failure near the river south of the hospital (S37.4742°, W73.3471°; at 1930 and 1830 hrs, respectively, on 

3/16/2010).
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7.3 Four 8-Story Buildings (Condominio los Presidentes) in Concepción 
The four 8-story condominium buildings named the Condominio los Presidentes, located at Los 
Gorriones No. 512, Comuna de Hualpén, Concepción, underwent liquefaction-induced movement and 
were damaged by seismically induced permanent ground movement and by strong shaking. Information
about the site was shared by Ms. Gaby Correa who represents some of the residents in the complex. 
Images of the master plan for the site were obtained from the condominium sales office, which was open 
at the time of the teams visit (Figure 7.15). The master plan indicates that six similar 8-story buildings
will eventually occupy the site. The two buildings at the south end of the property were built first 
approximately three years ago. The two buildings in the center of the property going from south to north 
were constructed a year later. These two buildings were not fully occupied at the time of the earthquake.
The final two buildings at the north end of the property have not been built yet. The southwest building, 
which is called the Riesco Building, is shown in the background of the photograph shown in Figure 7.16, 
and the southeast building, which is called the Errázuriz Building, is shown in the foreground of this
photograph. The northeast and northwest buildings are referred to as the Montt and Bulnes buildings, 
respectively. 
N� 
� 
Figure 7.15. Master plan at the Condominio los Presidentes site. 
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Figure 7.16. Southern most buildings at the four 8-story condominium building site (S36.791026°; W73.081235°; 
1300 hrs on 03/17/10). 
We were told by Ms. Gaby Correa that this area was marshy ground before it was developed. They placed 
sandy fill at the site to raise the ground level. During the GEER visit on March 17, 2010, groundwater 
was observed at a depth of 0.5 m. The structures are founded on shallow foundations that appear to be 
spread footings with interconnected grade beams. The exterior footings appeared to be an inverted T-strip 
foundation with a base width of 1.4 m and a stem width of 20 cm. The slab-on-grade is a floating slab at 
the first floor living spaces. The state of compaction of the sandy fill is not known. However, it is likely
that the sandy fill that would support structures would have been compacted to a higher density than the 
sandy fill placed in the open spaces.  
Individual buildings have a footprint of 11.43 m by 25.65 m, with two apartment units on each of the 
north and south wings of the buildings (Figure 7.17). The estimated height of the buildings was 18.7 m,
with the first floor measuring 2.3 m. The apartment unit pairs are separated by a full height elevator and 
stairwell approximately centered along the core of the building. Seismic load resistance in the 
longitudinal direction of shaking is provided by a full height structural shear wall at the elevator shaft of 
length 345 cm, with some redundancy and gravity load support provided by short wall segments within
the apartment units’ walls on either side of windows. The transverse axis of the buildings is absent 
openings, therefore, the full transverse length of the building comprises a structural shear wall for gravity 
and seismic load resistance. The perimeter wall thickness was measured as 15 cm, while interior partition 
walls were full height and measured as 7 cm thick. Along the longitudinal axis of the buildings, a 270 cm 
long by 78 cm deep coupling beam provides continuity in load transfer (Figure 7.18). 
As shown in Figure 7.19, evidence of liquefaction of the gray sandy fill was present throughout the site. 
Sediment ejecta, ground cracking, ground settlement, and other evidence of liquefaction could be seen
throughout the site. In the left photograph of Figure 7.19, sediment ejecta, ground settlement, ground 
cracks, and tilt of the guard room at the condominium entrance are seen. In the right photograph of Figure
7.19, similar evidence of liquefaction is seen inside the fenced area of the property. 
117 
  
 
 
  
Figure 7.17. Architectural plan of the Riesco, Errázuriz, Montt, and Bulnes buildings (image taken at 1615 hrs on 

3/17/2010). 

Figure 7.18. Elevation of the Riesco building depicting the general components of the structural system of the
 
building (image taken at S36.790929°, W73.081296°; 1400 hrs on 3/17/2010).
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Clear evidence of sediment ejecta is seen in the left photograph of Figure 7.20. Large amounts of sand 
and water stains were observed in this area, which is at the northeast corner of the Riesco Building (i.e., 
the southwest existing building). The maximum vertical displacement of a building at this site was 
measured at this location. The base of the northeast corner of the northern extension of the Riesco
Building displaced downward about 40 cm with respect of the ground adjacent to the Bulnes Building 
(i.e., the northwest existing building), which did not appear to undergo seismically induced permanent
ground movement during the earthquake. The southern end of the Riesco Building, however, appeared to
settle only 10 cm, and in this area, the ground surrounding the building actually settled an additional 9 to
14 cm more than the building’s foundation. The top of the Riesco Building’s northern end tilted 1o to the 
east and 1o to the north as a result of the differential ground movement across the building. The 
differential foundation movement produced tiling and warping of the interior on floor slab, which 
appeared to be on grade, and this produced damage of the living spaces as shown in Figure 7.21. A map
depicting the measured foundation movement can be seen in Figure 7.22.
Figure 7.19. Sediment ejecta, ground cracks, and other evidence of liquefaction of the sandy fill were found 

throughout the condominium site; however, street curbs around the property did not show evidence of liquefaction 

(S36.79107°, W73.08149°; 1300 hrs on 03/17/10). 

Figure 7.20. Riesco building that underwent most significant liquefaction-induced movement. Left photo shows 
evidence of large sediment ejecta at its northeast corner (S36.79077°, W73.08124°; 1330 hrs on 03/17/10). Right 
photo shows entrance to the building in the middle of its east facing side (S36.79089°, W73.08131°; 1310 hrs on 
03/17/10).
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Figure 7.21. Evidence of interior damage to Riesco Building due to differential foundation movement (S36.79085°,
 
W73.08128°; 1320 hrs on 03/17/10). 

Figure 7.22. Schematic plan view of the Riesco building depicting measured movement of foundation. (note that 

rotation about the transverse axis of the building is believed to largely hinge about the shear wall-coupling beam
 
interface as shown in Figure 7.23 (Bray, Hutchinson, Arduino, and Maureira).
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The ground surrounding the Errázuriz Building (i.e., the southeast existing building) and Montt Building 
(i.e., the northeast existing building) displaced down vertically 5 to 10 cm. The ground surrounding the
Bulnes Building (i.e., the northwest existing building) did not settle significantly, and it appears that the 
Bulnes Building did not settle a significant amount. The amount of settlement of the Errázuriz and Montt
buildings from their original elevation could not be determined precisely, but it could be estimated by 
assuming that the slope of the ground away from these buildings was similar to that around the Bulnes 
Building, which did appear to undergo seismically induced permanent settlement. With this assumption, 
the settlement of the Errázuriz and Montt buildings were on the order of 10 cm, with the ground around 
them settling an additional 5 to 10 cm as noted previously. 
Structural damage to the Riesco building appeared to be largely a result of damage induced by differential 
settlement of its foundation. In particular, damage was precipitated by the significant liquefaction-induced
settlement of the northern end of the building. As a result of the uneven foundation settlement and
rotation about the transverse axis of the building of its northern half, excessive internal deformations were 
imposed on the coupling beams. All coupling beams up the height of the building were heavily loaded 
and observed shear failure at their interface with the full height shear wall at the elevator core (Figure 
7.23 and 7.24). Shear walls in the transverse direction of the Riesco building appeared to be undamaged.  
In contrast transverse shear walls in the other three buildings, which did not significantly rotate, suffered 
damage to the first floor structural shear walls in the form of large shear cracks (Figure 7.25). 
Nonstructural damage to these buildings included primarily cracked and fallen glass and partition wall 
damage buckling and cracking (e.g., see Figure 7.26). 
Figure 7.23. Elevation of the Riesco building depicting the movement characteristics (about transverse axis only) 

and resulting damage map – refer to Figure 7.24 for images of a-d (image taken at S36.790929°, W73.081296°; 

1400 hrs on 3/17/2010).
 
121 
  
(a) (b) 

(c) (d) 
Figure 7.24 Observations at damage induced to the Riesco building due to liquefaction-induced movement of 
foundation. (a)-(c) at 7th floor of building; (a) left (north) end and (b) right (south end – at elevator shearwall 
interface), (c) ceiling-wall interface at end of coupling beam. Images taken at approximately S36.790867°, 
W73.081391°. (d) upper floor level coupling beam damage. Image taken at S36.791063°, W73.081043°. (images 
taken at 1430, 1430, 1430, and 1400 hrs, respectively on 3/17/2010). 
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Figure 7.25 Damage to ground floor shear walls of the Montt building (S36.790737°, W73.080901°; 1545 hrs on 

3/17/2010) 

(a) (b) 
Figure 7.26.Typical nonstructural damage to nonstructural components in the buildings. Interior partition wall due to 
bulging of the ground slab (ground floor Errázuriz building, S36.791063°, W73.081043°; 1415 and 1430 hrs, 
respectively, on 3/17/2010) 
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In summary, the Riesco Building settled 40 cm at its northeast corner and only 10 cm at its south end. 
This led to a tilt of the top of the building toward the north and toward the east of 1 degree, respectively.
The northern axis tilt appeared to hinge about the ends of the coupling beams to the structural shear walls
along the longitudinal axis of the building. The differential ground settlement contributed to structural 
damage. In contrast the Bulnes Building did not appear to settle. The Errázuriz and Montt buildings
appeared to settle at most 10 cm, and this settlement was fairly uniform around the perimeter of the 
buildings. The ground in the open space between buildings settled a non-uniform amount ranging from 0 
cm in the area around the Bulnes Building, but more commonly 10 to 20 cm in the areas closer to the 
other three buildings (e.g., Figure 7.27). The street that surrounded the property did not appear to settle 
and there was no evidence of ground failure in adjacent properties which contained relatively light one- 
and two-story homes. However, there was evidence of ground failure which collapsed a sidewalk within 
the neighborhood of the condominiums adjacent to a culvert approximately 120 m north of the site, in
addition to a ground failure at a roads edge exiting the neighborhood at 700 m north of the site was 
observed (Figure 7.28). Neither failure was related to that at the condominium site. 
(a) 	(b) 
Figure 7.27. Ground settlement and ejecta pattern (a) between the Riesco and Bulnes building (taken from the 
Errazuriz building; S36.7909°, W73.0810°; 1400 hrs on 3/17/2010) and (b) surrounding the Errazuriz building
(taken from the Riesco building; S36.7909°, W73.0814°; 1430 hrs on 3/17/2010). 
(a) 	(b) 
Figure 7.28. Neighboring ground failures at (a) sidewalk adjacent to a culvert about 120 m north of condominiums 
(S36.7898°, W73.0813°; 1300 hrs on 3/17/2010) and (b) roadside at 700m north of condominiums (S36.7847°, 
W73.0796°; 1630 hrs on 3/17/2010). 
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7.4 Homes on Alonso García de Ramón Road in North Concepción 
Several up-scale homes in the northern part of Concepción were damaged by a translational ground 
movement. The area is 2 km southeast of the Carriel Sur International Airport in Concepción near the 
intersection of Alonso García de Ramón Road and García Hurtado de Mendoza Road (S36.791841°, 
W73.056996°). A September 2, 2009 GoogleEarth image of the area is shown in Figure 7.29. Shallow
groundwater was observed at the site near the toe of the slide. At the back of the slide there were 
manholes that suggested that there was a drain line that may have supplied water to the affected zone. 
There was no obvious change in topography at the location of the head scarp of the slide. Photographs of 
the toe of the slide, and of the extension zone at the head scarp of the slide are shown in Figures 7.30 and 
7.31, respectively. Additional perspectives of the slide are shown in Figure 7.32. 
The slide appeared to be relatively shallow with its toe compressing ground directly along Alonso García 
de Ramón Road in a zone that was about 8 m wide, its head scarp causing a series of parallel extension 
cracks over a zone that was about 11 m wide, and its body between the toe and head scarp showing little 
evidence of internal ground distortion within it.  Careful measurements across the head scarp extension 
zone at the location of the right photograph in Figure 7.32 showed that a zone that was 9.05 m wide 
initially (as evidenced by regular-sized pavement sections) extended about 1.7 m, so that it was now 
10.73 m wide. At the toe of the slide, at the location of the person standing in the right photograph of 
Figure 7.30, the ground shortened about 1 m and pushed up about 1 m due to compression across a zone 
that was initially 8.5 m wide. 
Figure 7.29. Affected area with approximate limits of the translational earth movement; the toe of the slide is along 
the eastern side of Alonso García de Ramón Road and the head scarp runs through the houses and the open field 
behind the rectangular apartment complex. (S36.791841°, W73.056996°). The yellow arrows denote the location of 
two severely damaged home which are shown in Figure 7.31. 
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Figure 7.30. View to the north showing toe of slide in left photo, and view to the northwest of toe of slide along 

Alonso García de Ramón Road (right photo taken near its intersection with García Hurtado de Mendoza Road; 

S36.79146°, W73.05754°; 1200 hrs on 3/17/10). 

Figure 7.31. View of extension zone in open field behind apartment building (left photo(S36.79126°, W�73.05714°; 

1120 hrs on 03/17/10), and view of damage to a home due to ground extension across its foundation (right photo, 

S36.79108°, W73.05728°; 1200 hrs on 3/17/2010). 

Figure 7.32. View of toe of translation slide in foreground of left photo (also note that the driveway behind the toe is 

not damaged(S�36.79134°, W�73.05762°; 1150 hrs on 03/17/10), and view of the head scarp of the translation slide 

at back of driveway in the right photo (S36.79126°, W73.05719°; 1130 hrs on 03/17/10). 
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Figure 7.33. Apartment building underwent translation and tilt, but suffered no significant structural damage. (S� 
36.79167°, W�73.05721°; 1200 hrs on 03/17/10). 
Interestingly, the 2-story apartment building shown in Figure 7.33, which is located near the intersection
of Alonso García de Ramón and García Hurtado de Mendoza roads, showed no evidence of significant 
structural damage. Although the building translated to the southwest as a result of the translational earth
movement, it did not appear to undergo internal distortion. However, its top tilted 1o to the northwest and 
1o to the northeast, indicating that it had displaced and tilted in a rigid body manner. 
The two homes identified in Figure 7.29 and shown in Figure 7.31 were the most heavily damaged 
structures in the area. Both of these structures were located across the head scarp of the landslide where 
the extension of the ground was most severe. Most damage to surrounding homes was cosmetic or limited
to ground or hardscape dislocations, whereas these homes were severely damaged. Parents of the son 
residing in the home shown in Figure 7.34 informed the GEER team that the home was a total loss and 
will need to be demolished and reconstructed. 
Figure 7.34. Single family residence severely damaged at backside of scarp (S36.79108°, W73.05728°; 1200 hrs on 

3/17/2010). 
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7.5 Two-Wing Apartment Building at 1343 Salas, Concepción 
The EERI Reconnaissance Team observed damage of the south wing of a 13-story building located at
1343 Salas (S36.82044, W73.06164). The apartment building consisted of 2 rectangular wings in an 
offset T-shape (denoted as north and south wing in Figure 7.35). The north wings longitudinal axis runs 
approximately east-west, while the south wings longitudinal axis runs approximately north-south.  The 
response of the two wings was extremely different. The north wing suffered only moderate damage, while 
the damage to the south wing was significant, including a residual tilt to the east of the entire wing. 
Residual tilt is believed to largely be attributed to cumulative structural damage.  Failure was observed in 
the walls of the south wing, manifested as local shear as well as horizontal cracking (Figure 7.36). 
Although minor settlement was observed around both wings, pavement buckling was observed on the 
west, south, and east sides of the south wing (Figure 7.37), leading the EERI team to suspect that the 
south end foundation of the south wing  underwent rocking during the shaking (Figures 7.37 and 7.38). 
The foundation below the north end (east-west running walls) of the south wing did not manifest 
pavement buckling. This may be due to restraint provided at the north end of the south wing foundation 
from the north wing. Minor pounding between the north and south wings was evident in the upper stories
of the east side (Figure 7.39). It should be noted that the cracking pattern observed at the south end of the 
south wing was not pure shear as would be observed in well designed Chilean construction practice, but 
rather tension-type failure manifesting nearly horizontal crack patterns (Figure 7.37). For more 
information on the structural performance, refer to the EERI Reconnaissance Report. 
Figure 7.35. Annotated GoogleEarth image of 1343 Salas two wing apartment complex (S36.8205°, W73.0619°) 

(Image taken on March 11, 2010). 
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Figure 7.36. Elevation view of 1343 Salas, looking north. North wing in is the background, while the south wing is 

in the foreground. Note shear and horizontal cracks in the wall on first floor of south wing. (S36.8205°, W73.0619°; 

1458 hrs on 03/17/10). 

(a)  (b) 
Figure 7.37. Pavement buckling on the west side of the south wing (a) looking south and (b) looking north (note the
 
utility settlement off to the left of the photograph and the diminishing intensity of damage to the structure, with 

greatest damage at south end – foreground of photograph) (S36.8205°, W73.0619°; 03/17/10). 

. 

129 
  
   
 
� 
Figure 7.38. Pavement buckling on south side of south wing, view looking west (S36.8205°, W73.0619°; 03/17/10). 
. 
Figure 7.39. Interface between the north and south wings at the upper floors (north wing on right of photograph) 

showing evidence of minor pounding (view of east side, looking west) (S36.8205°, W73.0619°; 03/17/10).
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8.0 EFFECTS OF GROUND FAILURE ON PORTS, HARBORS, AND INDUSTRIAL    
FACILITIES 
8.1 Introduction 
Chile’s formidable natural barriers, the Andes in the West and the Atacama desert in the North, 
effectively isolate the country from the outside world (Rough Guides, 2009). Given Chile’s extensive 
coastline, ports provide the only means for importing and exporting large quantites of goods and 
merchandise. Early in the 21st century, 95% of Chielan exports and almost 90% of imports are carried out 
through port facilites. The country has about 35 operational ports, 10 of which are state-owned and 25 
privatetely owned. The export trade consists mainly of agricultural products, textiles, copper in the north 
and wood products in the south. Given the limited inland waterways, which are navigable for only a little
over 700 km and are located mainly in the southern Lake District, the vast majority of ports are located
along the coastline (http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Americas/Chile.html). The most
important ports are those in Valparaiso, San Antonio, Conception and Coronel. In addition to civil ports, a 
number of military ports exist – notably in Valparaiso and Talcahuano. 
In the period 3/13 to 3/18, GEER team members inspected a number of ports in Valparaiso, San Antonio, 
Conception and Coronel. Additional information came from EERI team members and local engineers. A 
summary of these observations is provided in this section. 
Figure 8.1. Location of lateral spread displacement measurements relative to sheet pile wall at Coronel Port. Photo 
from Google EarthTM (S37.0281o, W73.1507o). 
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8.2 Damage at Port of Coronel 
The Port of Coronel (37.02o, 73.15o) is located in the town of Coronel, in the Region of Bio-Bio, Chile, 
30 km South of the city of Conception and 545 km from Santiago, the capital of Chile. The surface of the 
port covers an area of 35 hectares, approximately 200 m in length parallel to the coast, with a width 
varying from 90 to 160 m. In 2008 the port handled approximately 2,500 millionm3 of cargo – consisting 
mainly of wood and byproducts. Cargo is stored on shore, in an open area and a hanger behind a 9m high 
sheet pile wall (1.6 m above ground) which provides a relatively level surface. The sheet-pile wall was 
driven on the sand beach.  No deep water exists in front of the wall. 
Cargo is transferred to ships via two pile-supported piers which extend 500 to 600 m out into the ocean as 
shown in Fig. 8.1. The northern pier was constructed in 1998, and is supported by conventional steel pipe 
piles (battered and vertical). The southern pier was constructed in 2008 and used a base-isolation system.
Lead core rubber bearing sit atop four battered piles connected together by steel beams.  The base-
isolation system works in concert with additional long flexible vertical piles which have the capability to 
move with deck during the earthquake. There was no evidence of damage to the base-isolated pier
although some pounding occurred at the joint with the conventional pile supported abutment. 
During the earthquake, about 10% of the cargo containers, which were typically stacked four high, fell 
over according to port personnel. In one case, the top two containers were ejected in front of the sheet pile
wall, passing through the barbwire fence above the wall. The wrecked containers were subsequently 
recovered from the beach and brought back to the dock using a crane (Figs. 8.2, 8.3). 
In addition, the port experienced significant lateral spreading as shown in Figs. 8.2, 8.3 which caused
cracking to the pavement as shown in Figs. 8.2 and 8.3. Black sand ejecta obtained from cracks in the 
lateral spread was similar to that of the sand on the beach. The sand had a D50 size of 0.5 mm and a fines
content of 2%. The sand classified as SP material based on the Unified Soil Classification System 
(USCS). Based on Google EarthTM, the slope of the beach at the port varies from 4 to 6 percent. Evidence
of lateral spreading was greatest in the northern part of the port where the surface was paved with asphalt
with a 0.2 m thick layer of compacted gravel fill. Movement was, naturally, less obvious in the southern 
part of the port where the surface was paved with bricks underlain by a 0.8 m thick layer of gravel. 
Measurements were made of the cumulative horizontal displacement behind the sheet pile wall by 
summing the crack widths in the pavement along two lines. The locations of the survey lines are shown in
Fig. 8.1 and plots of the displacement vs. distance for each line are provided in Fig. 8.4. Maximum
movement at the wall was between approximately 1 and 1.20 m and relatively little movement occurred
beyond a distance of 25 m behind the wall. 
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Figure 8.2. Photograph of lateral spread displacements at the Port of Coronel (S37.028680°, W73.150054°; 1445 

hrs, 03/17/2010).
Figure 8.3. Photograph of lateral spread displacements at the Port of Coronel. The wrecked container was part of a 
stack and was ejected in front of the sheet pile wall, passing through the barbwire fence above the wall. It was 
subsequently recovered from the beach and brought back to the dock using a crane (S37.028680°, W73.150054°; 
1440 hrs, 03/17/2010). 
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Figure 8.4. Cumulative horizontal displacement vs. distance from the sheet pile face resulting from lateral spreading 
at the port of Coronel, Chile. (Rollins, Mylonakis, and Assimaki). 
At least four large sinkholes developed at the port sometime after the earthquake. The sinkholes were 
typically about 3.5 m in diameter and extended to a depth of 2.2 to 2.4m as shown in Fig. 8.5. These 
dimensions are approximate, as some of the sinkholes were excavated after the earthquake. At the bottom 
of one hole a crack or gap in an underground pipeline could be observed as shown in the right photo of 
Fig. 8.5. Sand could flow into this gap eventually producing a cave-in at the ground surface. A major 
pipeline runs parallel to shore in the North-South direction. Secondary pipelines run perpendicular to the 
sheet-pile wall at a number of locations as highlighted in the photo in Fig. 8.6. These pipelines would be 
subjected to longitudinal strain due to lateral spreading which could cause distress to the pipes. 
Figure 8.5. Development of sinkholes (2.2 m deep, 3.5 m diameter) as a result of crack (gap) in pipe (S37.0339 o, 

W73.1467o; 1513 hrs, 03/17/2010). 
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Figure 8.6. Pipelines running transverse to sheet-pile wall which were subjected to longitudinal strain due to lateral 
spreading (S37.028680°, W73.150054°; 1520 hrs, 03/17/2010). 
The measured lateral spreading of 1 to 1.2 m caused the 0.5 m diameter steel pipe piles supporting the 
northern pier to rotate 14º from vertical to accommodate the movement as shown in Fig. 8.7. There were,
however, no obvious signs of distress in the surface of the pier.  Drawings of the piles and their 
connection to the pier are provided in Fig. 8.8 based on measurements made in the field and information
provided by engineers at the port. The piles were welded to plates which were in turn welded to steel
beams on the pier as illustrated in Fig. 8.8.  Pile rotation due to lateral spreading caused buckling of the 
stiffeners on the compression side and yielding of the stiffeners on the tension side of the beam as shown 
in photos in Fig. 8.7.
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(a) 
(b) (c) 
Figure 8.7. (a) Rotation of pile supported pier at Port of Coronel due to lateral spreading. The rotation of the pile led
to (b) buckling and (c) yielding of stiffeners on connection beam (S37.0280°, W73.1508°; 1555 hrs, 03/17/2010). 
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(a) 12.5 mm stiffners
0.85 m 
 Pile Length = 15 m
 Wall thickness = 14 mm
 No concrete fill
 Welded to 62 cm x 62 cm x 2.5 cm plate 
Displaced pile after lateral spreading 
Ground 
Notes: Pile Diam = 50 cm
14º 
2.2 m 
(b) 
 62 cm x 62 cm x 2.5 cm plate 
2.2 m 
Ground 
0.90 m 
12.5 mm stiffners 
25.4 mm 
 50 cm diameter pipe pile
 (14 mm wall thickness) 
Figure 8.8. Drawing of pile cap with battered piles before and after lateral spreading (a) longitudinal section and (b) 

transverse section (S37.0280°, W73.1508°). (Rollins, Mylonakis, and Assimaki) 
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Figure 8.9. Location of lateral spread measurement line and damaged pile cap with battered piles supporting pier at 

fishermen port north of the main Port at Coronel (S37.024622°, W73.155272°). 

Figure 8.10. Photograph of lateral spreading which destroyed pavement and cracked walls at the fishermen’s Port of 

Coronel (S37.0247°, W73.1550°; 1348 hrs, 03/17/2010). 
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In a small fishing port located about 600 m north of the main port (37.024o, 73.156o), liquefaction-
induced lateral spreading also produced significant damage to paved areas and a small pier extending 80 
m into the ocean. An aerial view of the pier and the line along which displacement measurements were 
made is provided Fig. 8.9. A photograph of the damage to the pavement and adjacent wall produced by 
lateral spreading is shown in Fig. 8.10. Horizontal ground displacements were measured relative to a 
concrete wall on the beach as shown in Fig. 8.9 by summing crack widths in the concrete pavement.
Maximum displacements reached nearly 3 m and movement extended about 90 m behind the wall (Fig.
8.11). Ground slope above water level at this location ranged from 3.5 to 5%. 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
0 
100 
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
H
or
iz
on
ta
l D
is
pl
ac
em
en
t (
m
) 
0  20  40  60  80  
Distance from Wall Face (m) 
Figure 8.11. Cumulative horizontal displacement vs. distance from wall face due to lateral spreading at Pier on small 
fishermen’s port at north end of Port of Coronel. (Rollins, Mylonakis, and Assimaki). 
Damage to the pier, which was subjected to the 3 m measured previously, is shown in Fig. 8.12. The pier 
was pulled apart in the landward side with gaps of 0.5 and 1.1 m between two segments; however, at the 
seaward end, the pier appears to be in compression as no gaps were present and the pier appears to have 
moved upward relative to the rest of the pier.  The pier was supported by a combination of battered piles 
and vertical piles. Battered piles were used on alternating supports along the pier. A photo of a pile cap
supported by battered piles is provided in Fig. 8.13. Based on field measurements, the batter was 
approximately forward 20º for the seaward pile and backward 20º for the landward pile. A sketch of the 
pile cap before and after the earthquake is provided in Fig. 8.14. When subjected to the large lateral
spread movements induced by earthquake, the leading row pile remained embedded in the cap, while the 
trailing row pile pulled out of the pile cap. Relative to the pile cap, the trailing row pile moved down 0.8 
m and horizontally 0.3 m so that it was within 10 cm of impacting the leading row pile. 
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Figure 8.12. Damage to pile supported pier at small fishermen’s Port of Coronel due to lateral spreading 

(S37.024319°, W73.156210°; 1321 hrs, 03/17/2010). 

Figure 8.13. Photograph of pile cap with battered piles supporting pier at small fishermen’s Port of Coronel showing 

pull out of trailing row piles (S37.024319°, W73.156210°; 1322 hrs, 03/17/2010). 
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0.85 m 
0.3 m 
Ground Surface 
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Pile Cap 
Before Earthquake 
Notes: Pile Diam = 33 cm
          Wall thickness = 8 mm
          4 - 12 mm bar
          Pile batter = ± 20°
          Embedment = 40 cm 
1.4 m 
0.85 m 
0.5 m 
Ground 
� 0.3 m 
� 0.8 m 
Pile Cap 
After Earthquake and Lateral Spreading 
Figure 8.14. Measurements of pile cap with battered piles supporting pier at small fishermen’s Port of Coronel 

before and after lateral spreading. (Rollins, Mylonakis, and Assimaki). 
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8.3 Damage of Port at Valparaiso 
Access to the private port at Valparaiso could not be obtained during this investigation; however, lateral 
movement and settlement was measured at an adjacent public dock as shown in Figs. 8.15 & 8.16. In 
addition, several pictures of the main port were taken from the outside, which showed significant damage, 
as discussed below. 
Apparent lateral 
spreading at Berth 5
Lateral displacement and 
settlement behind dock wall 
Figure 8.15. Google EarthTM photo of Valparaiso port area (S33.0364 o, W71.6267o).
The public dock consists of a concrete-block gravity wall about 1m thick which extends about 5.5 m 
above water level. No sand boils were observed at the site, so it is not possible to determine if the 
movement was a result of liquefaction or simply lateral pressure on the wall. Outward movement of the 
wall led to settlement of about 20cm in a section behind the wall as shown in the figure. A plot of 
cumulative horizontal displacement vs. distance behind the wall is provided in Fig. 8.17. 
As stated earlier, the main dock of the port of Valparaiso could not be inspected at the time of the visit. 
However, pictures taken from the street behind the quay wall (Fig. 8.19) show signs of severe settlement
of the backfill – possibly of the order of 0.3-0.5m at Berth 5. Likewise, pictures of the dock taken from 
the upper floor of a nearby building shows significant bulging of the quay wall towards the water over a 
length of 200m, accompanied by severe cracks on the asphalt pavement behind the wall (Fig 8.18). The 
overall opening of these cracks could be of the order of 1m or higher. This berth experienced 0.5m of 
lateral displacement as a result of the M8.0 Santiago earthquake in 1985. Although the observed damage 
could be unrepaired damage from the 1985 quake, as suggested by local engineers, given the extent of the 
deformations and the potential serviceability problems, these effects are likely a result of the 2010 
142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
earthquake. This view is reinforced by Google EarthTM images taken before the earthquake, which do not
show damage on the dock.
Figure 8.16. Photograph of lateral movement and vertical displacement of ground behind public dock at port of 

Valparaiso (S33.0375°, W71.6274°; 1452 hrs, 03/15/2010). 
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Figure 8.17. Plot of cumulative horizontal displacement vs. distance from free-face. (Rollins, Assimaki and 

Mylonakis).
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 Figure 8.18. Outward movement of quay wall and asphalt pavement cracks at commercial dock of Valparaiso port 
(S33.036o, W71.628o; 1640 hrs, 03/15/2010). 
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Figure 8.19. Settlement in backfill behind the quay wall at commercial dock of Valparaiso port (S33.034o, 

W71.627o; 1620 hrs, 03/15/2010).
 
8.4 Port at Conception Area (San Vicente International Terminal - SVIT) 
Lateral spread and liquefaction was observed at the Concepcion port area (S36.727  o, W73.1322 36°), 
including the neighboring San Vincente International Terminal (Figure 8.20). On the day of site visit 
however, the GEER team was not able to gain access to the SVIT although the SVIT is known to have
suffered significant damage due to liquefaction and lateral spreading ground. At the time of the visit, local
port engineers indicated the SVIT wharf moved approximately 50 cm with cracks in the pavement 
approximately 2-3m deep. Due to lack of access to SVIT, the ensuing discussion documents damage to
surrounding port structures. Most notably, the fishing industry in this area was at a halt due both to 
damage at a fishing wharf, and more importantly damage to a nearby fish packaging facility. In contrast,
petroleum facilities in this area, which provide a significant portion of gasoline to the country, were 
further from the coastline and therefore suffered little damage and only minimal disruption of activity. 
Figure 8.21 documents the approximate extent of lateral spread observed at the fishing wharf area, while 
Figure 8.22 shows photographs of the spread. Figures 8.23-8.25 present documentation regarding the
damaged fish packaging facility, in total three buildings were to be demolished due to significant 
movement of the ground and resulting building damage. Amongst these, a four story slender masonry 
building exhibited significant tilt and uplift/settlement about both axes (Fig 8.24). Despite the significant 
damage to the fish packaging facility, a number of neighboring structures were operational (Fig 8.26). 
The water level was noted to have risen by approximately 1-2 meters in this area (Fig 8.27 and 8.28), 
though tsunami waves were not observed by locals. The team visited and met with a manager of the 
Petrobas gas facility, which is one of a number of petroleum facilities in the port area. One tank was noted 
to have tilted approximately one degree (Fig 8.29 and 8.30), with sand boils observed nearest to the 
roadway portion of this facility (Fig 8.29). The tank was constructed in 1968, had dimensions of 11.6m
diameter and 12m height, and was full during the earthquake. 
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Figure 8.20. Google EarthTM overview of Concépcion port area (S36.727 o, W73.1322 o).
Figure 8.21. Lateral spread at fishing wharf area (S36.7252°, W73.1320°) denoted by red boundary. Note that spread 
likely continued to the East of the area documented. 
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(a) S36.7256°, W73.1324° (b) S36.7255°, W73.1323°
Figure 8.22. Photographs of lateral spread at fishing wharf (1110 hrs, 03/15/2010). 

Figure 8.23. Damage to fish packaging facility (S36.7260°, W73.1288°; 1356 hrs, 03/15/2010). 
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Figure 8.24. Damage to fish packaging facility (S36.7260°, W73.1288°; 1345 hrs, 03/15/2010). 
A four story frame building with masonry façade (approximate 8.5m x 16m plan dimensions) tilted 
approximately 1.5 degrees about its long axis and 3 degrees about its short axis (into photograph). 
Displacement of the front (South face) of the building were approximated as 30 cm uplift (South-East) 
and 11 cm settlement (North-East). 
Figure 8.25. Damage to fish packaging facility (S36.7260°, W73.1288°; 1400 hrs, 03/15/2010). 
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Figure 8.26. Google EarthTM overview map of fish packaging facility and neighboring structures (S36.7259°, 

W73.1291°). 

Figure 8.27. Damage to structures neighboring the fish packaging facility (S36.7267°, W73.1282°; 1200 hrs, 
03/15/2010). Note the scum level at the base of the structure of approximately 1-2 m evidence of the water rise.
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Figure 8.28. Evidence of water level rise at port area – neighboring fish packaging facility (S36.7267°, W73.1282°; 

1200 hrs, 03/15/2010). 

Figure 8.29. Location of Petrobas gas facility relative to other port structures (S36.7270°, W73.1271°). 
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Figure 8.30. Tilted water tank at Petrobas gas facility (S36.7270°, W73.1272°; 1250 hrs, 03/15/2010). 
8.5 Damage at Port of San Antonio 
The Port of San Antonio is Chile’s largest port and the busiest port on South America’s west coast 
(http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/CHL_Puerto_San_Antonio_124.php). Located on the shores of 
central Chile, in the town of San Antonio, in the Valparaíso Region, it is situated 80 km west from the 
outskirts of the country’s capital Santiago (http://ports.com/chile/puerto-san-antonio/.) According to the
above sources, the port occupies almost 500 hectares, comprising of approximately of 350 hectares of 
water and 145 hectares of land. Maximum water depth exceeds 10 meters. In 2007 the port handled over
12 million tons of cargo. 
Construction of the modern port began in 1910, but it was only in 1936 that the port acquired an electrical 
plant, new warehouses, housing for workers, and facilities capable of handling large sea-going vessels. 
The 1985 M8.0 earthquake destroyed much of the harbor’s infrastructure. A major reconstruction project 
started in 1992, which was completed in 1997 with a total cost of more than $23 billion. In 2002, the 
port’s activity reached a new high, as it moved over nine million tons of cargo. In 2003, the National 
Ministry of Goods reserved 101 hectares of land to the south of the port for the development of the 
harbor. In 2005, the South Molo extension began.
Surprisingly, despite the magnitude of the Feb 27, 2010 event, little damage was observed in the port. 
Indeed, with the exception on several minor cracks measuring no more than 5cm on the asphalt pavement
behind the quay wall (Figs. 8.31, 8.32) and some rock falls (Fig 8.33), most of the port appears to be 
undamaged. No surface evidence of soil liquefaction was observed. The satisfactory performance is 
attributed to the reconstruction of 1992-1997. 
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Figure 8.31. Cracks on asphalt pavement behind quay wall in San Antonio Port (S33.5870°, W71.6132°; 1456 hrs, 

03/14/2010).
 
Figure 8.32. Cracks on brick pavement behind quay wall in San Antonio Port (S33.5830°, W71.6138°; 1432 hrs, 

03/14/2010).
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Figure 8.33. Rockfalls in San Antonio Port (S33.587°, W71.613°; 1446 hrs, 03/14/2010). 
Notable exceptions are an old dock (apparently not part of the reconstruction) which suffered very severe 
damage (Fig. 8.34) and a wharf structure supported on combinations of vertical and raked steel piles. 
Displacements in excess of 1m were observed (Fig. 8.35) leading to failure of the connections at the pile
heads (Fig. 8.36). The settlement of the piles – a consequence of liquefaction - is also evident the figure. 
Figure 8.34. Severely damaged old dock in San Antonio Port (S33.5817°, W71.6154°; 1448 hrs, 03/14/2010).
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Figure 8.35. Separation from lateral pile screen of wharf structure in San Antonio Port (S33.5817°, W71.6154°; 

1526 hrs, 03/14/2010). 

Figure 8.36. Failure of head connection between wharf and raked piles in San Antonio Port (S33.5817°, W71.6154°; 

1527 hrs, 03/14/2010). 
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9.0 EFFECTS OF GROUND FAILURE ON BRIDGES, ROADS, RAILROADS, AND LIFELINE 
SYSTEMS
9.1 Introduction 
The February 27, 2010, Mw=8.8 Maule earthquake caused significant damage to Chile’s infrastructure. 
Evaluation of the performance of this infrastructure required covering a large area (approximately 600km
x 100km); including several regions and metropolitan areas. Chile’s two largest urban centers (Santiago 
and Concepción) are within the impacted area. These cities are connected by an important highway
network, which runs primarily in the north-south direction (main highway Route 5), and a large number 
of rivers that run predominantly in the east-west direction. Therefore many bridges, roads, railroads and 
water crossings present in this area were affected by the earthquake strong shaking. 
Most bridge structures performed well during the earthquake. From a geotechnical perspective the most 
significant bridge damage appeared to be associated with lateral spreading or strong shaking. The most
sizable failures were near river crossings along the coast where several bridge spans became 
unseated (e.g., in Tubul and Concepción) due to both lateral spreading and strong shaking. However, 
strong shaking appeared to be the cause of most widespread damage, including a large number of 
overcrossings along Route 5 inland, as well as a number of underpasses and connectors in Santiago. The 
strong shaking in many of these cases appeared to be related to seismic site effects (e.g., local soil 
conditions or subsurface topography), as the damage appeared to be quite localized and nearby similar 
structures were undamaged (e.g., Quilicura area of Santiago or near Ercilla along Route 5 in the south). 
While damage was widespread to these smaller bridge structures, in general they performed well in that
few totally collapsed onto the underlying roadway. Those that did completely collapse within the inland 
areas along Route 5 may be attributed to older construction and poor detailing. 
Retaining walls, MSE walls, and tie-back walls associated with transportation structures, including bridge 
abutments, appeared to perform well throughout the affected region. Even in locations of significant 
lateral spreading, which caused considerable damage, bridge abutments performed well. 
Widespread damage was observed in roads. Perhaps the most widespread geotechnical related issue was 
associated with settlement of compacted earth fills throughout the affected region. While there were 
isolated cases of embankment fill failures resulting in the closure of roadways (e.g., in and north of Lota), 
most noticeable were the patches of gravel quickly placed after the earthquake to compensate for 
settlement of bridge approach fills and culvert backfills. While generally not a life safety concern, these 
widespread settlements were a nuisance, leading to traffic problems.  
Railroads were also damaged during the earthquake. The most common failure was associated with
embankment loss of stability due to ground shaking, loss of rail alignment, and unseated railroad bridges.
Nevertheless, in most cases the damage appeared to be limited and repairable, indicating good railroad 
performance despite the strong shaking that affected the region. 
The following sub-sections of this section of the report include brief descriptions of selected bridge, 
roads, and railroad damage cases investigated by the GEER team during its visit in March 2010. 
9.2 Bridges along Bio Bio River near Concepción� 
The Biobío River is the second largest river in Chile. It originates in the Andes and flows 380 km to the 
Gulf of Arauco on the Pacific Ocean. The river is Chile's second-longest river and the widest river in 
Chile, with an average width of 1 km. Close to the Pacific ocean the river crosses the Metropolitan area of 
156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
� 
Concepción; which includes the cities of Talcahuano, San Pedro de la Paz, Lota, Coronel, and 
Concepción itself. In Concepción, the river is crossed by four bridges (Figure 9.1): Llacolén Bridge 
(2000), Juan Pablo II Bridge (1973), La Mochita bridge, Biobío Bridge (1942) and Biobío Railroad 
Bridge (1889). As a metropolitan area Concepción is the second-largest conurbation in Chile, with
900,000 inhabitants. During the February 27th earthquake these bridges were structurally damaged 
compromising normal business activities in the whole region. Due to their importance each bridge is 
analyzed separately.  
� 
Figure 9.1. Aerial view of Concepción metropolitan area and Bio-Bio river main crossings 
9.3 Llacolén Bridge (north approach), the Middle Bridge across the River Bio Bio in Concepción 
The Llacolén Bridge in Concepción was constructed in 2000 and spans 2,160 m across the Bio Bio river 
supporting four lanes of vehicular as well as pedestrian access to downtown Concepción (Figure 9.1). 
During the earthquake the north approach (S36.830108°; W73.067991°) suffered deck unseating and
lateral spreading shore (Figure 9.2). Ground damage at this approach was observed to extend inland into 
the southbound traffic lane of Calle Nueva road and south below the bridge’s exit ramp continuing along 
a pedestrian walkway (Figure 9.4). Calle Nueva parallels the coastline and runs under the approach to the 
bridge. The lateral spreading ground resulted in unseating of the west and east bound traffic support deck 
(Figure 9.5). Flexural cracks on the river-side face of the 1.5 m diameter support columns were observed
near the ground surface typically tightly spaced at approximately 0.10-0.20 m on center (Figure 9.6). The 
distribution of flexural cracking was more severe for those columns supporting the unseated deck, 
however, all columns at the north shoreline support observed flexural cracking at their construction joint 
(between 2-2.5m above ground surface). Ground settlement of 0.25-0.30 m was also noted to surround 
each of the exit ramp bents (Figure 9.7).  
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Figure 9.2. Plan view of the Bio Bio river region locating the damaged region of the Llacolén bridge in Concepción 
(S36.830108°, W73.067991°) 
Figure 9.3. Elevation photograph of the Llacolén bridge in Concepción (S36.830108°, W73.067991°). 
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Figure 9.4. Plan view of the North approach to the damaged Llacolén bridge in Concepción (S36.830108°, 
W73.067991°). 
Figure 9.5. Deck unseating at Llacolén bridge in Concepción. (note the temporary deck supporting approach traffic). 
View South (S36.829707°, W73.068220°, 1809 hrs on 3/14/2010) and (b) view north (S36.830380°, W73.067541°, 
1911 hrs on 3/14/2010).
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Figure 9.6. Substructure of the north approach at the damaged Llacolén bridge in Concepción showing the unseated
deck in the foreground. Flexural cracking of the column supports was observed at ground level and extending to the 
construction joint (2-2.5m above groun 
� 
Figure 9.7. Ground settlement surrounding an exit ramp support bent at the Llacolén bridge in Concepción 
(S36.830380°, W73.067541°, 1901 hrs. on 3/14/2010). 
9.4 Juan Pablo II Bridge, the North Bridge across the River Bio Bio, in Concepción 
The Juan Pablo II Bridge (S36.815864°; W73.083674°), also known as Puente Nuevo (New Bridge), is 
the longest vehicular bridge in Chile with 2310 m in length. The bridge, shown in Figure 9.8, connects 
the cities of Concepción and San Pedro de la Paz across the Bio-Bio River. The bridge was designed by
E.W.H Gifford & Partners and opened to the public in 1974. The bridge consists of 70 spans (L = 33 m,
W = 21.9 m) each one composed of 7 reinforced concrete girders and a concrete slab. The segments sit on
reinforced concrete bents with drilled pier supports. Figure 9.9(b) shows an example of a typical 
bridge bent configuration. 
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Figure 9.8. Juan Pablo II bridge connecting the cities of Concepción and San Pedro de la Paz across the Bio Bio
 
River (S36.815122° W73.084369°; 1453 hrs on 3/15/2010) 

During the 2010 Chile earthquake, the bridge suffered severe damage and was closed to the public. 
Evidence of liquefaction and lateral spreading was observed in the north-east approach with significant 
effects on the bridge. A Google Earth view of in Figure 9.9a and Figure 9.9b. As shown in the northeast 
approach with schematics of the observed ground failure and structural effects is shown Figure 9.11,
liquefaction of the soil and lateral spreading in the embankment contributed to settlements and lateral
displacement of the bridge deck. Visual inspection of the surrounding soils indicated the presence of fine 
loose sands. Several sand ejecta features were observed near the structure on the south and north sides of 
the embankment as shown in Figure 9.12. Several samples of the ejected soil were taken at this site, and
grain size analysis and Atterberg limit testing are being performed. The results of this testing will be 
included in later versions of this report. 
Figure 9.9.  Juan Pablo II Bridge (a) Google Earth view of northeast Approach with schematics of observed damage 
(S36.815864° W73.083674°) (b) Typical bridge bent configuration (S36.828181° W73.095850°; 1636 hrs on
3/15/2010). 
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Figure 9.10. Juan Pablo II northeast approach: (a) Settlement of bridge deck near bridge approach (S36.815900° 

W73.084064°; 1455 hrs on 3/15/2010), (b) Lateral spreading on northeast bridge abutment.
 
Column shear failure and significant displacements and rotation of the bridge bent were observed on the 
north-east approach Figure 9.11(a) shows shear failure of the column facing the bent’s south side. The 
north column, shown in Figure 9.11(b), indicates evidence of tension cracks and rotation and also 
suffered shear failure. In contrast with the damage observed at the northeast approach to the bridge, the
southwest approach suffered minor damage. 
Figure 9.11. Juan Pablo II northeast approach: (a) Column shear failure (S36.816233 W73.084144°; 1528 hrs on
3/15/2010) (b) Rotation and lateral displacement of bridge bent (S36.816233° W73.084144°; 1530 hrs on 
3/15/2010) 
Noticeable pier settlements were observed at several locations along the length of the bridge. Vertical 
settlements appeared to be due to liquefaction of the soil near the pier foundations. Visual inspection of
the surrounding soils indicated the presence of loose sands near the surface. Although the Bio Bio River 
was once navigable by ship up to the City of Nacimiento over-logging during the twentieth century has 
led to heavy erosion that has choked the river with silt and rendered it impossible to ship traffic. Near 
Concepción the river behaves as a meandering river with fine-grained material deposited on the 
floodplains. The GEER team identified several sand boils near the approaches (e.g. Figure 9.12a) and 
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along the bridge spans (in sections not covered by water). The presence of fine material is clearly shown 
in Figure 9.12(b). 
Figure 9.12. Juan Pablo II bridge: (a) Sand ejecta near northeast approach and (S36.815619° W73.083311°; 1522 hrs 
on 3/15/2010) (b) Fine-grained material in the floodplains (S36.825592° W73.093264° on 3/15/2010).
Settlements on the order of 0.50 m to 0.70 m were observed in piers #73-76 and piers #113-116 as 
indicated in Figure 9.13 (odd numbers for piers on the north side and even numbers for piers on the south 
side). The bridge deck accommodated these settlements with large vertical deformations and relatively 
minor damage of the asphaltic layer. This is observed in Figure 9.14(b). Settlements of piers # 73, 75, 113 
and 115 on the south side were larger than those of piers #74, 76, 114, and 116 on the north side 
indicating rotation of the bridge bents.
Figure 9.13. Juan Pablo II bridge – Pier settlements (S36.815122° W73.084369°; 1453 hrs on 3/15/2010)  
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Figure 9.14. Juan Pablo II bridge (a) View of bridge bent settlement (S36.826596° W73.094345° on 3/15/2010)(b) 
View of bridge deck settlement (S36.826596° W73.094345° on 3/15/2010) 
Although the GEER team had no direct access to the piers subjected to liquefaction and settlement it was 
possible to obtain some photos of the affected foundations. Figure 9.15(a) and (b) show a top view of a 
pier corresponding to pier group #113-116 and a close-up of the soil-pier interface.  The figure shows the 
effects of liquefaction of the soil surrounding the pier with soil depressions and standing water covering 
an annular section around the pier. The soil in the vicinity of the pier shows evidence of water being 
brought to the surface and accumulation of sand probably ejected during the liquefaction event.  
Figure 9.15. Juan Pablo II bridge–Evidence of liquefaction at piers subjected to settlements. (a) column and pier, (b) 
detail of pier and surrounding soil. (S36.826596° W73.094345° on 3/15/2010) 
9.5 La Mochita Bridge, a Four-Span Bridge Parallel to the River Bio Bio in Concepción  
La Mochita bridge, shown in Figure 9.16 (S36.846841°; W73.055496°), is a 4-span concrete bridge 
supported by seat-type abutments at each end and two-column bents at the interior locations. At this site,
ground failure occurred which induced transverse movement of the bridge superstructure. 
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The bridge, which was constructed in 2005, spans north-south along the east bank of the Bio-Bio river,
crossing a small inlet of water which fronts a water treatment facility in south Concepción. Bents are 
comprised of two 1.20 m diameter concrete columns (estimated) with pin connections at the deck, which 
are restrained vertically with a pair of tie bars integrated with a concrete block assembly (vertical 
restrainer blocks). The column bases are integrated with a concrete cap embedded below the ground. The
bridge superstructure is composed of precast I-girders and a concrete slab. Bents 2 and 3 are founded on a 
soil mass that slopes towards the east water inlet.  The high point of the soil mass is between 6-10 m east
of the Bio-Bio river, with the low point at the water level of the east inlet, which at the time of the teams 
visit was below the base of the pile cap. 
The bridge superstructure shifted transversely largely as a unit towards the east due to failure of the soil 
mass surrounding bents 2 and 3. Upon inspection of the ground at bents 2 and 3, significant spreading-
like failure towards the water treatment plant inlet water was observed (Figure 9.17). This failure may
have been attribute to either a deep seated slope instability or liquefaction-induced lateral spreading 
mechanism. Sand boils below the bridge were observed near bent #2 and 3 (Figure 9.18). Follow-up site
investigation is being conducted by GEER to more fully understand the characteristics of soils at the site 
and understand the underlying ground failure mechanism. Measurements taken by the team on March 15, 
2010 indicated that the north end of the bridge deck shifted 0.5 m to the east relative to the approach fill, 
while the south end of the bridge shifted 0.9 m towards the east relative to the approach fill on that side.
Bents 2 and 3 subassemblies (columns, bent cap and pile cap) were observed to rotate about the 
longitudinal axis of the bridge towards the east in consistent fashion with the deck movement. Rotations
of bents 2 and 3 were measured as 2 and 4 degrees, respectively (Figure 9.19a). Bent 1 could not be 
accessed at the time of the teams visit, however, views from the land mass at bent 2 indicate that the deck 
moved independently of bent 1 (Figure 9.19b). In addition, ground failure was not immediately visible 
from this vantage point, or above the north shore of the bridge. Movement of the abutments was observed 
to be minimal, with the resulting damage to the superstructure largely attributed to the rotation of the 
bents (Figure 9.21). It is noted that movement of the bridge resulted in damage on both east and west end
transverse shear keys of the interior bents (Figure 9.22). In addition, the approach road from the north 
observed significant ground movement and distress leading to the bridge (Figure 9.23). 
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Figure 9.16. Plan view of the La Mochita bridge in south Concepción describing observed damage (S36.846841° 

W73.055496°). 
Figure 9.17. Ground failure at the La Mochita bridge, (a) looking north at bent #3 (S36.847389°, W73.055219°; 

1831 hrs on 3/15/2010) and (b) looking north at bent #2 (S36.847495°, W73.055027°; 1835 hrs on 3/15/2010)
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(b)(a) 
Figure 9.18. La Mochita bridge: (a) Sand boils observed below the bridge (S36.847456°, W73.055129°; 1830 hrs on
3/15/2010), and (b)View looking north (S36.847453° W73.055225°; 1830 hrs on 3/15/2010) 
Figure 9.19. La Mochita bridge: (a) Rotation of bent #3 and surrounding ground failure at La Mochita bridge. View 

looking south (S36.847302°, W73.055151°; 1835hrs on 3/15/2010), and (b) Transverse shift of deck relative to bent
 
#1. (the tilt of bent #1 could not be measured at the time of site visit). Ground failure surrounding bent #1 was not 

Figure 9.20. Transverse shift of deck relative to south abutment at the La Mochita bridge (S36.847547°, 

W73.054876°; 1834 hrs on 3/15/2010). 

observed from this vantage point. View looking north (S36.847049°, W73.055443°; 1835 hrs on 3/15/2010). 
� 
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Figure 9.21. La Mochita bridge (a)Transverse gap developed between deck and south abutment. View looking north. 

(-36.847798°, -73.054797°; 1856 hrs on 3/15/2010), (b) Damage at the south abutment-road-deck interface due to 

transverse shift of the deck. View looking north. (S36.847761°, W73.054777°; 1856 hrs on 3/15/2010). 

Figure 9.22. Damage to transverse shear keys at bent #3 due to movement of the La Mochita bridge (S36.847405°,
 
W73.055084°; 1830 hrs on 3/15/2010). 

168 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.23. Damage to the approach road north of the La Mochita Bridge (S36.846473°, W73.055881° on 
3/15/2010). View looking north. The Bio Bio river is shown on the left (west) of the view. 
9.6 Puente Bio Bio (Puente Viejo) in Concepción  
The Bio-Bio bridge, also known as Puente Viejo (Old Bridge), was built in the 1930s and inaugurated in 
1937. The bridge connected the cities of Concepción and San Pedro de la Paz and had a length of 1,419 
m. For many years it was the only vehicular bridge connecting the two cities. Due to its precarious 
structural condition the bridge was closed in May 2002 and used only for pedestrian transit. During the 
2010 Chile earthquake the bridge suffered severe damaged with many slab sections collapsing (Figure
9.24a). Several bridge bents also collapsed during the seismic event (Figure 9.25). Evidence of 
liquefaction was observed at the East bridge abutment with visible lateral deformations and vertical 
settlements. 
Figure 9.24. Puente Bio-Bio: (a) Collapsed slabs (S36.836789° W73.062203° on 3/15/2010), (b) Evidence of lateral 

spreading near East bridge approach (S36.837311° -73.061831°; 1753 hrs on 3/15/2010). 

169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
� 
Figure 9.25. Puente Bi-Bio’s collapsed slab sections and bridge bents (S36.837968° W73.062896° on 3/15/2010).  
9.7 Railroad Bridge over the Bio-Bio River 
The Bio Bio river railroad bridge is one of the oldest crossings of the Bio Bio river. Originally built in 
1889 m, it was completely retrofitted in 2005. This railroad structure is composed of parallel top and
bottom chords separated by diagonal and vertical members in a Warren truss arrangement.  Three hundred 
and seventy pillars support the structure covering a length of 1889 m. The bridge was damaged during the
2010 Chile earthquake due to strong shaking and possibly lateral spreading of the river banks. Of the 370 
pillars of the bridge, 19 were damage during the earthquake and several portions of the rail were bent or 
miss-aligned (Figure 9.27).Visual inspection of pillars near the West abutment seems to indicate several
piles moved in the lateral direction and rotated (Figure 9.26). The rail lines were moved out of alignment 
as shown in Figure 9.27b.
Figure 9.26.  Bio Bio Railroad crossing (a) Pillars move and rotated during earthquake (b) Detail of broken crossbar, 
(S36.836075° W73.086969°; 1717 hrs on 3/17/2010) 
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Figure 9.27. Bio Bio Railroad crossing (a) rails aligned before earthquake, (b) rails bended after earthquake 
(S36.836097° W73.087094° on 3/17/2010)  
9.8 River Crossings in Talca 
The City of Talca suffered significant damage due to earthquake shaking. The damage was predominantly
associated with low-rise adobe and unreinforced masonry construction (Figure 9.28). Taller, well-
designed structures performed relatively well, with the exception of damage to exterior cladding and
contents in the upper floors (RMS, 2010). The GEER team did not conduct an extensive survey of
building damage within the city; rather the team focused on regions near the Rio Claro, which runs along 
the west edge of the city, extending north-south parallel with Route 5 (Figure 9.29). In addition, the team 
inspected areas along a branch of the river running east-west towards the southern edge of the city.  
Bridges crossing the east-west branch of the river were primarily short span (less than 50 m long) slab 
bridges (Figure 9.31). Of the bridges inspected along the branch of the Rio Claro, no visible damage to 
the structure or surrounding ground was observed. Two long span bridges that cross the Rio Claro), one a
vehicular bridge, the other a pedestrian bridge (Puente Rio Claro Nuevo and Puente Rio Claro Viejo) 
(Figure 9.31) were of interest. Both structures are constructed of reinforced concrete, and of a girder-slab 
type configuration with the vehicular bridge bents supported on pier walls and the pedestrian bridge bents 
supported on angled multi-column subassemblies integral with a pier cap at both base and column head.  
Local ground failure was observed approximately 50 m north of the Puente Rio Claro Nuevo (vehicular 
bridge) (Figure 9.32 and Figure 9.33). Two distinct regions were observed, a smaller lateral spread near 
shore (Figure 9.33), and a larger ground failure more characteristic of a soft clay failure confined within a 
park area (Figure 9.32). Soils near the shore area were predominantly gravely materials, likely with 
pockets of sand (one sand boil was observed at the near shore failure), whereas the park area indicated the 
presence of a soft clayey material. The ground failure extended approximately 90 m by 33 m north-south, 
however, it had no impact on the vehicular bridge, as it was open to traffic with no visible distress noted 
from the team’s inspection on the east shore area. In contrast, the Puente Rio Claro Viejo (pedestrian
bridge) suffered unseating of the longitudinally spanning girders and subsequent shear failure of the 
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southern-most girder at a vista point near the mid-span of the bridge (Figure 9.34). From the team’s
 
limited access to the bridge it was not clear if the deck unseating was due to movement of the bent due to
 
ground failure or excessive structural deformation at the bent. 
Figure 9.28. Typical construction type and observed damage within the city of Talca 

(S36.832375,W73.055439; 2016 hrs on 3/17/2010). 

Figure 9.29. Plan view of city of Talca locating the Rio Claro and Rio Claro branch inspected by GEER team
(S35.440800° W71.647233°). 
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Figure 9.30. (a) Typical short span bridge construction on the branch of the Rio Claro, city of Talca 

(S35.428011° W71.670269°; 1302 hrs on 3/18/2010). (b) Bridges were observed to remain undamaged 

(S35.428086° W71.669894°; 1303 hrs on 3/18/2010). 

Figure 9.31. Plan view of the Puente Rio Claro Nuevo and Puente Rio Claro Viejo, locating the observed ground
 
failure area to the north (S35.420772° W71.682932°).
 
Figure 9.32. Ground failure in a park area near the shore of the Rio Claro in Talca (S35.419919°, W71.682289°; 

1408 hrs on 3/18/2010), views looking north and south, for left and right images, respectively. 
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Figure 9.33. Near shore lateral spread on the western shore of the Rio Claro in Talca, view looking south. 

(S35.419682°, W71.682359° on 3/18/2010). Both the pedestrian and vehicular crossing bridges are shown in the 

background. 

Figure 9.34. Deck unseating and shear failure of longitudinal spanning girders of the Talca pedestrian bridge at the
vista area (S35.421044, W71.683197; 1354 hrs on 3/18/2010)� 
9.9 Undercrossings and Connectors for Autopista Vespucio Norte Express in Quilicura� 
Several transportation structures along the Autopista Vespucio Norte Express (i.e., Vespucio Norte 
Expressway) were damaged in the Quilicura area of North West Santiago (Figure 9.35). There was at 
least one collapse and several spans were unseated requiring temporary support (Figure 9.36). Both older
and newer structures were damaged, and the damage appeared to be the result of strong shaking. Since the 
damage appeared localized only as the Vespucio Norte Expressway came through the Quilicura area, it is 
suspected that local site effects, resulting from either soil conditions or subsurface topography contributed 
to the strong shaking. Retaining walls and mechanically stabilized embankment (MSE) walls appeared to
perform well in the area (Figure 9.37). No other signs of geotechnical conditions influencing the 
performance, such as liquefaction or slope movements, were observed. 
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Figure 9.35. (a) Damaged shear key is an example of typical performance on bridges along this section of Vespucio 
Norte Expressway in Quilicura (S33.365585, W70.688657; 814 hrs on 3/19/2010), (b) Close up of damaged shear 
key along Vespucio Norte Expressway (S33.365893, W70.688584; 817 hrs on 3/19/2010). 
Figure 9.36 (a). Example of one of the newer under crossings that suffered damage along the Vespucio Norte 
Expressway. The right span became unseated due to excessive transverse movement (S33.36245, W70.688865; 829 
hrs on 3/19/2010) (b) Close-up of shear key area on bent cap, with metal shear key or keeper bar hanging on right 
side of bent cap. Note complete unseating of I-girder on right side of bent cap (S33.366638, W70.689301; 837 hrs 
on 3/19/2010).
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Figure 9.37. Retaining walls and mechanically-stabilized-embankment (MSE) walls appeared to perform well in the 

Quilicura area of Santiago (S33.366137, W70.688913; 824 hrs on 3/19/2010) 

176
 
 
 
  
  
 
� 
9.10 Mataquito Bridge  
This bridge crosses the Mataquito river close to the Pacific Ocean. During the 2007 Maule earthquake 
extensive liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred at the north and south abutments and in the adjacent
fields. Figure 9.39�through Figure 9.43 show photos of the bridge and the damage. The lateral spreading
on the south abutment appeared to be more confined due to the topography of the area.  In contrast, on the
north side, and due to the large extent of the fields that are around the bridge, extensive lateral spreading 
was observed going back almost 270 m from the river edge. The lateral spreading from the edge of the 
abutment wall to the first row of piers was about 54 cm and the total lateral spreading from the edge of 
the abutment wall to the river’s edge was about 180 cm (over a distance of about 65 m). The approach 
embankment is about 7.6 m high, and settled about 70 cm relative to the bridge deck. The approach 
embankment experienced outward transverse movement of about 60 cm from the center line as 
manifested by cracking of the asphalt along a distance of about 200m.  This appears due to liquefaction 
and failure of the underlying soil and is evidenced by compression ridged in the field at the toe of the
embankments.  Despite evidence of liquefaction at both abutments of this bridge, its overall seismic 
performance was good. 
� 
Figure 9.38 Puente Mataquito, looking north, S35.050712°,W72.162258°, April 16, 2010 
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Figure 9.39 (a) Lateral spreading on the south end of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, S35.050712°,W72.162258°, 
April 16, 2010. (b)Lateral spreading on the north end of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, S35.050712°,W72.162258°,
April 16, 2010. 
Figure 9.40. (a) Settlement of the north abutment of the bridge, 70 cm offset at the bridge deck, Puente Mataquito, 
S35.050712°,W72.162258°, April 16, 2010. (b) Cracking and transverse movement (60 cm on each side) of
embankment due to liquefaction of underlying soi
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Figure 9.41 (a) Compression ridges at toe of embankment, due to liquefaction of underlying soil and settlement of 
embankment, north abutment of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, S35.050712°,W72.162258°, April 16, 2010. (b) 
Lateral Spreading towards the river, north abutment of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, S35.050712°,W72.162258°,
April 16, 2010. 
Figure 9.42. Mataquito bridge-(a) Blocks of soil crust against piers at the south end, (b) Sand boils at the north end 
of the bridge (S35.051961, W72.163217; 1450 hrs on 3/08/2010)
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� 
Figure 9.43 (a) North abutment shoved into bridge deck due to lateral spreading, Puente Mataquito,
 
S35.050712°,W72.162258°, April 16, 2010, (b) Shearing of bridge girder, North abutment of bridge, Puente 

Mataquito, S35.050712°,W72.162258°, April 16, 2010. 

9.11 Pulen and Patagual bridges near Hualqui
There was moderate damage of these bridges due to liquefaction and lateral spreading. These two-lane 
single-span old reinforced concrete bridges were close to each other. In these bridges the longitudinal
movement due to lateral spreading of both abutments seemed to have compressed the bridges causing 
geometric distortion and moderate damage. The originally horizontal decks of the bridges ended up with a 
concave-down shape. Some transverse cracks were observed on the bridge deck due to this effect. 
Information provided by local authorities indicates that most of these bridges, if not all, have been
recently surveyed as a part of a broad bridge assessment and improvement program, so there may be 
accurate survey points that could be used for future detailed analysis of the deformations. 
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Figure 9.44. Pulen Bridge-(a)Evidence of lateral spreading at the north abutment (b) Loss of longitudinal alignment 

of steel I-beam (S37.112036, W72.986902, 1225 hrs on 3/10/2010) 
Figure 9.45. Patagual Bridge-(a) Ground movement at the abutment (b) Sidewalk crack in the transverse direction 
on the top of the bridge deck(S37.111325, W72.987583, 1257 hrs on 3/10/2010). 
9.12 Laraquete Bridge 
Two bridges were inspected in the Town of Laraquete, which is 50 km south of Concepción: A pedestrian
two span bridge and an adjacent vehicular three span reinforced concrete bridge. The pedestrian bridge 
experienced damage due to foundation settlement of the middle bent with an estimated 0.50 m vertical 
deformation. Figure 9.47 shows the deformed bridge with noticeable inclination of the bridge deck. The 
adjacent reinforced concrete bridge, shown in Figure 9.46, suffered minor damage near the approaches 
due to pounding with the concrete structure and settlement due to poorly compacted fill. This bridge did 
not show evidence of foundation settlement. 
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Figure 9.46. Laraquete bridge (a) Aerial view (S37.166788° W73.184486°), (b)Bridge approach (S37.166804° 
W73.184760°; 1430 hrs on 3/10/2010) 
� 
Figure 9.47. Pedestrian Laraquete Bridge showing large settlement of middle pier (S37.166742° W73.184384°; 
1437 hrs on 3/10/2010).
9.13 Lebu Bridge (Puente Antiguo)
This bridge was operational by the time the GEER team got to Lebu. No major approach fill settlement 
could be observed. Good overall performance of the bridge in an area where evidence of ground uplift of 
1.8 m to 2 m was found.
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Figure 9.48. Lebu bridge: (a) Crossing Lebu bridge fully functional, and (b) Lebu bridge from the distance 
(S37.606344, W73.649496, 1818 hrs on 3/10/2010)� 
9.14 Nebuco Bridge along Route 5� 
The EERI LFE Bridge Team observed this pair of bridges crossing the Rio Nebuco just South of Chillan
along Route 5. The northbound bridge had a single dropped span, which had already been removed. The 
newer southbound bridge suffered only minor damage and was still in service handling both northbound 
and southbound traffic. The collapse was apparently a result of strong shaking. No apparent signs of 
liquefaction or lateral spreading and slope movement were observed.
Figure 9.49. This pair of bridges crosses the Rio Nebuco along Route 5 (S36.641846° W72.211264°; 1843 hrs on 
3/17/2010). 
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9.15 Damage to Bridge and Roadway near Tubul
A roadway and bridge near the small town of Tubul were damaged due to ground failure. The layout of
the bridge and roadway is shown in Figure 9.50. The roadway is about 0.33 km long and single span 
bridges cross the river on the east and west ends. Damage to the roadway and the bridge on the east end
closed the road to traffic following the earthquake. The two lane roadway, with an embankment height of 
about 2 m, traverses a swampy, low-lying area adjacent to a small river which flows northward into the 
Pacific Ocean. Therefore, soils in this area are likely to be soft and saturated.  The eastern bridge, which 
is about 50 m long, is supported by steel beams, which rest on a seat type abutment.   
� 
Figure 9.50. Damage to roadway and bridge due to ground failure near town of Tubul, Chile (S37.254345º, 

W73.437021º). 

Lateral spreading toward the river produced ground displacement of about 0.6 m to 0.7 m at the west 
abutment. The bridge beams appear to have acted as a strut to limit displacement at the top of the 
abutment. This led to an offset of about 0.30 m to 0.35 m between the bridge abutment and a retaining 
wall adjacent to the abutment as shown in Figure 9.51(c). The displacement and rotation of abutment was 
still sufficient to deform the vertical restraining bars connecting the base of the abutment and the bridge 
beams by about 0.35 m as shown in the photo in Figure 9.51(b). Displacement of the abutment relative to
the beams also led to shearing of the outer edge of the abutment wall as it impacted the bridge beam as 
shown in Figure 9.51(a).
On both sides of the roadway, slumps developed along nearly the entire length of the roadway leaving 
vertical scarps 1.0 to 2.0 m in height as shown in Figure 9.52. The slopes on both sides of the roadway
appear to have rotated downward causing an upward heave and rotation of the outer edge of the failure 
surface similar to a bearing capacity failure surface. In addition to the slumping along the sides of the 
road, the middle section of the road experienced lateral displacement towards the north as evidenced by 
the bow in the centerline of the road evident in Figure 9.52(a). 
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Figure 9.51. Damage to bridge abutment due to lateral spreading of soil around bridge abutment. (a) abutment wall 
movement relative to beams, (b) deformation of vertical restraining bar due to abutment movement relative to 
beams, (c) movement of retaining wall relative to abutment. (S37.254345º, W73.437021º; 1911 hrs on 3/17/2010) 
Figure 9.52. Photos showing scarps along both sides of the roadway due to bearing capacity failure in soil 

underlying the fill.  Note lateral spreading in upper photo (S37.254161º, W73.437577º on 3/17/2010)
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9.16 Road and Railroad Embankment Failures North of Lota 
Several large ground failure areas were observed north of Lota along Route 160. Two failures resulted in 
damage to a roadway embankment section (denoted herein as the “south bound failure” and “north bound 
failure”; Figure 9.55, 9.56 and 9.57), while a third failure resulted in damage to an elevated railroad
section (denoted as “railroad failure”; Figure 9.53 and Figure 9.56). Minor side road spreading-like
failures were also noted near the approach abutments to two short span overpass bridges, north of the
embankment failures, as well as just north of the short span bridges. The area east of Route 160 is largely 
marshy with low lying organic material (Figure 9.53). South of the north bound failure and east of the 
south bound failure of the elevated roadway sections is a small housing development. 
The north bound ground failure appeared to be deeply seated, perhaps due to softening of the foundation
materials. It was not clear whether the south bound failure was due to a deep seated foundation failure or 
due to poorly compacted earth fill in the embankment section. A gray sandy fill overlaid by compacted
clay fill was used in the elevated road embankment. The roadway elevation was approximately 10–15m
above the valley area (10 m nearest to the overcrossing bridges, with high point above the housing 
development area). The bridge overcrossings, and therefore the road embankments, of the north and south 
bound sections may have been constructed at different times, as evident in the differences in construction 
type of the bridges (Figure 9.56(a)). The neighboring elevated railroad failure is characterized by a
slumping and spreading of the elevated section, which is likely due to movement of the compacted fill 
(Figure 9.56(b)). The railroad was approximately 5-7 m above the low lying marshy area along its failure 
zone. 
Figure 9.53. Plan view of approximate affected area (Google Earth image at S37.0734°, W73.1469°). 
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Figure 9.54. View looking north on route 160 showing south bound and north bound failure areas (S37.0744°, 

W73.1480°; 1220 hrs on 3/16/2010). 

Figure 9.55. Lota (a)View looking south on route 160 showing north bound failure area (S37.0730°,W73.1475°; 
1145 hrs on 3/16/2010) (b)View looking north on route 160 showing south bound failure area (S37.0746°, 
W73.1479°; 1215 hrs on 3/16/2010). 
Figure 9.56.  Lota (a) Slab and girder-type overpasses at northern end of road embankment failure area, showing 
railroad and supporting ground settlement. View looking west. (S37.0729°, W73.1469°; 1150 hrs on 3/16/2010), (b) 
Ground failure below elevated railroad east of road embankment failure. (image looking east; S37.0727°, 
W73.1471°; 1150 hrs on 3/16/2010) 
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9.17 Collapsed of Embankment Fills near Copihue and Parral 
Two collapsed embankment fills were identified near Copihue and Parral. The first, shown in Figure 9.57, 
occurred on a straight section of Ruta 5 located ~ 8 km North of Parral (S36.0796 W71.7881). The 
Southbound lanes collapsed to the West and appeared to involve a shallow translational slide in near
surface foundation soils as evidenced by the location of the failed soil mass including a mound of soil
pushed up at West toe of the embankment (Figure 9.57a). The embankment failed along a length of 
approximately 150 m at a location where a low lying softer soil area was located at the toe.  
Figure 9.57. This embankment fill collapsed together with an overhead near Copihue, north of Parral, closing the 
South bound of Route 5 (a) View from the South, (b) View from the North (S36.087891, W71.791513, 1325 hrs on 
3/11/2010) 
The second failure, shown in Figure 9.58, occurred on an overpass of Ruta 5 located ~ 13 km North of 
Parral. (S36.0347 , W71.7558). The overpass embankment was curved and the embankment failed over a 
length of about 80 m towards the outside of the curved section. Again, the failure appeared to involve a 
shallow translational slide in the near surface foundation soils as evidenced by the intact failed soil mass 
and the mound of soil pushed up at the toe (Figure 9.58a). Foundation soils in the region appeared to be 
relatively competent (unlike the above case) suggesting possible elevated pore pressures in the foundation 
soils played a role in the observed failure with 3-D effects leading to failure to the outside of the curved 
embankment section as opposed to the inside of the embankment. The outside section of the slide mass 
remained completely intact as evidenced in Figure 9.58b.
Figure 9.58. Curved overpass embankment failure 13 km North of Parral (a) Translational 3-D slide failure, 
(S36.0343 W71.7568; 1405 hrs on 3/11/2010) and (b) Failed outside of the curved embankment (S36.0347 
W71.7558; 1409 hrs on 3/11/2010)
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9.18 Ground Failure along Highway 5 near Paine 
Abutment and embankment failures were common along Route 5. Figure 9.59 and Figure 9.60 show 
typical highway failures due to poor compaction of the embankment fill and abutments near Paine 62 km 
South of Santiago. The same scenario repeated at multiple sites. In contrast, mechanically stabilized 
retaining structures performed exceptionally well. Figure 9.59 shows the failure of an overpass bridge.
The figure shows cracks on the sloping ground that propagated away from the abutment, and reduced in 
size away from the bridge. It seems cracks succeeded the abutment failure. The structural damage of the 
overpass was caused by differential settlement of the supports. Figure 9.60 shows the failure of the 
highway shoulder and pavement due to poor compaction of the fill material. 
� 
Figure 9.59. Highway 5 crossing near Paine;  (a)View of bridge approach from  East (S33.854592° W70.747687°; 
1118 hrs on 3/16/2010);  (b) View of damaged bridge abutment (S33.854211° W70.747784°; 1120 hrs on
3/16/2010) 
Figure 9.60.  Highway 5 failure near Paine; (a)shoulder settlement due to poorly compacted soil (S33.864897° 

W70.742222° 1203 hrs on 3/16/2010), and  (b) road failure due to poorly compacted soil (S33.864897° 

W70.742222°; 1204 hrs on 03/16/2010) 
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Route 5 Sur overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill Overpass 
Team D performed SASW measurement s on a damaged overpass embankment on the right side of the 
north bound lane of Route 5 Sur. The damage of the embankment appears to be due to shaking and 
bulging of the embankment material. The underlying soils appear to be intact with no evidence of loss of 
loss of strength. The embankment bulged laterally and settled. The overpass embankment to the left of the 
north bound lane does not show signs of damage.
� 
Figure 9.61 Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, looking north, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill 

(S36.051209°,W71.768005°). 

� 
Figure 9.62 (a) Damage to overpadd embankment, Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill, 

April 15, 2010 (S36.051209°,W71.768005°), (b) SASW line, Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel 

Mill, April 15, 2010 (S36.051209°,W71.768005°). 
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9.19 Railroad Bridge near Longavi 
The EERI Bridge team observed the unseated railroad bridge span shown in Figure 9.63 approximately
330 km south of Santiago. This appeared to be the result of strong shaking, as no signs of liquefaction 
were observed. The Route 5 highway bridge was undamaged. An adjacent highway bridge was out, but 
demolished prior to the earthquake (S36.004136, W71.726193). Approximately 217 km south of
Santiago, a railroad bridge crossing the Rio Claro was apparently undamaged, though the approach fills 
settled over 0.5 m, resulting in separation of the tracks from the support.  
Figure 9.63. Unseated railway bridge span near Longavi from excessive transverse movement (S36.004136, 

W71.726193, 0801 hrs on 3/18/2010) 

9.20 Culvert near Mataquito River 
In this area, the tsunami caused most of the damage, washing off the road and uncovering a concrete pipe 
(Figure 9.64). Considering the extent of the damage in this zone, the pipe did not distort very much. This 
part of the road, however, was totally destroyed. This may be due to the orientation of the pipe relative to
the receding tsunami water. 
Figure 9.64. Failed culvert pipe: (a) View from the north, and (b) View from the south (S35.115611, W72.203245, 

1519 hrs on 3/8/2010) 
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10.0 SLOPE STABILITY AND LANDSLIDES 
While landslides of various types on natural and cut slopes occurred throughout the region affected by
strong ground shaking, the overall landslide density was uncharacteristically low given the magnitude of 
the event and the topography of the region.  The central region of Chile is forested and managed for 
timber resources.  In addition to major highways, many forest roads traverse the hilly Coastal Range to
access the timber and cuts along these roads experienced sporadic slope failures.  The coastal zone is
characterized by lengthy sections of steep bluffs in marine terrace and Tertiary sedimentary rocks. While 
there were a number of shallow slides along these bluffs, the failures were not pervasive except in a few 
highly localized areas. Deep seated slides were relatively rare.  In most cases, the slides did not present a
significant engineering issue. In most cases the debris was quickly plowed off the road and traffic could 
continue unimpeded. No damage of any significance was observed along any slopes stabilized by
conventional slope stabilization techniques: rock bolts, wire mesh, shotcrete.  Consequently, only 
illustrative examples of failures are presented without any specific regional grouping. 
10.1. Rock Falls and Shallow Disaggregated Slides
Rock falls and shallow disaggregated slides in areas with steep rock slopes are a common occurrence in
major seismic events. As already noted, while present, their density was quite low and their impact on 
engineered structures or human habitation was minimal.  
Rapel Dam (34.041445°S, 71.588856°W) - Figure 10.1 shows a rock fall from a road cut in granitic 
jointed rock mass on the main road approaching the Rapel Dam.  Fortuitously, there was no damage to the 
buildings, because the road acted as a buffer.  Rock falls also occurred from steep unscaled slopes 
immediately below Rapel Dam on both abutments.  While not causing any damage of consequence, the
fallen rock did represent a removal nuisance (Figure 10.2). A shallow disaggregated slide in road cut in 
the weathered rock mass also covered a portion of the roadway along the immediate upstream section of
the right abutment of the reservoir (Figure 10.3).  This type of limited raveling failure is characteristic of 
failures observed sporadically throughout the region, as shown below. 
� 
Figure 10.1. Rock fall from a road cut at the approach to Rapel Dam (34.0365°S, 74.586983°W). 
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Figure 10.2. Rock fall from the downstream left abutment of Rapel Dam (34.04167°S, 71.59263°W). 
� 
Figure 10.3. Shallow raveling failure of a road cut in weathered and heavily jointed granitic rock at Rapel Dam
(34.0407421°S, 71.587153°W). 
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Road Cut Failures – Sporadic failures in road cuts were noted throughout the region and their size and 
characteristics typically reflected the height of the cut and the competency of the source material.  More
competent rock types exhibited larger size boulders within the failed mass while less competent source 
materials exhibited more disaggregated masses of smaller boulders and particles. Figure 10.4 shows a
relatively extensive failure in a cut in jointed welded tuff north of El Manzano along the western edge of
Lago Rapel. Figure 10.5 is a shallow failure in an approximately 15 m (45 ft) high cut in highly
weathered rock on the road from Nacimiento to Santa Juana. The volume of the material was just enough
to overtop the barrier, but not enough to damage it or to impede traffic.  Figure 10.6 is a cut in Holocene 
fluvial sand deposits just North of Pulen bridge (Bridge Case No. 9) that simply sloughed along most of 
its face. The failure was shallow and had no effect on traffic. Similar shallow slides were observed on 
numerous highway overpass fills which typically appeared to be densely compacted sand with very few 
fines. Finally, Figure 10.7 is a bench failure in a high, ~ 30 m, benched road cut in residual soil/heavily 
weathered rock. The failure appears to have occurred along a daylighting joint surface that was 
unrecognized when the uppermost bench was cut. An immediately adjacent, identically benched slope 
showed no signs of failure; hence, joint orientation most likely controlled the location and mode of
failure. 
� 
Figure 10.4. Road cut failure in jointed welded tuff north of El Manzano. The height of the cut is about 6 m (20 

feet). Picture looking NE (34.144076°S, 71.38000°W). 
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Figure 10.5. Shallow failure in a road cut in highly weathered bedrock (37.256493°S, 72.96018°W, looking SW).  
� 
Figure 10.6.  Sloughing of unconsolidated fluvial sand in a road cut North of Santa Juana (37.1111°S, 72.9876°W). 
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� 
Figure 10.7. Bench failure along a daylighting joint in a road cut in deeply weathered rock south of Lota (37.1213°S,
73.1550°W). 
Failures in Coastal Bluffs – Tectonically uplifted Tertiary sediments and more recent beach terrace 
deposits form steep coastal bluffs along most of the affected coastline. The bluffs are particularly steep 
where they are directly at the beach level while in other locations they are less steep and slightly set back. 
In general, these types of slopes are susceptible to shallow raveling and sloughing, and such was the case 
in this event. However, as already noted, the failures tended to be concentrated in a few localities with 
only occasional failures along large sections of the coastline.  This was quite surprising given the 
magnitude of the earthquake and duration of shaking. 
Lebu and Arauco region - The active tectonic uplift along the section of the coast between just south of
Lebu and extending northward toward Arauco has produced a series of prominent headlands in uplifted 
Tertiary sedimentary rocks capped by younger marine terrace deposits. These headlands reach heights of 
as much as 200 meters and drop abruptly and steeply to narrow rocky beaches. The steep seaward slopes 
would have been expected to have been subject to slope failure and indeed numerous slope failures were 
in evidence and they were locally pervasive.  Figure 10.8 shows the headland just southwest of Lebu with 
the town of Lebu in the distance. As can be seen, whole sections of the slopes are denuded by shallow 
raveling and sloughing, however, deep seated rotational or block failures are not observed. Local
evidence suggests that the coast was inundated by a tsunami and the toes of the slopes exhibit evidence of 
wave erosion. Hence, it is possible and likely that at least some of the landslide material has been
removed by the tsunami wave action. Similar setting but less frequent failures are exhibited along the 
bluffs north of Pta Carneros just southwest of Arauco as shown in Figure 10.9. 
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Figure 10.8. Shallow slides along bluffs southwest of Lebu (37.6°S, 73.674°W). 
� 
Figure 10.9. Bluffs north of Pta Carneros, southwest of Arauco, showing frequent but not pervasive sliding and 

raveling (37.326°S, 732674°W). 
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The character of the coastline changes to the north of Arauco, with softer sediments exposed in the terrace 
and beach bluff slopes. The slopes tend to be more gentle and more densely vegetated. Similarly slope 
failures are less frequent although when they occurred they had greater impact as road alignments take 
advantage of the less rugged coastal zone.  A series of slides occurred at the seaward ends of low ridges in 
soft sandstones west of Arauco, with two of the slides closing the coastal road.  The aerial view of the 
general setting is shown in Figure 10.10 with the town of Tubul in the distance and Arauco off the picture 
to the distant left (SE). A view of a slide that closed the road just West of Arauco is shown in Figure 
10.11. 
� 
Figure 10.10. Aerial view of the coastal bluffs West of Arauco (37.2205°S, 73.443°W).
� 
Figure 10.11.  Shallow failure along a truncated ridge forcing road closure West of Arauco (37.2437°S,  73.413°W) . 
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Concepcion Area – Very similar types of highly localized landslides occurred on bluffs in Tertiary
sedimentary rocks in the region around Concepcion.  Figure 10.12 shows steep bluffs on the eastern shore 
of Isla Quiriquina which experienced shallow raveling which mostly denuded the slopes. However, 
several larger failures occurred in this area as well. Figure 10.13 shows a large complex of shallow 
coalescing slides located on the western shore of Pta Tumbes just north of Talcahuano. While this 
landslide complex in Teritiary sedimentary rocks was one of the most extensive failures noted along the
entire coastline, pre-existing photography suggests that this was a previously disturbed area used as a 
quarry with a history of prior sliding.  This conclusion is supported by the fact that very few other slides 
are found in the vicinity. However, a well documented large failure of a road cut occurred across the bay 
just north of Tome (Figure 10.14). The road cut in interbedded sandstone and shale is about a year old and 
the estimated volume of the slide is 3200 cubic meters (Jose Miguel, personal communication). 
� 
Figure 10.12. Shallow failures and raveling in Tertiary sedimentary rocks on Isla Quiriquina (36.627°S, 73.05°W). 
� 
Figure 10.13. Disagregated landslide complex, Punta Tumbes looking West (36.66°S, 73.098°W). 
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Figure 10.14. Landslide in a road cut in Cocholgue, north of Tome (36.595 S, 72.974 W). Photo and details courtesy 
of J.M. Lopez.  
Navidad to San Antonio – Long stretches of the coastline north of Concepcion are fronted by bread 
beaches that are punctuated by occasional headlands with only occasional small slope failures.  To the 
north of Navidad the coastline is defined by a relatively flat terrace capped by unconsolidated shallow 
marine and fluvial deposits. The terrace has an elevation of 80 to 100 m and drops abruptly to a narrow 
rocky beach.  Numerous shallow failures by toppling and slumping of relatively thin slabs of bedrock and 
overlying sediments occurred in this region as illustrated in Figure 10.15. 
� 
Figure 10.15. Typical shallow failure of steep coastal bluffs, Reserva Nacional El Yali (33.841°S,  71.817°W) . 
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Interior Region – Widely scattered occasional disaggregated slides in natural slopes seemed to occur
without any particular association with lithology or damage to nearby infrastructure as already shown at 
Rapel Dam. Figure 10.16 is an example of a typical small failure from a steep slope which occurred  just
below the Colbun Dam which suffered no damage.  
Figure 10.16. Typical shallow disaggregated slide, Colbun Dam (35.668°S, 71.351°W) .
Given the paucity of sliding and rock falls in the main event, or at least lack of any significant damage 
due to them, it is interesting that rock falls and shallow raveling type failure was captured on camera in 
the foothills of the Andes during the M 6.9 event on March 11 (Figure 10.17). The site is east of San
Fernando, in the direction of the Tiguiririca volcano, roughly 160 km east south east from the epicenter of
the event, in steep terrain in highly fractured volcanic rock of the Coya-Machali Formation. Hence, rock 
falls presumably occurred in the main event but were not observed due to darkness and were apparently 
not considered significant enough to be reported as they did not cause damage of any consequence. 
� 
Figure 10.17. Rock falls and shallow debris slides following the M 6.9 event on March 11, 2010 (approx. 34.8°S, 

70.5°W). Note, the time in the picture is 20 minutes off. Picture courtesy of Cristian Avila.  
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10.2 Deep-Seated Slides 
In general, deep-seated block or rotational slides were notable by their general absence. The one observed 
large failure, a deep-seated block slump, occurred in the coastal terrace in the El Yali National Park 
(Figure 10.18). The failure is clearly joint controlled, however, the exact reason for the size of this slump
in an area otherwise characterized by relatively minor toppling or slumping (see Figure 10.15) is not
readily apparent without further investigation. 
� 
Figure 10.18.  Deep-seated bedrock slump in Tertiary sedimentary bedrock capped by marine terrace sediments 
(33.846°S, 71.821°W). 
10.3 Summary 
he general paucity of landsliding is best illustrated by the fact that even clearly identifiable areas of prior 
extensive landslide activity had little or no evidence of seismically triggered slides.  For example, Figure 
10.19 shows an old landslide complex along the coastal ridge just north of Lebu.  The only evidence of 
sliding is seen at the lowermost portions of the slopes which form the back of the beach. 
Overall the most likely explanation is that the earthquake occurred during the dry season and groundwater 
levels were low and the slopes were quite dry, as evidence of past debris flows and other rainfall triggered 
slides was abundant throughout the region. In addition, apparently the intensity of shaking was focused in 
relatively small zones within the whole region and in those locations the landslide activity was greater as 
well. 
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Figure 10.19. Old landslide complex north of Lebu showing no evidence of seismically-induced slope movement 
(37.561°S, 71.64°W). 
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11.0 DAMS, LEVEES, AND MINE TAILINGS DAMS 
11. 1 Water Storage Dams 
The Hydraulic Works Directorate of the Government of Chile (Dirección de Obras Hidráulicas) reported 
that the vast majority of dams in Chile suffered no damage from the February 27, 2010 earthquake. Three 
water storage dams were identified with damage:  
� Lliu Lliu (S33.096005o, W71.219220o); 
� Huelehueico (S37.81667o, W72.51667o); and,
� Coihueco (S36.637166°, W71.797530°).  
The earthquake occurred towards the end of the dry season in Chile when reservoir levels are normally
low. No un-managed water releases were reported.   Coihueco is the only one of these dams visited by
GEER personnel during March 2010. 
11.1.1 Coiheuco Dam (S36.637166°, W71.797530°) 
The Coiheuco Dam was visited by two GEER teams.  The first visit was on March 10, 2010 and the 
second visit was on March 14, 2010.  
The dam was built during the period from 1964 to 1970 and has a maximum height of 31 m and a crest 
length of 1040 m. A Google Earth image of the dam taken before the earthquake with the reservoir full is 
shown in Figure 11.1a. The typical section used for the dam is shown in Figure 11.1b.  It was not clear if 
soil liquefaction occurred at this site as potential evidence of liquefaction was destroyed by the time the 
GEER team arrived. Several slumps occurred in the upstream shell. A scarp is visible at the upstream
crest and toe bulging occurs along the upstream toe.  The left (west) abutment slump is most significant 
with clear toe bulging (Figure 11.2).  A second slump occurs to the east with lesser amounts of toe 
bulging (Figure 11.3). There is another small area of crest movement further to the east (Figure 11.4). A 
small dam on the west side of the impoundment, to the south of the main dam, shows cracking along the 
crest (Figure 11.5). 
Main Dam 
Side Dam 
Figure 11.1a. Google Earth Image of Coihueco Dam taken in December 2007
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Maximum Operating Level 
Figure 11.1b Typical Cross Section of Coihueco Dam 
Figure 11.1c View of toe bulge area near left abutment of main dam, showing fine sand at the ground 
surface; due to the foot traffic it was not possible to see evidence that would allow one to classify these 
features as sand ejecta from soil liquefaction. 
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Scarp at Dam Crest 
Bulging at Toe 
Figure 11.2. March 10, 2010. Slump of the upstream face of Coihueco Dam near the left abutment 

(S36.637166°, W71.797530°) 

Figure 11.3. March 10, 2010. Slumping at Coiheuco Dam Crest and Bulging at Dam Toe. (S36.636508°, 

W71.792505°)  
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Figure 11.4. March 10, 2010. Small Area of Upstream Crest Slumping on Coiheuco 

Dam (S36.636902°, W71.788897°)

Figure 11.5. March 10, 2010. Cracking of Crest of Small Dam South of Main Coihueco Dam
 
(S36.645411°, W71.800212°).  
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Rapel Concrete Dam (34.0413oS 71.5893oW) 
Observations of the Rapel Concrete Dam were made from helicopter on March 10, 2010.  The dam was 
functioning and no signs of damage were observed.   A leak upstream of one of the gates is reported to 
pre-date the February 27, 2010 earthquake.  
Figure 11.6.  March 10, 2010. Rapel Concrete Dam Downstream Face
(S34.038754o, W71.590223o) 
Figure 11.7. March 10, 2010 – View of Upstream of Rapel Concrete Dam
(S34.043786o, W71.592053o) 
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TAILINGS DAMS
 
There are no published reports of damage to operating tailings dams due to the February 27, 2010 
earthquake. One tailings dam at a closed facility failed, creating a flow slide that travelled downhill 
several hundred meters. 
Tailings Tranque Ovejeria (33.0527o S, 70.8007o W)
Tranque Ovejeria is a modern tailings sand dam. The dam is constructed using the downstream technique.  
Sand is produced from the tailings in hydro-cyclones and discharged onto the downstream face of the 
dam.  The sand is spread by a bulldozer and compacted.  An underdrain system is used to maintain a low 
phreatic surface in the dam. Tailings and the cyclone overflow are discharged into the impoundment.  A 
geosynthetic liner is installed on the upstream face to reduce seepage into the dam from the tailings pond. 
The dam was visited by GEER personnel on March 9, 2010 and a follow-up reconnaisance was made by
helicopter on March 10, 2010. 
Both the on-ground inspection and the helicopter reconnaissance identified no problems with the tailings 
sand dam.  There were many expressions of high pore pressure (sand boils) in the tailings upstream of the 
dam and the maximum settlement of the tailings near the dam was about 0.5 m, representing a strain of 
about 1%. The liner on the upstream showed no signs of dam.  Several large valves rest directly on the 
liner, and there was not stretching or tearing of the liner at these valves.  No cracks were observed on the 
crest or on the downstream face. 
Figure 11.8. March 10, 2010 View of Ovejeria Tailings Dam from Helicopter 
(S33.054182o, W70.768953o) 
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Figure 11.9. March 9, 2010 View from the Left Abutment Along the Ovejeria Tailings Dam
(S33.049364o, W70.785354o) 
Figure 11.10. March 9, 2010 View along the Upstream Face of the Ovejeria Tailings Dam. There is no 

damage to the liner and no signs of slumping of the sand beneath the liner

(S33.052911o, W70.807067o) 
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Figure 11.11. March 9, 2010 Sand Boils in Tailings about 10 m Upstream of Ovejeria Tailings Dam
(S33.052016o, W70.798687o) 
Figure 11.12. March 10, 2010. Upstream face of the Ovejeria Tailings Dam showing approximately 
0.5 m of the tailings adjacent to the dam.  (S33.052081, W70.792067) 
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Tailings Tranque Tortolas (33.1228o S, 70.7413o W) 
Tranque Tortolas uses modern tailings sand dam construction techniques. The dams are constructed using 
the downstream technique.  Sand is produced from the tailings in hydro-cyclones and discharged onto the 
downstream face of the dam.  The sand is spread by a bulldozer and compacted.  An underdrain system is 
used to maintain a low phreatic surface in the dam. Tailings and the cyclone overflow are discharged into 
the impoundment.  A geosynthetic liner is installed on the upstream face to reduce seepage into the dam
from the tailings pond. 
An overflight by helicopter was made of this tailings impoundment.  The impoundment was operating 
and dam construction was ongoing.  No damage was observed.  
Figure 11.13. March 10, 2010 View of Tortolas Tailings Dam from Helicopter  
(S33.115406o, W70.733297o) 
Figure 11.14. March 10, 2010 View of Tortolas Tailings Impoundment from
 
Helicopter (S33.144658o, W70.710449o)
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Tranque Cabildo (32.4238oS 71.0796oW) 
The Calbildo tailings dam was visited by helicopter on March 10, 2010. The helicopter landed and a 
ground based inspection was made of the dam.  No issues were observed with this dam due to the 
February 27, 2010 earthquake.  The tailings facility was not being operated.  There was a minimal amount 
of water in the pond against the natural topography and long dry beaches adjacent to the dam.  The 
downstream face of the dam is being rehabilitated by planting trees and an irrigation system has been 
installed. 
Figure 11.15. March 10, 2010 View of Cabildo Tailings Dam from Helicopter
(S32.427724o, W71.077282o) 
Figure 11.16.  March 10, 2010 View of Cabildo Tailings Dam from Helicopter Showing Sprinkler 
System on Downstream Face (S32.422414o, W71.077165o) 
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Tailings Tranque Caren (34.0961oS, 71.1771oW) 
The Caren Tailings Dam is a zoned earthfill embankment using a sloping upstream core.  The dam is 
raised using the downstream method.  Dam raise construction was in progress at the time of the February
27, 2010 earthquake. Foundation preparation was complete for the downstream raise and compacted 
rockfill had been placed to about original ground level.  The dam was visited on March 10, 2010. The 
March 11, 2010 M6.9 aftershock also affected this dam, but the site was not visited by GEER personnel 
following this second event.  Minor (mm width) transverse cracking observed near each abutment, Figure 
11.19. Evidence of settlement or movement of the downstream face not observed.  Tailings upstream of 
the dam liquefied.  Sand boils were observed in many areas of the tailings beach, Figure 11.17. 
Figure 11.17. March 10, 2010 Sand Boils in Tailings Upstream of Caren Dam
(S34.111476o, W71.141992o) 
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Figure 11.18. March 10, 2010 View from Helicopter Towards the Left Abutment of the Caren 

Tailings Dam (S34.093959o, W71.175046o) 

Figure 11.19. March 10, 2010 Millimeter Width Transverse Crack Near the Left 

Abutment of Caren Tailings Dam (S34.096050o, W71.180748o) 
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   Figure 11.20. March 10, 2010 View of the Downstream Face of the Caren Tailings Dam Showing 

Progress of Dam Raise Construction (S34.092422o, W71.173250o) 

Figure 11.21. March 10, 2010 Crest and Downstream Face of Caren Dam from Left 

Abutment (S34.095570o, W71.179076o) 
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Las Palmas Tailings Pond Failure (35.184679o S, 71.759410o W)
Las Palmas mine was operated from the early 1980’s until 1997.  The mine was closed and the tailings 
area partially covered with a thin (+/- 6”) layer of gravelly material.  Drilling of the tailings is reported to 
have been carried out in January and February 2010 to assess reprocessing of tailings for additional gold 
recovery.  The profile seen at the upper failure scarp shows the gravelly cover layer and unsaturated 
tailings. Variable oxidation of the tailings has occurred with colours varying from tan to rusty in oxidized 
tailings to grey in unoxidized tailings.  Clear evidence of liquefaction of the tailings with sand boils and 
ejecta along cracks indicating some portion of the tailings was saturated .  Tailings flowed almost 0.5 
kilometers.  
The site was visited by GEER personnel on March 11, 2010 and then a follow-up visit was made on 
March 28, 2010 to collect data with LIDAR and DCPT.  
G 
1. 
Approximate area of failure and 
flow direction 
Figure 11.22. Google Earth  Image Tailings Impoundment Pre-Failure
(35.184679o S, 71.759410o W) 
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Figure 11.23. March 11, 2010. Upper Scarp of Failed Tailings Impoundment Looking 
Southwest (35.184679o S, 71.759410o W)
Figure 11.24. Upper Scarp of Failed Tailings Impoundment Looking Northeast (35.184679o
 
S, 71.759410o W)
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Figure 11.25. March 11, 2010. View Along Flowpath of Tailings  
(35.18468o S, 71.759410o W)
Figure 11.26. March 11, 2010. View Along Flowpath of Tailings  (35.18468o 
S, 71.759410o W)
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Figure 11.27. March 11, 2010. Side View of Tailings Flow 
(35.186864o , 71.757873oW) 
Figure 11.28. March 11, 2010. Side View of Tailings Flow 
(35.187204o S, 71.757997o W)
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Figure 11.29. March 11, 2010. Gravelly Cover Layer Over Oxidized and Unsaturated Tailings 
(35.184679o S, 71.759410o W)
Figure 11.30. March 11, 2010. Variably Oxidized Tailings – Unsaturated Conditions in Upper Portion 
of Tailings Impoundment (S35.18728o, W71.75781o) 
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 Figure 11.31. March 11, 2010. Sand Boil in Tailings (S35.18872o, W71.75764o) 
Figure 11.32. March 11, 2010.  Sand Boil In Tailings along Flow Path 
(S35.18872o, W71.75777o) 
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Figure 11.33. March 11, 2010. Tailings Sand Boil Due to March 11, 2010 M6.9 Earthquake near 

Rancagua (S35.184146o, W71.761118o) 

Figure 11.34. March 11, 2010. Ejecta of Tailings from Cracks Indicating Liquefaction of 

Tailings ( S35.183986°, W71.761844°)  
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Levees 
Earth levees generally performed well.  The GEER team surveyed several lengths of levees and only 
observed two cases of poor levee performance. These two cases are described below. 
Levee Breach West of Colbun 
An earth levee that is located west of Colbun failed at 6:50 pm on March 13, 2010 (Figure 11.35), two 
days after the Mw=6.9 aftershock (epicenter at S34.259o, W71.929o) that occurred on March 11, 2010 at 
11:40 am. The levee was inspected after the Mw=8.8 main shock of February 27, 2010, and no evidence 
of distress was noted. Additionally, a rapid inspection of the levee after the significant aftershocks on 
March 13, 2010 did not identify evidence of distress. The levee breach reportedly released a discharge of 
80 cm, which is reported to have flooded a few neighboring homes in this agricultural area of Chile, but 
none of the homes were significantly damaged.  
Figure 11.35. Earthen levee breach west of Colbun (S35.698672°, W71.487294°; photograph taken by Mr. Juan
 
Carlos Romo of the El Mercurio on March 12, 2010; http://diario.elmercurio.cl). 

The levee breach site was visited by GEER team members on March 18, 2010. At that time the levee was 
being reconstructed as shown in Figure. 11.36. A sample of the levee fill material was taken and is in the 
process of being classified. The levee fill material appears to be a silty sandy gravel material with a 
significant amount of cobbles. The levee is approximately 7 m high with a crest width of 6 m. Its side are 
sloped at about 1.5H:1V with cobble facing on its water side. The width of the zone being rebuilt was 15 
m.  The levee was reported to have been built 25 years ago. Whereas at other locations the existing 
material was excavated to build the levee, it is reported that no or little excavation occurred at this 
location because the natural ground surface elevation was already low at this location. 
Figure 11.36. Site of earthen levee breach during reconstruction on March 18, 2010  

(S35.698672°, W71.487294°).  
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Levee Slumping North of Juan Pablo II Bridge 
A liquefaction-induced levee slump occurred along the River Bio Bio north of the Juan Pablo II bridge’s 
NE abutment (Figure 11.37). The water level was well below the top elevation of the slumped crest of the 
levee so there was no breach at this location. Details of the levee construction are not known. 
Figure 11.37. View obliquely down on the slumped levee from the NE approach of the Juan Pablo II bridge with 

evidence of sand ejecta in the foreground, and ground level view looking back at slumped level crest (S36.814555°,
 
W73.084624°); 1700 hrs on 3/15/10).  
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Mine Rock Dumps 

Soldado (32.65556oS 71.1145oW)
 
Overflight by helicopter made. No evidence of movement of these high rock dumps.   
Figure 11.38.  March 10, 2010.  Soldado Waste Dump
(S32.654695o, W71.121352o) 
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12.0 RETAINING STRUCTURES 
The seismic design of retaining structures is an area of ongoing discussion with the active 
development of the latest generation of codes and hence the performance of retaining structures in
the February 27th event was of great immediate interest. Many different types of retaining 
structures, ranging from modern mechanically stabilized walls and bridge abutment to older 
cantilever and gravity concrete structures were subjected to strong ground motions during the M 
8.8 event. Their performance was uniformly good, if not excellent, and no significant problems 
have been reported or observed during the reconnaissance. Similarly, no basement wall damage 
of any kind has been reported. The rare failures or damage when noted appeared to be due to
construction defects. The purpose of this section of the report is to thus show examples of various 
types of structures observed during the reconnaissance in order to provide baseline documentation 
for possible future detailed analyses.  
Mechanically Stabilized Retaining Walls – Mechanically stabilized earth embankment walls, 
specifically Reinforced Earth walls, have been used in Chile quite extensively for highway
embankments, particularly for overpasses and bridge abutments. In the greater Santiago
metropolitan area there are numerous underpasses, overpasses and sidehill fills retained with 
Reinforced Earth walls. Their performance was excellent even when bridges supported by the 
abutments failed by sliding off their seats as happened in a number of instances as shown in 
Figure 12.1. The same level of performance occurred along the major north-south freeway, 
Route 5. Figure 12.2 shows a Reinforced Earth abutment of a collapsed bridge across a rail line. 
In this case, the approach embankment to the North of this failed railroad overpass had a major 
failure as well (see Section 9.15), however, the abutments themselves showed no signs of 
appreciable deformation. In this case, the adjacent older bridge with multiple supports also 
performed very well and showed no evidence of damage.  
Figure 12.1. Intersection of Americo Vespucio Norte and Independencia.  Abutment of a collapsed bridge. 

(33°21'57.83"S, 70°41'17.71"W) 
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Similarly, block faced mechanically stabilized wall performed very well. Figure 12.3 shows a 
block faced mechanically stabilized bridge approach which lost the top most row of blocks but 
otherwise remained intact. 
Figure 12.2. Reinforced Earth bridge abutments at a collapsed rail crossing on Route 5 north of Parral 

(36.0803°S, 71.788°W) 

Figure 12.3. Block faced mechanically stabilized embakment, Intersection of Americo Vespucio Norte and 

Lo Echevers. (33°22'34.54"S, 70°44'52.83"W)  
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Figure 12.4 shows a photograph of yet another typical MSE retaining structure. This wall, 
located west of Chillan, was approximately 6 m high and exhibited no damage despite 
surficial slope instability in the adjacent approach fill slope.   
Figure 12.4  Undamaged MSE wingwall on overpass structure over highway 152 west of Chillan despite 
sliding of adjacent fill slope (S36.6588, W72.2776). 
Conventional, Concrete Gravity and Cantilever Structures – Conventional concrete 
gravity and retaining structures similarly performed very well in many different settings. 
Figure 12.5 shows an overpass structure on the coastal highway just south of Coronel, 
about 140 km south of the epicenter in an area which experienced significant shaking.  
The structure experienced no distress and the bridge structures were fully functional after 
the event. 
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Figure 12.5. Multiple retaining structures for highway overpass structures south  end of Coronel (37.0455°S, 
73.1421°W) 
Most importantly, there were numerous bridge approach embankments that were shaken 
with sufficient intensity to experience surficial slumping, yet the abutment forming 
retaining walls performed very well and showed no evidence of damage.  The bridge 
decks on the other hand were often offset and the concrete seats were spalled or 
completely fractured.  Figure 12.5 shows one such bridge approach embankment and 
abutment wall on Route 5 north of Chillan.  The bridge deck had temporary scaffolding
supporting it at the other abutment as it was close to sliding off. 
Figure 12.6. Surficial sloughing on a bridge approach embankment, with the abotment showing no 

evidence of damage, Route 5, north of Chillan.  
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A rare failure of the uppermost section of a reinforced concrete retaining structure was
observed in San Pedro, about 110 km south of the epicenter.  The wall (Figure 12.7) was 
located within 3 km of the south approach to the Llacolen Bridge (the middle bridge 
across the River Bio Bio connecting Concepcion and San Pedro).  The 16-inch thick wall 
was reinforced vertically with No. 3 or No. 4 bars on 12 inch centers (Figure 12.8). 
Failure occurred at the uppermost joint as the top wall toppled to the east apparently due 
to inertial forces. The granular backfill is clearly self supporting (Figure 12.9). Figures
12.9 and 12.10 show water seepage behind the intact portion of the wall and corrosion of 
the horizontal reinforcing along the joint. 
Figure 12.7. Failed reinforced concrete retaining structure in San Pedro. 

Figure 12.8. Toppled portion of 16-inch thick wall showing bent compression bars and snapped tension 
bars. 
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Figure 12.9. Granular fill soils and water seepage evident behind failed portion of wall. 

Figure 12.10. Corrosion of horizontal reinforcing steel where water entered the joint.
Temporary Retaining Structures – Temporary retaining structures were not widely 
observed; however, those observed performed well.  Figure 12.11 shows a temporary 
shoring system in Santiago that appears to have been constructed some months before the
earthquake given the vegetative growth on the wall face.  The vertical members and 
single row of tieback anchors appeared undamaged while the exposed gravels between 
the vertical members did experience some raveling.   
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Figure 12.11. Undamaged temporary retaining structure in Santiago. 

233
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.0 TSUNAMI EFFECTS 
One of the major consequences of the February 27, 2010 earthquake was the tsunami generated by sea 
floor deformation. While detailed ground reconnaissance of the height and distance of run-up resulting 
from the tsunami along the coast was beyond the scope of activities being conducted by the GEER team, 
there was nevertheless the opportunity to make measurements in selected locations along the coast to 
better understand the pattern of uplift and subsidence as detailed in Section 4 of this report. In addition, a
few members of the GEER team conducted a more focused study of tsunami inundation extent and 
associated consequences for the city of Dichato and these are presented in this chapter. Careful 
measurements of inundation height and distance were made by the NSF funded Tsunami Ocean Sciences 
Group under the leadership of Costas Synolakis of the University of Southern California and Hermann 
Fritz of Georgia Tech along the Chile coast from as far North as San Antonio to as far South as Tirua. 
Results from these extensive tsunami reconnaissance studies will be published elsewhere.   
GEER team observations focused on patterns of tsunami-related damage documented during aerial 
reconnaissance and cataloguing simple tsunami characteristics including minimum flow depth 
measurements and delineating the landward limit of inundation where possible. We also asked local
residents to describe the tsunami waves including: (1) the time of wave arrival; (2) whether the first
tsunami wave involved sea level rise or sea level fall; (3) the number of tsunami waves; (4) the largest 
tsunami wave; (5) the direction of wave arrival and other descriptive characteristics of the event. The
following summary descriptions of tsunami impacts documented along the coast is organized by area 
from south to north, including Laraquete, Talcahuano, Dichato, Curanipe to Constitución, Iloca to 
Bucalemu, and Pichilemu.
13.1 Laraquete 
In Laraquete, sand blanketing the road along the beach and accounts from local residents indicate the 
tsunami reached the first row of houses. Considerable flooding of the beach and along the river channel is 
evident by deep scouring that damaged the outfall of a storm sewer near the river bank (Figure 13.1). At 
one beach front house a car was pushed tens of meters landward and water marks on the foundation
indicate a minimum flow depth of 0.55 m (Figure 13.2). 
13.2 Talcahuano 
Several flow depth measurements and interviews of witnesses provide information about tsunami impacts
at Talcahuano. Visual surveys of damage and estimates of tsunami inundation by the Chilean government 
(http://www.ine.cl/canales/sala_prensa/noticias/2010/marzo/not190310.php) show the greatest impacts 
affected nearshore areas along the Bahia Concepcion and the Rio Andalien. Gas station attendants in 
Talcahuano recall three waves arriving around 4 am. Second hand accounts report a 15-m-high wave at a 
beach along the Tumbes Peninsula. In a different account, a worker at a storage warehouse on the
waterfront who witnessed the wave said the tsunami arrived about 1.5 hours after the earthquake and 
commenced as a slow rise in sea level.
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Figure 13.1. Tsunami scoured out the foundation of this storm sewer outfall at Laraquete 

(S37.165352° W73.188051, 1907 hrs on 03/16/2010).
 
Figure 13.2. Beach-front homes in Laraquete were inundated by the tsunami. At this 
woman’s home, tsunami flow depths reached at least 0.55 m, which transported the white 
car from the street to the backyard. The tape measure left of the woman indicates the flow 
depth measured from a water stain on the building (S37.165650° W73.188136, 1915 hrs 
on 03/16/2010). 
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Minimum tsunami flow depths were measured at four sites in Talcahuano. At the storage warehouse, 
water lines left by flooding indicate 0.65 m flow depths along Perez Gacitua Street near Rio Andalien 
(Figure 13.3). West of the warehouse, high water marks showed sustained flow depths of about 0.63 m 
(Figure 13.4). To the north, sites closer to the bay experienced greater flow depths. At one building along 
Avenue Manuel Rodriquez the tsunami left marks 1.6 m high above ground (Figure 13.5). Port facilities 
along the shore of Bahia San Vicente experienced heavy damage caused by ground failure due to 
liquefaction and tsunami inundation. Near a fish processing plant at the port in west Talcahuano, lateral 
spreading dropped the waterfront down making it more susceptible to moderate tsunami flooding. Here 
the tsunami left a 1-m-high, indelible dark tarry stain along waterfront buildings that had slid toward the 
bay (Figure 13.6). At adjacent areas unaffected by lateral spreading and settlement, including a vast fuel 
tank farm, little or no flooding occurred. In light of the relatively modest tsunami inundation in western 
Talcahuano compared to more extensive inundation and damage observed in the eastern part of the city, 
we propose that Punta Pardo and the massive Tumbes Peninsula may have offered some protection to the 
northeastern shoreline of Bahia San Vicente, especially if tsunami waves propagated from north to south. 
Figure 13.3. Tsunami flow depths reached a minimum of 0.65 m at this waterfront 

warehouse in Talcahuano along Perez Gacitua Street (S36.728263° W73.109199°, 1136 

hrs on 03/16/2010).
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Figure 13.4. Tsunami flow depths reached a minimum of 0.63 m at this green house on 

El Morro Street in Talcahuano (S36.727354° W73.109530°, 1206 hrs on 03/16/2010).
 
Figure 13.5. Along Avenue Manuel Rodriquez in Talcahuano, the tsunami reached 

minimum flow depths of 1.6 m (S36.725249° W73.106313°, 1215 hrs on 03/16/2010).
 
237 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
� 
Figure 13.6. One-meter high dark stains on buildings at Talcahuano port facilities along 
Bahia San Vicente mark the elevation of the tsunami. Major damage of port facilities, 
including a fish processing plant were caused by a combination of factors, including 
modest tsunami inundation in areas that dropped vertically due to liquefaction-induced 
lateral spreading (S36.727076° W73.128058°, 1258 hrs on 03/16/2010).
13.3 Tsunami Observations in Dichato 
13.3.1 Population distribution
The largest town in Coliumo Bay is Dichato, located at the South end of the bay that measures
approximately 2 km West to East and 2.5 km South to North. Many of the homes in Dichato are built on 
the floodplain of a small river called the Rio Dichato. Pingueral is a gated residential community, about 2 
kilometers north of Dichato, on the east side of the bay.  Pingueral has a wide swimming beach that faces 
northwest towards the Pacific Ocean. There are three small fishing communities built on the steep
hillsides of the west side of the bay. From south to north, they are Las Vegas de Coliumo, Caleta de 
Medio and Los Morros de Coliumo. On the northwest corner of the bay is Nocochea Beach, where there 
are about 25 vacation homes built along a beach facing north towards the Pacific Ocean. The location of
the various population centers are shown in Figure 13.7. 
13.3.2 General observations
The maximum inland incursion of the tsunami in the Dichato area was about 2.2 kilometers. Based on 
ground measurements, it is estimated that the maximum depth of the water in the town of Dichato was 
about 6 m, and about 6.5 m in the agricultural valley that extends to the South of Coliumo Bay west of
Dichato as shown in Figure 13.8. A photograph of a large portion of the town of Dichato taken during an
aerial reconnaissance flight is shown in Figure 13.9. An expanded view of the inundation extent and depth 
based on ground observations at the location of the black open dots is shown in Figure 13.10. Structure
locations are overlaid in Figure 13.11. Most residents of the Dichato area agree that the first wave arrived 
within an hour after the earthquake. A second set of waves entered Coliumo Bay between 6:30 and 7:00 
am.  A third surge of water entered the bay at about 10:00 a.m.  Depending on location, the largest and 
most destructive waves were either the second or third set of waves. Eyewitness accounts stated that the 
waves did not generally advance as cresting breakers, but moved into the bay and onto the land as surges, 
first causing flooding and then creating an outwash that carried structures and debris back into the ocean. 
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Coliumo Bay remained agitated and large surges continued to inundate the low-lying south end of the bay 
until mid-to-late afternoon on February 27th. 
The variations in how the tsunami affected different areas around Coliumo Bay are dramatic.  The homes 
facing directly onto the Pacific in Necochea experienced the smallest waves and the least tsunami
damage; whereas, many of those structures built inside Coliumo Bay were washed away, especially those 
built less than 5 meters above sea level.
13.3.3 Water flow observations
Walls and structures on the east and west sides of Dichato were moved away from the bay, while walls 
and structures in the center of town were carried north towards the bay.  This is consistent with a report
from one witness who reported that the tsunami seemed to advance south along both sides of the bay into
the east and west sides of town, and then to combine together in the center of Dichato before flooding 
back towards the bay through the center of town. 
Evidence suggests that the tsunamis created a clockwise water flow within Coliumo Bay.  The greatest 
flooding and deepest water in Dichato was on the eastern side of town. Residents of Pingueral witnessed a 
slow-moving vortex at the mouth of Coliumo Bay which circulated houses, boats and debris in a 
clockwise direction from about 7:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m.  The center of this vortex is marked on the map 
in Figure 13.8 with a red dot. After the tsunami, the beaches of the east shore of the bay were relatively
clean, while the south and west sides of the bay were choked with debris. 
Although the motion of the water was primarily north-south, fishermen on the west side of the bay
observed east-west surges during the morning of the 27th February. Large waves that struck the west side 
of the bay seemed to have been reflected off the eastern shore. Pre and post event image pairs showing 
tsunami damage are given in Figures 13.12 and 13.13.
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Figure 13.7 Location of population centers around Coliumo Bay (after Zoa et al.). 
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Figure 13.8 Inundation extent and depth for Dichato region based on ground 
observations by Zoa et al. 
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13.3.4 Additional observations and reports
Immediately after the earthquake, residents of Pingueral moved to a ridge east of town at an elevation of 
about 60 meters.  From this viewpoint, they noted that the ocean was as smooth as a lake.  There was no
wind, swells or ripples. As the full moon was setting to the northwest, its reflection was visible as a circle 
on the surface of the ocean. From 4:05 until 4:20 a.m., the moon´s reflection on the ocean stretched
slowly from a circle into an oval, elongating towards the shore.  This change in the shape of the moon´s 
reflection indicates that a change in the curvature of the ocean was taking place.  At 4:20 a.m., three dark 
lines appeared on the northwest horizon, advancing towards the coast. All that remains of the Pingueral 
marina is a section of a floating pier which is anchored offshore.  All structures and boats are missing. 
Almost no debris is present on the eastern shore near where the marina used to be.  
Near Rio Dichato, there is a stand of mature pine trees.  Seaweed was observed hanging from the 
branches of these trees approximately 6 m above ground level.  There were freshly broken branches 7 m 
above the ground.  The seaweed in the trees seems to be a reliable indicator that the water depth was at
least 6 m in this area.  The tree branches may have been broken by one of the fishing boats washed inland. 
On the west side of Dichato there are two 10 story apartment buildings.  These buildings incurred no
obvious structural damage as shown in the pre and post images in Figure 13.14 and the aerial 
reconnaissance photo in Figure 13.15.  They withstood the earthquake and at least one 3 m wave. 
Although the first floor apartments and the basement show significant flooding damage, the upper floor 
apartments were intact and were available to be reoccupied after the residents cleaned up broken items 
inside them. Behind the 10-story apartment buildings are about a dozen homes and shops which are
constructed of lightweight materials, such as wood and corrugated metal. Little damage occurred to these 
structures suggesting that they may have been sheltered from a direct impact from the tsunami by the 10­
story apartment buildings located between them and the bay. A pre and post image pair for the area 
further to the East of the apartment buildings shows significant damage to smaller structures much further 
inland (Figure 13.16). Severe damage to homes in central Dichato illustrate the effects of the tsunami with
a wave depth of about 5 meters (Figures 13.17 and 13.18). 
Sea water surged 2.2 km into the agricultural valley southwest of Dichato as previously shown in Figure
13.19. Several large fishing boats and other vessels remain beached in these fields and farmlands, which 
are now brown and dead due to salt poisoning. 
Residents of Nicochea Beach described the earthquake strong motion as being sufficient to throw objects 
into the air and break every breakable object in their houses.  Across the bay in Pingueral, a survivor of 
the 1960 earthquake in Valdivia reported that there was no violent motion in the February 27th 
earthquake, only long, rolling motion.  Objects on his kitchen counters remained in place and nothing in 
his house was broken during the earthquake. 
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Figure 13.12  Pre/Post Imagery of Dichato (S36.546°, W72.933°) 
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Tsunami 
Damage 
Figure 13.13  Pre/Post Imagery of Dichato (S36.548°, W72.935°) 
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Intact High-rise 
Buildings 
Figure 13.14  Pre/Post Imagery of Dichato (S36.548°, W72.942°) 
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Inundation 
Run-up
Figure 13.16  Pre/Post Imagery of Dichato (S36.551° , W72.933°)
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Figure 13.17 The home in this picture was lifted by the 3rd wave and dropped 

onto a tree (S36.547 , W72.939 , 2010 hrs, 3/13/10).
 
Figure 13.18 The tsunami wave removed the lightweight wooden second story of 

this house from its more substantial masonry and concrete block first floor 

(S36.546 , W72.935 , 2010 hrs, 3/13/10). 
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13.3.5 Changes in stream channels
The course of the Rio Dichato has been altered as shown in Figure 13.17.  Prior to the earthquake, 
the river meandered through a neighborhood with gardens abutting the river, before exiting to the 
bay at the east end of town.  The tsunami´s greatest water depth -- and presumably the most
destructive erosional power -- was in the area of this meander.  The tsunami removed the soft 
sediments that formed a barrier between the river and the bay and the meander has been
eliminated.  Now, the mouth of the river is about 100 meters southwest of its former location.  A 
delta is forming where a neighborhood used to be.  The area of the former river bed is now a low-
lying mudflat, which floods at high tide. 
There is a lagoon and stream at the north end of Pengueral.  The lagoon is separated from the 
lagoon by a sandbar.  During the flooding which occurred from 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., water flowed
in and out over the sandbar 3 or 4 times. After the last flood retreated, residents noted that the 
sandbar had changed shape, with more sand at the southern end. Also in Pengueral, there are five 
wooden houses which were lifted, with their foundations somewhat intact, and moved several
meters towards the east and southeast, parallel to the flooding which surged up the stream valley 
north of Pingueral. 
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River Channel 
Erosion 
Figure 13.17  Pre/Post Imagery of Dichato (S36.541°, W72.933°) 
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13.4 Curanipe to Constitución 
Communities we visited along the coast between Curanipe and Constitución were particularly 
hard hit by tsunami inundation. At Curanipe two local women we interviewed reported that the 
tsunami came from the north and noted that much of the sand had been removed from the beach, 
possibly due to erosion by the tsunami. Emilia Sagado Alveal, a Curinape resident, said she 
witnessed the first wave arrive about 10 minutes after the earthquake. She remembers three waves 
in all and the water nearly covered the Roca San Pedro leaving only the cross on top above water 
(Figure 13.20). Alveal also indicated that geographers from the Universidad de Catolica had
surveyed the area and estimated average tsunami wave heights of 6.5 m. Water stains on the wall 
of a restaurant near the beach indicate that minimum flow depths at this site were about 1 m
(Figure 13.21). 
At El Torreon, a small beach community south of Pelluhue, the tsunami destroyed a number of
houses and caused at least 5 fatalities (Figure 13.22). Witnesses interviewed included Chilean
Army Lieutenant Alfredo Diaz and local residents of the community. One resident reported that
the earthquake seemed to last for 5 minutes and the first tsunami wave arrived about 30 minutes 
later at 4:05 am. Some witnesses noted that the ocean did not recede after the earthquake and they
assumed no tsunami was coming until the first wave arrived. A total of 7 to 13 waves continued 
to arrive over the next 4 hours, according to different accounts. The flow depths remained high 
until 8 am when the water level started to retreat. At one house that partially survived the
tsunami, water marks indicate minimum flow depths between 1.6 and 2.2 m (Figure 13.23). The 
brother of the owner of the house said debris carried by the tsunami broke the windows on the 
first floor not the wave and also noted that water did not enter the second floor. 
In communities between Pelluhue and Constitución , buildings in low-lying areas within a few 
hundred meters of the coast sustained heavy damage. For example, beach front houses in the
small fishing village of Los Pellines were severely impacted as was a derelict wood pulp 
processing plant in Las Cañas. However, in other areas coastal dunes appeared to present barriers 
to tsunami inundation preventing more extensive damage. In Reserva Nacional Frederico Albert 
near Chanco, 3- to 4-m-high dunes on the beach apparently prevented the tsunami from 
penetrating further inland (Figure 13.24). 
We did not conduct detailed surveys of tsunami impacts in Constitución . A rapid tour of the 
tsunami impacted area by car confirmed reports of extensive damage to the city along the south 
bank of Rio Maule. We noted high water marks on several buildings in Constitución  that suggest 
minimum tsunami flow depths were near 2 m at sites close to the river (Figure 13.25). Further 
information on the tsunami impacts at Constitución and tsunami runup estimates, including high 
resolution inundation maps have been compiled by Armijo et al. (2010). 
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Figure 13.20. Roca San Pedro, a prominent landmark in Curanipe, was almost 

entirely submerged by the tsunami says one local resident. Only the cross 

remained above the water (S35.8436°, W72.6390°, 03/17/2010).
 
Figure 13.21. Watermarks on a restaurant in Curanipe indicate minimum
 
tsunami flow depths of 1 m at this location (S35.8436°, W72.6365°, 03/17/2010). 
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Figure 13.22. The blue and white two-story house in the beach community of El 
Torreon was heavily damaged by the tsunami and all but the walls of the adjacent 
vacation house was destroyed. The tsunami arrived at 4:05 am, about 30 minutes 
after the earthquake, and the water remained high for four hours when it started 
to retreat around 8 am (S35.8215°, W72.5990°, 03/17/2010).
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Figure 13.23. On this post inside the first floor of a beach front house in El 
Torreon, a small community south of Pelluhue, visible lines mark the water 
height 1.6 m above the ground providing a minimum estimate of the tsunami 
flow depth at this location (S35.8214°, W72.8215°, ~1556 hrs on 03/17/2010).
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Figure 13.24. The tsunami carried wood and debris about halfway up these 

dunes near Chanco but left the walkway along the dune crest undamaged 

(S35.739239° W72.571586°, 1829 hrs on 03/17/2010). 

Figure 13.25. Watermarks on damaged buildings in Constitución indicate 

tsunami flow depths reached at least 2 m along the waterfront on Calle Blanco 

(S35.336 W72.403, 1757 hrs on 03/15/2010).
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13.5 Iloca to Bucalemu 
Communities between Iloca and Bucalemu may have been more severely impacted by the 
tsunami because this region of the coast may have dropped vertically during the earthquake (see 
evidence in Section 4). Evidence of high flow depths comes from debris caught in the railings of 
a bridge damaged by the tsunami at Pichibudi. A temporary road had been constructed over the 
river to detour around the bridge. Grass debris in the bridge indicates minimum flow depths of 5.2
m above the river (Figure 13.26). Local residents encountered at the bridge attest the wave topped 
6.6 m and report of a bus that was carried 80 m inland. 
At Bucalemu we interviewed two men outside of a small market along the front street at the west 
end of town. The older man said the tsunami consisted of 3 or 4 waves, the first was the largest 
arriving at 4 am and the water moved back and forth, oscillating in the low valley north of town. 
The younger man, Carlos, and the woman in the market say the largest wave arrived around 7 am.
The older man says the wave came from the north. A slightly different account of events comes 
from two police officers interviewed in Bucalemu. Both men recount 3 tsunami waves and the 
largest wave arrived at 4 am, but instead of coming from the north, the wave came from the 
southwest and flowed into the lagoon and up the river valley. They attest that the largest wave 
overtopped the rocks where the bridge is located on the beach at Bucalemu.
Bucalemu was clearly harder hit by the tsunami than Pichilemu. Residents say the wave was ~2 
m deep in the valley at the river mouth. Flow depth measurements show the highest water levels 
in the west end of town decreasing toward the east. Damaged siding at a restaurant on the 
waterfront suggests wave heights of 3.5 m or more near the beach (Figure 13.27). At La Estrella, 
in a small sandwich shop near the lagoon, water marks on the building and in the interior of the 
store indicate flow depths of 1.35 to 1.5 m (Figure 13.28). At the east end of Bucalemu, water 
marks on buildings indicate flow depth of 0.1 m or less near the limit of inundation (Figure 
13.29).
At Puente Cahuil, a bridge over Rio Est Nilahue, we investigated tsunami impacts at a 
campground with small wooden kiosks and a fence that appear to have been moved around by 
high water. Near the first intact fence and kiosk evidence of high water offers measurements of 
tsunami flow depth near the probable upper limit of inundation (Figure 13.30). Dead and dried 
vegetation strewn in wooden lattice fencing along with what appears to be a water mark on the 
adjacent kiosk indicate water depths of 0.3 to 0.4 m. Between this location and the river, small
cabanas or kiosks appear to have been transported ~30 m landward. A yellow metal fence has 
been pushed over in the direction of a wave flowing inland. 
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Figure 13.26.  Debris clinging to the railing of this damaged bridge in Pichibudi 
suggests minimum tsunami flow depths reached 5.15 m. Local residents reported 
flow depths of 6.65 m above the creek. Anecdotal accounts suggest the tsunami 
moved a bus 80 m up the creek valley. Tsunami damage along coast becomes 
heavier toward the south of this site in Iloca (S34.880055° W72.155819°, 1515 
hrs on 03/15/2010).
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Figure 13.27.  Damaged siding on this building suggests tsunami flow depths 

reached at least 3.5 m at the west end of Bucalemu (S34.640097° W72.044194°, 

1130 hrs on 03/15/2010).
 
Figure 13.28.  Tsunami flow depths reached a minimum of 1.5 m along the 

waterfront in Bucalemu (S34.641882° W72.043158°, 1051 hrs on 03/15/2010). 
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Figure 13.29. Tsunami flow depths at the east end of Bucalemu reached 0.1 m or 

less near the landward limit of tsunami inundation (S34.642586° W72.037371°, 

1228 hrs on 03/15/2010).
 
Figure 13.30. At Puente Cahuil tsunami flow depths reached a minimum of 0.3 

to 0.4 m and pushed kiosks at a campground several tens of meters landward 

(S34.479276° W72.017610°, 1922 hrs on 03/14/2010). 
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13.6 Pichilemu 
The impact of the tsunami in Pichilemu was considerably less relative to the severe damage 
observed at locations to the south. Residents report that at least 3 waves arrived beginning about 
10 minutes after the earthquake. The first two waves were slow rises of water level, the third 
wave was the largest. Other witnesses noted that there was no receding wave at Playa Hermosa 
and Playa Infernio. The tsunami did fill a small lagoon north of Pichilemu, evident as you enter
the town, then the water flowed out. Debris dangling from limbs of trees east of the lagoon 
indicate minimum flow depths of 2.5 to 3 m (Figure 13.31). Tracing the wrack line of debris 
inland showed that tsunami inundation in the lagoon extended several hundred meters east of the 
beach (Figure 13.32). 
North of town, we encountered a surfer and two friends walking along a street near the western 
margin of a lagoon. Inundation by the tsunami at this site was evident as a wrack line, or line of 
debris chiefly composed of dried reeds from the marsh in the nearby lagoon to the west. The 
surfers recalled the first wave arrived at about 4 am and approached from north to south. They 
remember several waves arriving between 4 am and 7 am. 
The daughter in law of the owner of Cabanas Gusman-Lyon testified that the height of the first 
wave reached about 1.5 m high on a chain-link fence near the beach and about the same height in 
a small shed a few meters away (Figure 13.33). She said the first wave arrived between 3:30 and
4 am in the morning. 
Our interviews with people in Pichilemu and elsewhere converged on a common theme: the wave 
came from the north and traveled to the south. After talking with multiple (3 to 4) witnesses with 
consistent accounts, it appears that along this part of the coastline the tsunami had a directionality 
and approached the shore from the north. One man said the wave struck the large rocks at the tip 
of Punta del Lobos. Other witnesses interviewed at Punta del Lobos attest that the tsunami 
overtopped the sea stacks, which from the overlook at the point appear to be about 15 m above
sea level.
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Figure 13.31. Debris suspended in trees along a lagoon north of Pichilemu 

indicate tsunami flow depths exceed 3 m at this site (S34.385195° W71.999901°, 

1619 hrs on 03/14/2010).
 
Figure 13.32. Tsunami inundation north of Pichilemu was restricted to a small 
coastal lagoon, leaving stems of reeds, trash and other debris near the landward 
limit of inundation. The “wrack line” of debris indicates the tsunami reached the 
fence in the distance but probably did not overtop the higher ground in the right 
of the photo (S34.384558° W71.996936°, 1631 hrs on 03/14/2010). 
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Figure 13.33. Below Cabanas Gusman-Lyon, a local lodging along the water 
front in Pichimelu, tsunami flow depths reached about 1.5 m, destroyed a 
wooden fence (in this photo the fence has been replaced by a new one) and 
washed away cars in the parking area (S34.384288° W72.003774°, 1711 hrs on 
03/14/2010).
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14.0  GEOLOGIC AND TSUNAMI HAZARDS, URBAN PLANNING, AND RECONSTRUCTION  

14.1 Introduction 
The February 27 earthquake and tsunami resulted in substantial geotechnical and structural damage as 
well as loss of life. The geologic setting and patterns of damage offer a variety of challenges to rebuilding 
in Chile. There are also several important lessons for geologic hazards mitigation and planning in 
earthquake and tsunami-prone regions of the U.S. and Canada, particularly in the Cascadia subduction 
zone area of the West Coast, and elsewhere. 
The purpose of the urban planning mission of the GEER team was to assess the geologic and tsunami 
impacts of the February 27 earthquake and identify urban risk management lessons for the U.S. Another
key purpose was to identify candidate areas for potential long-term monitoring of post-disaster rebuilding 
actions in Chile.  
Field reconnaissance between March 14 and 18, 2010 covered over 350 km of the central Chilean 
coastline between Pichilemu and Laraquete. The coastal region experienced some of the most significant 
damage from the tsunami, vertical deformation (uplift versus subsidence), and other geologic effects. 
Much more limited assessments were made of damage-affected areas in the central Chile Valley region, 
Santiago, Vina del Mar, and Valparaiso. Other information has been gleaned from media accounts and 
other reconnaissance reports, as well as collaborations with other investigators including members of the 
GEER team, as well as Nicholas Zoa, and William Siembieda – a member of the Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute’s Learning from Earthquakes reconnaissance team.
14. 2 Earthquake Impacts 
The M8.8 earthquake occurred at 3:34 am in the early morning hours of Saturday, February 27, 2010. 
Given the time of day and day of the week, few people were driving, on the streets or at work, and thus
were not much affected by falling debris or damage to highways, bridges, and roadways. Instead, most
were sleeping, and because it was the end of summer, many people were camping and staying in tourist 
facilities along Chile’s central coast.  A major tsunami struck much of the epicentral coast within minutes 
of the mainshock. 
A “state of catastrophe” was declared in 6 of Chile’s 15 regions – Valparaiso, Metropolitana, Libertador
O’Higgins, Araucania, Biobio and Maule. As of April 7, the Government of Chile's (GoC's) official death
toll was 486 people, with 79 still reported as missing (U.S. AID 2010). The GoC confirmed that the 
earthquake and tsunami affected more than 1.8 million people in the four most affected regions – almost 
1/8th of the country’s population (U.S. AID 2010). At least 30 cities and towns were badly damage.
Infrastructure, including roads, bridges, ports, airports, utilities and communication networks also 
sustained significant damage, with the most severe damage along the coast and in parts of the central 
valley; see Figure 14.1. As of March 29, the GOC is reporting that approximately 370,000 housing units
were damaged by the February 27 earthquake (U.S. AID 2010); see Table 14.1.  
The major industries of the region – fishing, shipping, mining, refineries, forestry, winemaking, and
agriculture – were all disrupted by the earthquake, some with long-term consequences for local and, in 
some instances, regional economies. Details are still forthcoming. Schools, including colleges and 
universities, were on summer break at the time of the earthquake, so damages have not been as well 
reported. However, school damage was extensive across central Chile. To avoid delaying the start of the 
school year, the Government of Chile is merging schools and installing portable classrooms while repairs
take place (Burgoine 2010). Chile’s healthcare system also sustained heavy damage.  Chile’s Minister of 
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Health reports that 7 hospitals in south central Chile were not operational and another 11 are severely 
damaged (Burgoine 2010). They estimate that hospital rebuilding will cost USD 3.6 billion - four times 
the national hospital investment plan that was just launched in November 2009 (Burgoine 2010). 
Figure 14.1. Extent of Earthquake and Tsunami Affected Area in Chile 

(Source: U.S. AID, March 14, 2010)
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Table 14.1. Estimate of Housing Damage (As of March 29, 2010) 

 Housing Units 
Destroyed 
Housing Units 
Significantly
Damaged 
Housing Units 
with Minor 
Damage 
Total Housing 
Units 
Coast 7,931 8,607 15,384 31,922 
Urban Adobe 26,038 28,153 14,869 69,060 
Rural Adobe 24,538 19,783 22,052 66,373 
Multi-unit Public 
Housing 
5,489 15,015 50,955 71,459 
Multi-unit Private 
Housing 
17,449 37,356 76,433 131,238 
Total 81,444 108,914 179,693 370,051 
(Source: Government of Chile) 
Total economic loss estimates range from USD15 to 30 billion which, at a conversion rate of 520 Chilean 
Pesos (CLP), translates to 8 to 16 trillion CLP (10% to 15% of Chile's real GDP (EQECAT 2010). 
EQECAT expects that most of the damage, 55% to 65%, would be to residential structures, with 
commercial damage accounting for 20% to 30% of the total and industrial damage making up 15% to 
20%. As of March 8, 2010, insurance industry estimates ranged from USD2 to 8 billion (or as much as 
25% of total economic losses) (EQECAT 2010). A large degree of uncertainty in the loss estimate mainly
accounts for the extent of infrastructure damage which in some cases is still unknown.  While electricity 
and telecommunication systems are being restored fairly rapidly, water, wastewater, and transportation 
damages are going to take much longer to repair which can significantly escalate business interruption 
losses.
14.3 Urban Planning and Risk Reduction Overview 
After a large-scale disaster like the February 27 earthquake, there are immense psychological, economic
and political pressures to enable repairs and reconstruction as quickly as possible. Taking time to evaluate 
damage causes and patterns, assess future risks, and consider actions to reduce future risk may be seen as
interfering with rapid recovery. However, the post-disaster period can provide unprecedented financial 
resources and other opportunities to reduce future risk and make other improvements.  Given the 
relatively high level of awareness of seismic risk in Chile, and its advanced building codes and 
emergency preparedness systems, this earthquake provides an important case study as to how risk 
reduction or other improvements are made as part of the recovery. 
In their landmark study, Land Use Planning After Earthquakes, William Spangle et al. studied the factors 
influencing rebuilding decisions following damaging earthquakes in Alaska (1964); Santa Rosa, 
California (1969); San Fernando, California (1971), Skopje (former Yugoslavia) (1963), and Managua, 
Nicaragua (1972), as well as Laguna Beach, California after a major landslide (1978) (William Spangle 
and Associates et al. 1980). Their interest was in understanding the effectiveness of post-disaster land use 
planning for achieving risk reduction in the rebuilding. They found that improved safety, post-disaster, is 
more easily achieved through improved structural design and construction than through changing land use.
However, in specific instances, changing land use is the best response (William Spangle and Associates et
al. 1980, 11).
Chile has had seismic design provisions in its codes since 1935, and the standards are comparable with 
the U.S. Generally, seismic codes get stricter with time and most of the recent construction in Chile 
follows the 1996 and 2003 updates to Chile’s Seismic Design Code. The codes apply to new construction, 
268 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
but it is unclear how the codes guide building retrofits or the extent to which seismic retrofitting has been 
required. Chilean engineers estimate that about 25% of the country’s building stock is older without any 
seismic design provisions, and that only about 3% of the country’s new construction is not to code; these 
are usually informal or illegal housing and non-engineered structures.  
Possible structural and building code related responses that Chile may undertake in the aftermath of the
2010 earthquake include: enhanced seismic provisions for new construction, seismic retrofit requirements 
for existing construction, and structural hardening for storm surge and tsunami loading. It is not yet clear 
how storm surge and tsunami loading are addressed in Chile’s current codes. 
Chile also has a multi-governmental framework of land use planning with a National Ministry of
Planning; strong regional planning offices that provide broad-based regional planning; and local planning 
agencies that are more directly involved in the siting and permitting of development and actual land use 
decision making. More research is needed to fully understand Chile’s planning system, but input from
local engineers and architects, and fellow planning researchers, revealed the following preliminary 
information: 
�	 Chile has the regulatory framework to support land use planning and zoning. Recent (2006/2007)
changes in national planning law have required regional and local planning agencies to update 
plans but many have not done so yet. 
�	 Chile has had an active housing and urban development program focused on providing housing to
replace informal settlements throughout the country.
�	 Chile has a coastal zone management act that provides a framework for planning and specifying
desired land uses in coastal areas.
�	 Starting around 2004/2005, the Chilean Navy has been developing tsunami inundation flood 
maps for coastal areas. They are published on the Navy’s website (SHOA website address still
unconfirmed). While this information may have been available, it is not believed to be widely 
known, nor have most coastal cities incorporated the information into local plans, planning 
policies, and planning and building practices.
�	 The availability of hazard mapping for flooding, known faults, earthquake-induced landslides,
vulnerable soils, areas of strong shaking, and areas of liquefaction is unknown. Its use in siting 
structures and building design is also unknown. Local architects do not feel that they receive 
adequate academic training on how to apply such information if it exists. Hazard zonation does 
not appear to be a part of local planning practice. 
�	 Chile has planning and building inspection procedures, in addition to stringent building codes, but 
code violations and lax enforcement by local governments have  been raised as issues of concern 
in light of the spectacular failures of some newer buildings. 
As part of the restoration and rebuilding, there are also a range of possible land use responses that Chile’s 
national government, as well as local and regional governments, may pursue in the restoration and 
rebuilding. They include:  
�	 Changes in land use plans and regulations 
�	 Changes in land use or occupancy 
�	 Relocation of facilities 
�	 Redevelopment 
�	 Land acquisition 
269 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In additional to structural and land use decisions, there are other possible risk reduction responses that 
Chile may choose to pursue. They include public education about hazards and risk, and enhanced warning 
and response planning. 
According to William Spangle et al (1980, 11), the key factors influencing post-disaster risk reduction 
decisions are:
�	 The cause and extent of damage 
�	 The ability to delineate hazardous areas and evaluate the level of risk pertaining to potential uses 
in those areas 
�	 Post-earthquake authority and capabilities of local government to impose building and land use 
limitations 
�	 Availability of, and conditions for the use of, any large blocks of funding, such as from the 
national government, for post-earthquake recovery. 
The following parts of this section of the report explore these issues in further detail with an emphasis on
identifying causes and extent of damage in areas that are likely to have long-term rebuilding challenges, 
as well as opportunities for significant risk reduction and other improvements as part of the rebuilding.  
14.4 Causes and Extent of Damage 
This section summarizes observations made from the entire GEER team on the extent of damage from 
tsunami inundation as well as the following geologic effects: 
�	 Severe shaking and site amplification of ground motions 
�	 Coastal uplift and subsidence 
�	 Liquefaction and lateral spreading 
�	 Landsliding 
More details on the causes and extent of damage can be found in the other, referenced sections of the 
GEER report. By no means is this an exhaustive analysis.  Instead, its main purpose, at this early stage 
post-disaster, is to identify candidate areas to continue to monitor as part of the recovery as well as issues 
for further study. 
14.4.1 Severe shaking and site amplification of ground motions.  
Strong shaking lasted for over ninety seconds in some areas and shaking intensities of VII and greater 
were felt over a vast area, affecting 12 million people (USGS, 2010). As a result, subsequent damage and
ground-surface effects occurred over a north-south length of more than 600 km (375 mi). This is roughly 
equivalent to the entire coastline for the states of Washington and Oregon along the Cascadia subduction 
zone, or the distance between Los Angeles and San Francisco along the San Andreas system in California.  
Long duration ground motions and their effects on buildings and infrastructure are directly relevant to
rupture scenarios for a Cascadia megathrust earthquake in the Pacific Northwest as well as to a large San
Andreas Fault event, like the M7.8 Great Southern California Shakeout scenario.  
According to zoning in Chile’s seismic building code, buildings in the earthquake-affected region must be 
constructed to withstand up to 0.4 g (force of gravity) in peak ground accelerations. Available ground 
motion records are showing ground motions that are less than 0.4 g. And, commensurately, shaking 
damage was minimal in most modern, engineered structures. However, the strong shaking was 
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particularly harmful to adobe, unreinforced masonry, and other non-engineering buildings. As the housing 
damage statistics show, 50,576 (62 %) of the 81,444 housing units that were totally destroyed were adobe
structures. About half of these structures were in more urban settings, while others are classified as rural 
dwellings. It is unclear how the GoC is making its urban-rural distinction. It is also unclear how the GoC 
is treating coastal adobe structures, since it has a separate count for coastal dwellings (see Table 14.1). 
Concentrations of collapsed and heavily damaged structures due to strong shaking were observed in both 
the central valley and coastal areas during the reconnaissance.  Chile’s central valley is a basin of young 
alluvial soils. Towns are typically built alongside rivers and the young sediments likely influenced strong 
ground motions. Further study is needed to characterize whether soft alluviums or other site affects 
contributed significantly to the damage patterns and may need to be considered as part of the rebuilding. 
Some of the localities with significant concentrations of shaking-related damage are shown (in roughly 
north to south order) in Table 14.2. Strong shaking related damage occurred throughout the coastal areas;
however, much of it was erased by the tsunami. Pockets remain, particularly in areas of older building 
stock that were not within the tsunami’s path. 
Areas of concentrated damage in older and more vulnerable building stock are potential areas where
changes in land use or large-scale redevelopment may be likely. It has been reported that the city of 
Chillan, in the central valley area, experienced heavy damage in a 1939 earthquake. It has been an 
explanation for why there was less damage in Chillan in the 2010 earthquake. Subsequent investigations
of Chillan should verify post-1939 reconstruction, structural and land use risk reductions made as part of
the rebuilding, and building performance in the 2010 earthquake. Chillan could be a good comparative 
case study with Talca or other central valley cities that had a higher percentage of older buildings that 
suffered extensive damage in 2010. 
Section 5 details observations of soft soil related ground amplification and damage in select areas of
Santiago, Vina del Mar, and Talca. The Santiago and Vina del Mar observations focused on site effects at
modern, engineered structures. Additional pockets of heavy damage also exist in the older parts of several
other central valley and coastal area cities. Two examples are Parral (37,822 population) and Cauquenes 
(41,217 population) located on the western side of the central valley. In these two localities, local
commerce was functioning and much of the town was inhabited and active. These areas are less likely to 
consider substantive land use changes or redevelopment. It is unclear at this time whether building owners 
will be required to repair or rebuild to higher seismic standards.  
14.4.2 Tsunami Inundation
The February 27, 2010 earthquake in Chile generated a tsunami that arrived within 30 minutes of the
earthquake in the epicentral region of the Chileans coast. Towns in this region of the coast, such as 
Talcahuano, Constitucion, and Curanipe, had wave heights of 3 to 4 meters. Within an hour, the tsunami
struck further north near the ports of San Antonio and Valparaiso with heights of 0.75 to 2.5 meters, as 
well as to the south. Tsunami inundation extended over 1 kilometer inland in some areas and also
propagated much further up the mouths of rivers and streams. 
Section 13 details the impacts of the tsunami along Chile’s coast, and Section 4 provides details on wave 
measurements taken as part of the investigations of coastal deformation. This section of the report focuses 
on areas of the coastline where tsunami damage was most extensive.  Table 14.3 lists from north to south, 
the most heavily impacted localities where risk reduction measures, such as changes in building codes and
land uses, may be implemented as part of the recovery. In particular, the towns of Bucalemu,
Constitucion (see Figures 14.2 and 14.3), Curanipe (see Figures 14.4 and 14.5), Dichato, and Talcahuano
(see Figure 14.6) sustained extensive damage. Some cases also had pre-existing economic challenges and
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substantial life loss resulting from the tsunami. These conditions may make these areas likely candidates
for post-disaster risk reduction and other improvement efforts. 
Table 14.2 Areas of Concentrated Shaking-Related Damage
Central Valley area �	 Santa Cruz. Extensive damage to masonry and adobe structures.
�	 Marchihue (small town approaching the Coast Range). Nearly
all adobe and masonry buildings collapsed or severely damaged, 
but the few modern buildings appeared undamaged. 
�	 Curico (population 119,585). The downtown commercial district 
(about 20 city blocks) sustained heavily damage. As of March 
17, much of the debris had been cleared in the downtown 
district, remaining damaged structures were gutted, and the 
district was devoid of business activity. 
�	 Talca (population 210,797). There was significant damage to 
older masonry and adobe structures. Media report of 1,800 
housing units being demolished the week of March 14 – 18.
�	 Curepto (population 10,812). Damage reported to be extensive. 
�	 Maule. Damage reported to be extensive. 
Coastal area �	 Chanco (population 9,457). Much of the adobe and masonry
buildings are seriously damaged. Chanco is well away from the 
coast so all the damage is from shaking, not tsunami. Paredones. 
Damage reported to be extensive. Away from the coast so all 
damage is from shaking, not tsunami.  
�	 Constitucion (population 46,081). Significant adobe and 
masonry building damage in the downtown area surrounding the 
main plaza. The shaking damage merges with the tsunami
damage that extends inland along the Maule River. (This 
example is discussed further in section 14.3.2) 
�	 Talcahuano (population 250,348). Adobe and masonry building 
damage merges with tsunami damage in the older downtown 
area near the bay and ocean ports. 
�	 Concepcion (population 216,061). Adobe and masonry building 
damage in older areas of the city, such as the city center. Site of 
two severely damaged high-rise structures; the cause of those 
damages is still uncertain. 
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Figure 14.2. Constitucion. Debris removal and road clearing still underway in the tsunami inundation zone along the 

Maule River. (S35.340323°, W72.396772°; 16:54 hours on 3/15/2010).   

Figure 14.3. Constitucion. Tsunami damage merges with shaking related damage in the older section of the city 

center with its many adobe and unreinforced masonry buildings.  

(S35.335383°, W72.410055°; 17:25 hours on 3/15/2010). 
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Figure 14.4. Curanipe. Main beach and much of town’s debris has been completely cleared. 

(S35.843823°, W72.6385°; 15:58 hours on 3/17/2010) 

Figure 14.5. Curanipe. According to locals, hundreds were at a campground in this grove of trees. Many ran to the 

beach to avoid falling trees and were swept away by the tsunami. 

(S35.843957°, W72.69647°; 15:59 hours on 3/17/2010) 
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Figure 14.6. Tsunami damage near Navy facilities and bayside port of Talcahuano.  

(S36.711305°, W73.114808°; 12:39 hours on 3/16/2010) 

14.4.3 Coastal Uplift and Subsidence
 
As the earthquake ruptured, it uplifted the central Chilean coast (as much as 3 meters) and also subsided 
elsewhere (as much as 2 meters). It also permanently displaced much of the South American continent.
Buenos Aires moved 4 centimeters closer to Chile. The city of Concepcion, near the epicenter, moved 3 
meters to the west. The uplift and subsidence have had immediately visible impacts to shorelines, beaches,
ports, and harbors. The subsurface deformation may have resulted in more hidden damage to subsurface 
pipelines, infrastructure, foundations, and other elements vulnerable to differential displacements.  
Section 4 details the measurements and evidence of uplift and subsidence observed along the coast.  The 
towns of Bucalemu and Lebu are featured in that section and also here. Both towns have experienced
substantial deformation that may result in land use changes and risk reduction efforts. 
Bucalemu (S34.642627o, W72.043017o) (approximate population 1,500) is part of the coastal region north 
of Constitucion that appears to have had substantial tsunami inundation of over 3 meters at the shore, 
coupled with vertical subsidence of 0.5 meters. There was limited evidence of shaking-related damages to 
non-tsunami impacted structures. The small resort and fishing village is a popular tourist destination with 
lodging, restaurants, discos, and shops all nestled in and around an inland estuary and lagoon. In the 
summertime, the town’s population doubles to about 3,000 with tourists.   
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Table 14.3 Areas of Concentrated Tsunami-related Damage 

Pichelemu
(25,000 approx. 
pop.)
The dunes, bluffs, and levees protected much of the town. Tsunami damage extended 
across the main beach road and also propagated up a channel on the north end of 
town. Beach front redevelopment is likely and may involve structural and land use 
changes, such as building elevations, setbacks and reductions in occupancies. 
Bucalemu (1,500 
approx. pop.)
The tsunami inundated the small lagoon area and propagated up the channel, 
depositing fishing boats more than 100 meters to the east of the coast highway bridge 
(and more than 1 kilometer from the shoreline). Houses, discos, cabanas, and 
campgrounds were destroyed. (This example is discussed further in section 14.4.3) 
Boyeruca Small village with reportedly substantial tsunami damage. It was not part of this 
investigation. 
Lipimavidia Small village where tsunami damage appears to have been reduced somewhat by the 
dunes. But, it still crossed the road in lower-lying areas and inundated structures 
along the inland side of the coast road as well. 
Iloca The town was heavily damaged by the tsunami. The north end of the town sustained 
less damage than the south side.   
Constitucion 
(46,081 pop.)
Tsunami damage is quite extensive. The tsunami reportedly traveled more than 4 
kilometers up the Maule river. Damage also extends inland for several blocks from
the river and the beach front (e.g., 10 blocks long and 3 to 4 blocks inland). 
Los Pellines A small village that may have been suffering economically before the earthquake due 
to a nearby paper pulp plant closing. Tsunami damage impacted the beachfront and 
streamfront structures. 
Pelluhue A resort and fishing village. Low-lying areas, around beaches, coves, and the mouths 
of streams, were hit hard by the tsunami.  There were tsunami-related deaths in 
beachfront motels. 
Curanipe A resort and fishing village with an extensive beach that had camping grounds, 
discos, tourist accommodations, and housing. Low-lying areas, around beaches, 
coves, and the mouths of streams, were hit hard by the tsunami.  There were tsunami-
related deaths in the campgrounds and beachfront hotels and discos.  Locals reported 
that local government considerations of changes in land use were already underway.  
Dichato One of hardest hit towns. Only buildings on higher ground were undamaged. A 
number of stronger structures also survived, but with substantial first floor damage. 
A boat was swept inland over 3 kilometers.  
Penco Tsunami damage both in the town and the port. Penco received substantive debris 
from neighboring Talcahuano port, including containers and a marine ship.
Talcahuano 
(250,348 pop.) 
Tsunami damage is extensive at the Navy port, bayfront and oceanfront port 
facilities, and in the older downtown area near the bay and port. The ocean front and 
downtown areas may have been in decline prior to the earthquake and may be a focus 
for post-earthquake redevelopment. 
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Local policeman say that there were many cabanas, campgrounds, and discos along the estuary, and about
500 people were in this low-lying area when the earthquake hit (see Figures 14.7a and 14.7b). There was 
a lot of moonlight and many people were out dancing. There was no tsunami alarm. But, many of the 
local people, firemen and police shouted to get out knowing that a tsunami might strike after the 
earthquake shaking stopped. Some saw the ocean receding and knew it was a forewarning of tsunami.
Vacationers jumped into their cars and drove inland and up into the hills above the town. The tsunami
was up to 2 meters deep in the estuary valley area and penetrated nearly 1 kilometer up the river, pushing 
fishing boats upstream under the coast highway bridge.  
Prior to the earthquake, the town had been embarking in a fairly significant capital improvement project 
that included expansion of the lagoon and construction of a boardwalk along the shore (see Figures 14.8 
and 14.9). Local residents say that the lagoon used to be only 10 meters wide and did not have a 
permanent opening to the sea and the rough waves like it does now. They say the beach extended about
20 meters beyond the arched, orange bridge out next to the pub building at the rocky point. Now the 
waves are crashing up against the pub building (see Figure 14.10). The cement boat launch ramp next to
the pub building is now under water and the beach that local fisherman used to pull their boats up onto is
gone.
Bucalemu’s physical geography has been dramatically altered by the earthquake and tsunami. High-
density tourist-oriented uses that were previous adjacent to the estuary may be much more vulnerable to 
flooding, storm surge, and tsunami hazards. As part of the rebuilding, changes in land use, reductions in 
allowable densities, and condemnation or acquisition of low-lying areas both along the estuary and the 
adjusted shoreline, may be considered in addition to other risk reduction and community improvement
measures.
Figure 14.7a and 14.7b Bucalemu.. Much of the tsunami debris and damaged structures had already been removed 

from the low-lying area along the estuary that had campgrounds, hotels, restaurants, and discos. As many as 500 

people were in this area when the earthquake struck. (S34.62552°, W72.038395°; 09:05 hours on 3/15/2010) 

277 
  
 
 
Figure 14.8. Bucalemu. Prior to the earthquake, the town had been expanding the lagoon and constructing a 

boardwalk along the shore.  (S34.642367°, W72.040965°; 09:06 hours on 3/15/2010) 

Figure 14.9. Bucalemu. Local residents say the beach extended about 20 meters beyond the arched, orange bridge 

out next to the pub building at the rocky point. (S34.641713°, W72.043115°; 09:09 hours on 3/15/2010) 
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Figure 14.10. Bucalemu. Waves crashing up against the pub building. The cement boat launch ramp and former 
beach are now submerged after the tsunami.  (S34.474325°, W72.023918°; 10:42 hours on 3/15/2010) 
Lebu (S37.591897°, W73.668353°) is part of the coastal region that had as much as 2 meters of uplift in 
the February 27 earthquake. Lebu is the capital of the province of Arauco. Its economy centers on fishing, 
forestry, trade, and services. It is also home Lebu mine (Carvil), the last coal mine in the area following 
the closure of Lota, Schwager and Trongol; it has been kept open with state subsidies.  
Coseismic uplift has stranded boats in Lebu’s harbor (see Figure 14.11). The lighthouse northwest of the 
Lebu Harbor inlet is on an island that was uplifted enough to almost form a peninsula.  Lebu will likely 
have significant land use planning issues as part of the rebuilding that may include relocation and 
construction of the harbor and appropriation of rights to the newly-created land. This area was also 
uplifted in the 1960 earthquake, so there are historic decisions and ongoing risk management issues to be 
studied as well. 
14.4.4 Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading
Evidence of ground cracking, liquefaction, and lateral spreading have been documented across a vast 
region that is roughly 600 kilometers long and 100 kilometers wide. River sediments were especially 
vulnerable to ground deformation, and observations were made along many of the regions large, east-west
trending watersheds the flow into the Pacific Ocean. Areas alongside lakes, bays, and ports were also
especially vulnerable. Section 6 documents in much greater detail the ground deformation observations 
made as part of the GEER reconnaissance.
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Figure 14.11. Boats stranded in Lebu’s Harbor. (S37.603694° W73.654372°; 1800 hrs on 03/10/2010).  
For the most part, these deformations are fairly distinct occurrences and were not a significant contributor 
to the overall damage levels. However, there are some potential areas for more focused study. A key
concern is ports and bridges, where ground deformations were a consistent cause of damage; sites should 
be remediated as part of the repairs. There were also a few instances where the future stability and 
suitability of building sites may be questioned as part of the rebuilding. Two such observations are briefly
discussed below, and are good candidates for long-term observation. 
Lateral spreading along the banks of Lago Vichuquen (S34.796068o, W72.078810o), near the Laguna
Torca National Reserve, severely impacted the road bed, underground utilities, and lakeside properties 
(see Figures 14.12, 14.13, and 14.14). Much of the ground underlying a small lakeside cabana hotel has 
been affected. Over 50 feet of shoreline was submerged and there was evidence for submarine landsliding 
as well. Sections of lawn, trees, and boat docks were all submerged. The shore side piers of several
cabanas were also submerged and there was evidence of structural damage as well. The future viability of
this property is definitely in question since there is not adequate land area between the cabanas and the 
road to setback and reconstruct. Ground deformation was observed in another location along the lake road
but did not appear to be a consistent feature along the shoreline. Other boat docks along the shoreline did 
not appear damaged or submerged, but further study is needed. 
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Figure 14.12. Lago Vichuquen,. Lateral spreading on the inland side of the lakefront road. 

(S34.39097°, W72.077815°; 12:46 hours on 3/15/2010) 

Figure 14.13. Lago Vichuquen. Lateral spreading has affected much of the ground underlying a small lakeside 

cabana hotel. Some shore side piers of the cabanas were submerged and there was evidence of structural damage as 

well. (S34.796345°, W72.07885°; 12:58 hours on 3/15/2010) 
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Figure 14.14. Lago Vichuquen, March 15. The lawn, trees, and boat docks are all submerged and there was evidence 
for submarine landsliding as well.  (S34.79634°, W72.078852°; 12:52 hours on 3/15/2010) 
Several port side properties at Port San Vicente in Talcahuano were also significantly damaged by lateral
spreading and ground deformation (S36.72593o, W73.12872o). Two fish processing plants, Alimentos 
Marinos and Concession Maritima, were both severely damaged and not in operation on March 15 (see 
Figures 14.15 and 14.16). 
Port San Vicente is a major fish processing facility and the two plant closures are likely to have prolonged 
impacts on the region’s fishing economy. On March 14, fishing boats were observed dropping their loads
in the harbor since the plants were not operational. Alimentos Marinos employed 300 people directly and 
another 300 indirectly. Insurance adjustors were onsite on March 15 and the former plant manager said 
the facility will likely not be rebuilt in this location. This type of relocation could have significant local
economic ripple effects. The suitability of the port side land for rebuilding is also a major question. 
Across the port road from the two damaged plant is a tank farm facility that had no observable damage 
(see Figure 14.17). Perhaps, the tank farm had better site preparations as part of its construction. Also, the 
port road was slightly elevated from surrounding lands and may be part of a levee system along a former 
shoreline. The fish processing facility may be sited on much more vulnerable bay fills than the tank farm.
Additional study is needed to clarify these concerns.
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Figure 14.15. Port San Vicente, Talcahuano. The damaged Alimentos Marinos fish processing plant will likely not 

be rebuilt at this port. (S36.725983°, W73.128817°; 11:45 hours on 3/16/2010) 

Figure 14.16. Port San Vicente, Talcahuano. The damaged Concession Maritima fish processing plant.

(S36.725892°, W73.128678°; 11:50 hours on 3/16/2010) 
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Figure 14.17. Port San Vicente, Talcahuano. View of two damaged fish processing plants and nearby tank farm. 
(S36.724605°, W73.136475°; 12:18 hours on 3/16/2010) 
14.4.5 Landsliding
Earthquake-induced landsliding was not prevalent in this earthquake. Section 12 documents the 
landsliding observations made as part of the GEER reconnaissance. Rockfalls and slides were observed in 
highway road cuts traversing the coast ranges (see Figure 14.8). Slumping was also observed along 
coastal bluffs and river banks. While, there do not appear to be any large-scale landslides that would have 
significant long-term rebuilding issues, landsliding may have some important near- to medium-term 
implications for recovery. 
The February 27 earthquake occurred at the end of the dry, summer period and ground water tables were 
low. Slope instability may significantly increase into the rainy season, with more significant episodes of 
landsliding possible as future earthquake sequences occur. Access across the coast ranges to coastal areas 
could be significantly affected by rain-induced slope failures.  
Also, many temporary settlements were observed in hillsides and on coastal bluffs (see Figure 14.19). The 
site selection of both informal and formal (organized) encampments is likely being driven by tsunami-
hazard related concerns. Formal encampments established by the government and non-governmental
organizations seem to have included some site preparations. However, informal settlements did not. These 
encampments may be vulnerable to landsliding in future aftershocks or with increased rainfall and soil 
moisture conditions.  Local architects report that there is a history of temporary encampments becoming
permanent, low-cost housing.
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Figure 14.18. Lota Alto, Bio Bio region. Failures on the road cuts along one of two main highways leading to the 

Port of Coronel and surrounding coastal cities. (S37.047677°, W73.061597°; 15:30 hours on 3/16/2010) 

Figure 14.19. Temporary housing settlement being established in the hills above the coast near the town of 

Lipimavidia.  (S34.853393°, W72.135148°; 13:41 hours on 3/15/2010) 
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14.5 Post-Earthquake Evaluations of Hazards and Risk 
There is a tremendous need for timely and credible evaluations of the hazards as well as future risks 
throughout the region affected by the February 27 earthquake. Low-lying coastal, bay, and riverine areas 
that had tsunami inundation, as well as areas with concentrated building damage, should be given priority 
for evaluation. Priority areas for mapping might include, put should not be limited to, Bucalemu, 
Constitucion, Curanipe Dichato, Talca, and Talcahuano, as well as specific sites in Santiago, Valparaiso,
and Vina del Mar. 
As a first step, high hazard areas should be delineated and followed by more detailed studies. Areas with 
problems for tsunami evacuation also should be identified to assist with evacuation route design and 
education efforts. Hazard delineation can be accomplished fairly readily, but evaluating future risk is far 
more difficult. The earthquake affected region has experienced many large earthquakes in the past century,
including the Chillan Earthquake (M7.7) of 1939, which damaged an area covering 45,000 square 
kilometers and killed 30,000 people; and the catastrophic series of earthquakes and tsunamis in May and 
June of 1960 that killed hundreds, displaced about 1 million people, destroyed over 400,000 houses, and 
resulted in damage totaling over $417 million (1960 U.S. dollars) (RMS 2009). The risk of future
earthquakes and tsunamis, and their consequence, need further study, particularly in light of geologic and 
tsunami impacts of the 2010 earthquake and the improved building stock that will likely result from the 
rebuilding. 
It is hoped that the series of tsunami inundation flood maps developed prior to the earthquake will be 
widely distributed to local governments and private landowners in the most heavily affected areas. 
Additional damage and hazard mapping efforts are reportedly underway in some of the most heavily 
impacted areas, like Constitucion and Dichato. 
14.6 Post-earthquake Authority and Capacity of Local Governments for Risk Reduction  
Initial investigations suggest that local governments will have authority for post-earthquake land use and 
rebuilding considerations, but there capacity to deal with technical issues of hazards evaluation and risk 
reduction is uncertain. Technical assistance may be needed for hazards mapping, risk evaluation, 
policymaking and decision making, and enforcement. 
More education and training is needed, particularly with local government decisionmakers, architects,
planners, as well as landowners. These stakeholders need to understand the process and purpose of hazard 
and risk evaluations, as well as how to interpret and use the resulting information in decision making. 
Such education and training will be critical if there is political will and the desire to reduce future risk as 
part of the rebuilding process. 
In rebuilding, local governments should consider reconstructing easily accessible and well-marked 
tsunami evacuation routes and shelters in areas where access may have been more limited prior to the 
earthquake. Additional consideration should be given as to whether to allow high-density and tourist 
related uses in tsunami hazard areas. Such uses include campgrounds, hotels, and nightclubs.  The public 
also need to be involved in post-earthquake planning and decision making. It is unclear how versed 
Chile’s local governments are in public involvement processes.
Priority localities for monitoring recovery and rebuilding decision making are: Bucalemu, Constitucion, 
Concepcion, Curanipe, Curico, Dichato, Lebu, and Talca. 
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14.7 National Policies and Plans for Post-Earthquake Recovery
Soon after taking office on March 11, President Pinera created a special reconstruction team to advise on 
the rebuilding effort and also began reviewing the national budget to make adjusts in2010 to help finance 
reconstruction (Burgoine 2010). 
Based on observations in mid-March, the national government’s initial priorities in recovery have been to 
help disaster-impacted populations with basic food, water, and shelter needs; repair and reconstruct the
main highways and bridges; inspect buildings; and remove debris. 
Interviews with impacted residents verified that most were receiving basic assistance of food, water, and
shelter, but there were a few exceptions where these services had been delayed or were insufficient. Most 
residents interviewed did not expect to receive government assistance for rebuilding their damaged homes 
or businesses. 
On March 29, the GoC announced plans for a national housing reconstruction plan called “Chile United
to Build Better” (Van der Horst 2010). The plan will cost approximately $2.5 billion and will provide
housing subsidies to assist nearly 196,000 families affected by the February earthquake and tsunami.
Housing subsidies will be provided between April 2010 and April 2012 and will target the most 
vulnerable and middle-income families. Additional details of the subsidies, conditions for funding, are
needed. 
Based on initial investigations, however, hazard mitigation does not appear to be an integral part of 
national, regional, or local planning or disaster management policies. There do not appear to be any
guidelines to require mitigation as part of post-disaster assistance, such as the local and state hazard 
mitigation planning requirements of the U.S. Disaster Mitigation Act, or post-disaster assistance 
requirements of the U.S. Stafford Act.   
But, it is early in the recovery and government agencies, at all levels, are only beginning to plan for the 
rebuilding. Given Chile’s fairly robust framework of building standards and planning regulations, there 
are many potentially valuable lessons to be learned (at the national, regional, and local levels) on how risk 
reduction and other improvements are considered and addressed in rebuilding from the February 27 
earthquake. 
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15.0 SITE CHARACTERIZATION USING ADVANCED RECONNAISSANCE 
TOOLS 
15.1 Advanced Tools Reconnaissance Approach 
The Phase C reconnaissance effort was led by Dr. Robert Kayen (US Geological Survey 
& UCLA), and included Professor Scott Olson (University of Illinois), Dr. Lenart 
Gonzalez (Golder Assoc., Santiago, Chile), Sebastian Mauriera (Graduate Student, 
University of Chile), and Valentina Peredo (Undergraduate Student, University of Chile). 
This team focused exclusively on performing field tests for characterizing the soil 
properties, ground conditions, and surface manifestations of deformations at sites deemed 
highest priority by the Phase A & B teams, because site conditions or soil properties were 
likely to change during reconstruction, or the properties of the geotechnical failure were 
needed to analyze the failure mode(s). The third reconnaissance group returned from 
Chile on March 31, 2010, and field data are still being processed. This section provides
an overview of the equipment used in the field, the sites that were tested, and preliminary
data from the testing effort. All processed data will be available in the final report.
The Phase C team used a dynamic cone penetration test system (DCPT) originally 
designed by Dr. George Sowers (Sowers and Hedges 1966) and built by Humboldt 
Manufacturing Co. This system utilizes a 15-lb drop weight on an E-rod slide drive to 
penetrate an oversized 45° apex angle cone. The cone is oversized to reduce rod friction 
behind the tip. Spectral analysis of surface waves (SASW) was used to non-invasively
measure soil stiffness to depths between 8 and 30 meters. The SASW system employed 
1-Hz sensors, a signal analyzer, and a sledge to impact the ground and create random 
vibrations. Using a sledge limited the depth of surface wave dispersion measurement to 
shallow depths of 8 to 15m. For some sites, the Phase C team hand-dropped a steel 140-lb 
SPT donut weight from a height ranging from 30 to 45 cm to generate lower-frequency 
signals. It may be possible to invert profiles in excess of 20 meters using the heavier SPT 
drop weight, although these data are still being processed. Surface mapping of damaged 
sites was performed using a terrestrial laser scanner (TLS-LIDAR, or LIDAR). One or
more of the three tests, DCPT, SASW, and LIDAR, were performed at a total ten 
locations from March 24 to 28, 2010. The test locations are listed in Table 1, and mapped 
in Figures 15.1 through 15.3. 
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Figure 15.1. Sites investigated during the Phase C reconnaissance.  Five sites are located 
in Concepcion (see Figure 15.2). South of the city, the team investigated the embankment 
failure on the coast highway and at Curanilahue Hospital. North of the city, the team
investigated the Curiheuco Dam, the Ruta 5 overpass embankment failure, and the 
tailings pond failure at Las Palmas mine. 
Figure 15.2. Site investigations in Concepcion. Testing was performed at: [1] the 

Llacolen Bridge approach deck collapse; [2] the collapsed building near the Llacolen 
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Bridge; [3] the West Bridge (Juan Pablo II) liquefaction site; [4] the 8-storey building 

liquefaction settlement site; and [5] the Parallel bridge liquefaction site.
 
Figure 15.3. Site investigation at the new Provincial Hospital of Curanilahue south of 
Concepcion. The SASW and DCPT sites are located along a walkway on the southwest 
corner of the Hospital. Additional hand auger holes were drilled in the interior 
courtyards, but encountered only structural fill. 
The Phase D reconnaissance effort was led by Professor Youssef Hashash (University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and included Professor Jame Bay (Utah State University) 
and Gabriel Ferrer Zagle (Graduate Student, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 
Santiago). The team traveled along with the team from Mid-America Earthqauke Center. 
This team was tasked to acquire data at a sites , identified, but not covered by previous 
GEER teams and included collection of geometric and shear wave velocity data using 
SASW. The team also collected data that represented targets of opportunity. The team
arrived in Chile On Monday April 11th 2010, and departed on Saturday April 17th 2010. 
In addition to visit to damaged sites defined by Phase 2 team, Team D visited with 
faculty and engineers at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and University of Chile.   
Phase D team used spectral analysis of surface waves (SASW) to non-invasively measure 
soil stiffness. The team used a sledge hammer or a steel SPT donut weight to generate the 
signals. The sites visited and tested by Team D are listed in Table 2 and shown in Figures 
15.4- 15.7. 
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 Figure 15.4 Sites visited and GPS tracks (black lines – blue arrows) of areas traveled by 

Team D 
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Figure 15.5 Sites visited around Santiago (Team D) 

Figure 15.6 Sites Visited between Santiago and Concepcion (Team D) 
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Figure 15.7 Sites visited around Concepcion (Team D) 

15.2 Dynamic Cone Penetration (DCPT)
Sowers and Hedges (1966) developed a dynamic cone penetration test system (DCPT) for 
shallow foundation and site characterization testing, and the system is built by Humboldt 
Manufacturing Co. This system utilizes a 15-lb drop weight on an E-rod slide drive (as 
shown in Figure 15.8) to penetrate an oversized 45° apex angle cone to depths up to 
about 6 meters during these site investigations. The cone is oversized to reduce rod 
friction behind the tip. Hand auger holes were drilled in conjunction with the DCPT to
determine stratigraphy (to depths slightly below the groundwater table), minimize rod 
friction, and collect soil samples (Figure 15.9).  
Dynamic cone penetration tests were performed at seven of the ten highest priority sites 
to refusal (typically the DCPT refused in gravelly soils) or to a depth of about 6 meters, 
when we ran out of rods. In most cases, the DCPT/hand augers were able to delineate the 
stratigraphy at shallow depths, identify the depth to the ground water table, and allow us 
to retrieve soil samples for subsequent index testing (these results are not currently
available). In addition, the DCPT provided a viable wave source at shallow depths for the
SASW testing described subsequently (see Figure 15.10). 
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Figure 15.8. Dynamic CPT testing using the manual drop weight. 

Figure 15.9. Augering to assist DCPT testing. 
15.3 Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) 
The noninvasive Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) method was used to obtain 
shallow shear wave velocity (Vs) profiles at nine sites affected by the earthquake. Shear 
wave velocity measurements at these sites are collected to: (1) delineate the depth and 
thickness of liquefiable soils that contributed to observed deformations of bridges, 
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highways, and buildings; and (2) to assess site amplification effects by way of dynamic 
analyses using representative recorded ground motions. The SASW field measurements 
were made using three 1.0 Hz Wilcozon geophones powered with a small external 
amplifier box, a four-channel Agilent 35670A dynamic signal analyzer, two hammers 
purchased in Chile, and an SPT donut drop weight borrowed from a local driller in 
Concepcion. The spectral analyzer runs off a single car battery and the seismometer 
system is powered by 9-volt radio batteries. This system is easily transportable and still 
allows for adjustment of signal gain, ideal for earthquake reconnaissance efforts. SASW 
data were collected at seven investigation sites (see Table 1) using multiple source 
signals from the DCPT (Figure 15.10), a sledge hammer (Figure 15.11), and a 140-lb 
SPT donut hammer drop weight. Figure 15.12 provides an overview of the SASW test 
and a DCPT sounding performed at the Llacolen bridge site. 
The experimental dispersion curve data obtained at the sites were gathered for 
wavelengths between approximately 0.2 and 80 meters, and were resolved at frequencies 
between approximately 5 to 200 Hz. The theoretical dispersion curve was fit to the 
experimental data via iterative forward modeling using the 3D solution in WinSASW 
(Joh 1996), which accounts for fundamental and higher-mode surfaces waves, as well as 
reflected body waves. The dispersion trends show changes in the velocity structure of the 
soil column. Typically near the surface a crust results in a velocity inversion at short 
wavelengths and high frequencies, followed by a normally dispersive trend of increasing 
phase velocity with increasing wavelength, and corresponding decreasing frequency. 
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Figure 15.10. When the DCPT test was penetrating the upper two meters of soil, the drop 

weight was used as a wave source for the SASW test.  (35.183884°S, 71.76110°W; 28 

March 2010; 

Figure 15.11. Using a small sledge hammer as a wave source for the SASW test. In 

addition, a larger, 10-lb sledge was also used as a wave source. 
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Figure 15.12. DCPT and SASW testing beneath the Llacolen Bridge site. 
15.4 Terrestrial Laser Scanning 
The terrestrial LIDAR technique (3D laser scanning) consists of sending and receiving 
laser pulses to build a point file of three-dimensional coordinates of the scanned surface.
The time of travel for a single pulse reflection is measured along a known trajectory such 
that the distance from the laser, and consequently the position of a point of interest, is 
computed. Using this methodology, data collection occurs at rates of thousands of points 
per second generating a “point cloud” of three-dimensional coordinates.  
A Riegl Z210 laser scanner (Riegl, 2007) was used to conduct tripod-mounted surveys 
(see Figure 15.13) at nine sites in the affected area. Table 1 lists the sites scanned using 
the TLS method, and Figures 15.13 and 15.14. Multiple scans were collected during each 
site survey to fill in “shadow zones” of locations not directly in the line-of-sight of the 
laser and to expand the range and density of the point data. Data were collected at a rate 
of 8000 points per second, scanning a range of 360 degrees in the horizontal direction and 
80 degrees in the vertical direction. For all the sites, a project coordinate system was used 
to register and reference multiple scan locations into one large project file. No global 
georeferencing using differential GPS was performed at any of the sites. Scanning and 
registration were performed using Riscan-Pro (Riegl, 2009). Point cloud processing and 
surface modeling of the data was performed using I-SiTE software (I-SiTE, 2007) 
specifically designed to handle laser scan data.  
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The registration of LIDAR data involves merging two, or more, individual scans data to 
form a single model of the reconnaissance site area, termed the registration process. Two 
methods are used to register individual scans, reflector-based registration or point cloud-
based registration. Between five and ten 5-centimeter diameter reflectors were placed in 
the target area of each reconnaissance site, identified in the individual scans, and 
rescanned at ultra-high resolution to determine the reflector center. A least square best fit 
model was used to translate and rotate the individual scans to merge them together. For 
several sites (Curanilue Hospital, Las Palmas Tailings Pond, and the Parallel bridge), it 
was impossible to place reflectors. For these sites, a best fit translation and rotation 
registration process, using millions of points, aligns the overlapping data within a pair of 
point cloud data-scans. For example, at the Llaracon bridge approach deck failure, we 
digitally removed bridge deck to digitally view the lateral spread in plan view (Figure 
15.20). In this figure, the approach deck collapse is at the bottom of the image (also seen 
in the photograph in Figure 15.14). The cylindrical cross section of the bridge piers that 
displaced riverward can be seen just above (west) of the bridge collapse. The first river-
crossing pier is at the top of image, and can also be seen in Figure 15.14. 
Point data from each set of scans were subjected to a series of filters to remove non-
ground surface and extraneous laser returns from the point clouds. Points reflected from 
vegetation, power lines, and other non-ground or water conveyance features were 
manually cropped from each of the point clouds. Next, an isolated point filter was used to 
remove single point instances occurring above the land surface. These isolated points are 
usually a result of reflections from moisture in the atmosphere. Topographic filters that 
select the lowest point in the point clouds were used to remove vegetation from point 
clouds. Here, the entire data set was divided into 5 to 10 cm square bins, and only the 
lowest points within the bins are selected.  
The final product of LIDAR data processing is the generation of three-dimensional 
surface models. A linear interpolation method is used in the processing of surface 
models: linear interpolation is used to generate surface edges of TIN facets between 
points. Triangular irregular network (TIN) models represent a topographic surface of 
each area. After filtering (see above), a TIN surface was generated from each scan file 
using either a spherical surface algorithm (curved facets) or a linear topographic 
algorithm (flat facets) (I-Site, 2007). 
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Figure 15.13 Terrestrial laser scanning with a Riegl z420 LIDAR unit at the Las Palmas 

Mine tailings dam failure.  The system uses a PC for data acquisition and a car battery to 

power the laser. 

Figure 15.14 Terrestrial laser scanning with a Riegl z420 LIDAR unit at the West Bio 

Bio River (Juan Pablo 2) bridge.
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15.5 Data sets for Sites Investigated During Phase C & D 
Data set for Coiheco Dam (S36.637166°, W71.797530°) 
The Coiheuco Dam was visited by three GEER teams. The first visit was on March 10, 
2010, the second visit was on March 14, and the third visit was on March 28. The dam 
was built during the period from 1964 to 1970 and has a maximum height of 31 m and a 
crest length of 1040 m. A Google Earth image of the dam is shown in Section 11.  It was 
not clear if soil liquefaction occurred at this site as potential evidence of liquefaction was 
not apparent to the GEER teams. Several slumps occurred in the upstream shell.  The  
upstream-left (west) abutment slump was most damaged with a well defined head scarp 
and toe bulging (LIDAR image Figure 15.15 and 15.16). A second slump to the east had 
lesser amounts of toe bulging.  Team C performed LIDAR scans on the west slump.  In 
Figure 15.15 a well defined head-scarp can be seen at the crest of the dam and, following 
the fall-line from the scarp (RED line), a bulge of compressed material can be seen at the 
lower portion of the slope defining the toe of the slump.  Figure 15.16, a cross section 
cutting through the slump is presented along with lidar data for the adjacent unfailed 
upstream shell (accentuated with a RED line).  There is a volumetric balance between
evacuated material from the head scarp and the volume at the toe bulge at the base of the 
slope. The hinge point of the material and accretion appears to be approximately half 
way down the slope. Team C conducted one DCPT sounding near the waterline (after the 
reservoir was drawn down). The sounding and profile is illustrated in Figure 15.17. As 
illustrated in the figure, the soils were fine-grained – primarily volcanic silty clays 
derived from the Chillan volcano located approximately 30 km to the west of the dam 
site. Dynamic penetration in this material ranged from about 3 to 12 blows in the upper 3 
m, then increased approximately linearly with depth. In addition, Team C members hand-
dug a shallow trench in the upstream slope after removing the riprap from the slope 
surface. The near-surface soil in the upstream shell consisted of gravelly sand and sandy 
gravel (see Figure 15.7). The large grain size of the materials precluded the use of DCPT 
here. 
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Figure 15.15. Oblique view of slump at the Coihueco Dam (36.63782°S, 71.79700°W; 

27 March 2010; 13:00) 

Figure 15.16. Cross section view through the slump at the Coihueco Dam, and adjacent 

un-failed upstream shell, accented with a Red Line (36.63782°S, 71.79700°W; 27 March 

2010; 13:00). 
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Figure 15.17. DCPT and hand auger logs from sounding performed at toe of upstream 
slide at Coihueco Dam (36.63782°S, 71.79700°W; 27 March 2010; 13:00) and log from
hand-dug trench in upstream slope (36.63737°S, 71.79674°W; 27 March 2010; 16:00). 
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 Figure 15.18 Shear Wave velocity log using the SASW method for the slide portion of 
the Coihueco Dam (36.63782°S, 71.79700°W). 
Data set for the north Concepcion side of the Llacolen Bridge across the  Bio Bio 
River(S36.830108°; W73.067991°) 
The north approach of the Llacolen Bridge suffered deck unseating due to lateral 
spreading of the bridge piers. The Llacolen Bridge in Concepcion was constructed in 
2000 and spans 2,160 m of the Bio Bio river.  The bridge supports four lanes of vehicular 
traffic pedestrian walkways. The lateral spreading unseated the  traffic support deck. 
Ground settlement of 0.25-0.30 m was also noted to surround each of the exit ramp bents. 
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We performed three DCPT soundings and hand augers at this bridge, LIDAR sans, and 
an SASW profile.  The soils at the bridge were relatively uniform, consisting of very dark 
gray to black, medium to coarse-grained sand with trace fine gravel. At depths of about 
2.2 to 3 m (at nearly the same elevation), the sands became dense and penetration 
refused. The soils above about 2 m were loose, exhibiting DCPT blowcounts generally 
less than 10. 
Figure 15.19. DCPT and hand auger logs from soundings performed at middle Bio Bio 
Bridge (Llacolen Bridge). The DCPTs and hand augers were performed at (36.83029°S, 
73.06860°W; 24 March 2010; 11:30), (36.83038°S, 73.06878°W; 24 March 2010; 
12:30), and (36.83007°S, 73.06908°W; 24 March 2010; 13:30). 
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Figure 15.20. Plan view of the LIDAR scans at the Llacolen approach with the bridge 
deck digitally removed.  The unseated approach deck is at the bottom-middle of the 
image adjacent to and against the circular columns.  Outward tilting of the riverward
(upper) columns is evident, as are fissures in the soil due to lateral spreading. 
Figure 15.21 Shear Wave velocity log using the SASW method for the Llacolen Bridge 

approach embankment. 
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Data set for the Juan Pablo II Bridge, the North Bridge across the Bio Bio River, in 
Concepcion (S36.815864°; W73.083674°) 
The Juan Pablo II Bridge is the longest vehicular bridge in Chile with a length of 2310 m
and suffered lateral spreading on the North-East approach and liquefaction-induced 
settlements along the length of the bridge The Juan Pablo II Bridge connects Concepcion 
and San Pedro de la Paz. The bridge, designed by E.W.H Gifford & Partners and opened 
to the public in 1974, has 70 33m spans, each composed of 7 reinforced concrete girders 
and a concrete slab. The segments sit on reinforced concrete bents with drilled pier 
supports. Severe liquefaction and lateral spreading at the north-east approach 
embankment settled the bridge piers, dropping and laterally displacing the bridge deck.  
The team performed two DCPT soundings and hand augers at this bridge, as well as 
LIDAR scans and one SASW shear wave velocity profile near the settled pier at the 
approach embankment. Both DCPT soundings were performed to depths of about 6 m,
and we terminated the soundings only because we ran out of DCPT rods. The soils below 
about 0.5 m consisted of loose to medium dense, poorly and well-graded sands, similar to 
those observed at the Llacolen Bridge. 
Figure 15.22 . Plan view of the LIDAR scans at the Jan Pablo II bridge approach clover 

leaf ovals (south is up). Bridge damage was located on the west (right) riverward side of 

the interchange with the riverfront highway (S36.815864°; W73.083674°). 
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Figure 15.23. Settled bridge pier at the approach embankment of the Juan Pablo II 

Bridge (S36.815864°; W73.083674°). 

Figure 15.24. Distorted bridge centerline guard wall and settle deck above the north east 

approach embankment. 
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Figure 15.25. DCPT and hand auger logs from soundings performed at Juan Pablo II 

Bridge. The DCPTs and hand augers were performed at (36.81565°S, 73.08342°W; 25 

March 2010; 11:00) and (36.81573°S, 73.08297°W; 25 March 2010; 14:00). 

Figure 15.26. Shear Wave velocity log using the SASW method for the southwest oval 

soil near the settled approach embankment of the Juan Pablo II Bridge. 
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Data set for the La Mochita Four-Span Bridge Parallel to the River Bio Bio in 
Concepcion (S36.846841°; W73.055496°) 
La Mochita is a 4-span concrete bridge supported by seat-type abutments at each end and 
two-column bents at the interior locations. At this site, ground failure induced transverse 
movement of the bridge superstructure. The bridge, constructed in 2005 spans a small 
inlet of water that fronts a water treatment facility along the east bank of the Bio-Bio 
river. The bridge superstructure shifted transversely as a unit towards the east due to 
failure of soil surrounding bents 2 and 3. A lateral spread failure moved soil towards the 
inlet. This failure is attributed to liquefaction-induced lateral spreading. Measurements 
taken by the team on March 15, 2010 indicated that the north end of the bridge deck 
shifted 0.5 m to the east relative to the approach fill, while the south end of the bridge 
shifted 0.9 m towards the east relative to the approach fill on that side. As a result of our 
schedule, we were unable to perform any DCPTs at this site, though we did take LIDAR 
scans. Team C members were able to perform a visual reconnaissance of the site and 
drill a single hand-auger hole from the base of a large crack below the bridge. As 
illustrated in Figure 15.27, the major damage at the site resulted from liquefaction-
induced lateral spreading in a direction transverse to the longitudinal axis of the bridge. 
The large cracks at the site were filled with sand boils, which are visible in the 
photograph (Figure 15.27). The soils in the hand-augered borehole consisted of moist to 
wet, very dark gray to black, medium- to coarse-grained sand with trace fine gravel, 
consistent with the soils encountered at the other Bio Bio River bridges in Concepcion. 
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Figure 15.27. Liquefaction-induced lateral spread at Concepcion bridge parallel to the 

Bio Bio River. (36.84722°S, 73.05530°W; 27 March 2010; 09:25) 

Figure 15.28 Plan view of the La Mochita bridge crossing (North to the right). 
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Figure 15.29. Oblique LIDAR image of Bents 2 and 3 seated in the liquefied soil mass 

that moved latrally to the bottom left corner.
 
Figure 15.30. Hand-auger log from Concepcion bridge parallel to the Bio Bio River. 

(36.84722°S, 73.05530°W; 27 March 2010; 09:45) 
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Data set for the Complex of Four 8-Story Buildings (Condominio los Presidentes) in 
Concepción (36.79076°S, 73.08155°W) 
The four 8-story condominium buildings named the Condominio los Presidentes, are 
located at Los Gorriones No. 512, Comuna de Hualpen, Concepcion.  These structures 
underwent liquefaction-induced settlement that damaged the structures. The master plan 
indicates that six similar 8-story buildings will eventually occupy the site. The first two 
buildings at the south end of the property were built approximately three years ago. The 
two buildings in the center of the property were constructed a year later. These two 
buildings were not fully occupied at the time of the earthquake. The first two buildings 
are named Riesco (southwest building) and Errzuriz (southeast building). The second 
buildings that were built were the Montt (northeast) and Bulnes (northwest), respectively.  
The native ground in the area was marsh. Sandy fill was placed at the site to raise the 
ground level. Groundwater was observed at a depth of 0.5 m. 
Clear evidence of sediment ejecta was seen at the northeast corner of the Riesco Building 
(i.e., the southwest existing building). The maximum vertical displacement of a northeast 
corner of the northern extension of the Riesco Building was downward about 40 cm with 
respect of the ground adjacent to the Bulnes Building. The Bulnes building did not appear 
to suffer seismically induced settlement during the earthquake. The southern end of the 
Riesco Building appeared to settle only 10 cm, and the ground surrounding the building 
settled an additional 19 to 24 cm.  
The ground surrounding the Errzuriz Building (i.e., the southeast building) and Montt 
Building (i.e., the northeast building) settled vertically 5 to 10 cm. Structural damage to 
the Riesco building appeared due to differential settlement of the foundation.  The street 
that surrounded the property did not appear to settle and there was no evidence of ground 
failure in adjacent properties that have one and two-story homes.  
Team C performed two DCPT soundings and hand augers at the site, as well as SASW
and LIDAR scans. Both soundings encountered a 1 to 1.5-m thick layer of loose to 
medium dense, nonplastic, sandy silt to silty sand below a shallow watertable. The color 
and grain size of this layer was visually consistent with the ejecta observed at the ground 
surface near the southwest apartment building. This layer became relatively dense below
a depth of 3 to 3.5 m, also consistent with the damage (without collapse) of the SW
apartment building.
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Figure 15.31. Height of ejecta sprayed onto wall of Riesco southwestern 8-story 

apartment building in Concepcion. Gray soil in foreground of photo also is sandy silt to 

silty sand ejecta, (36.79076°S, 73.08155°W; 25 March 2010; 16:50) 

Figure 15.32. DCPT and hand auger logs from soundings performed at four 8-story 

apartment complex in Concepcion. The DCPTs and hand augers were performed at 
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(36.79076°S, 73.08155°W; 25 March 2010; 17:00) and (36.79098°S, 73.08167°W; 25 

March 2010; 19:00). 

Figure 15.33.Shear wave velocity profile for the four 8-story buildings by the SASW
 
method 
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Figure 15.34. Oblique view of the 4- eight story buildings. The Riesco (southwestern) 

building is in front, the Errzuriz (southeast building) is to the left, the Montt is to the right 

(northeast) and Bulnes is in the background (northwest). 

Figure 15.35. Detailed LIDAR imagery of settlement of soil around the Riesco Building 

(Southwest). 
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Figure 15.36. Oblique detailed LIDAR imagery of the Riesco Building (Southwest). 

Figure 15.37. Detailed LIDAR imagery of racking of the Riesco Building (Southwest). 
Road Embankment Failure North of Lota , 37.073306°S, 73.147825°W 
Several large ground failure areas were observed north of Lota along Route 160. Two 

failures resulted in damage to a roadway embankment section. The area east of Route 160 

is largely marshy with low lying organic material. South of the north bound failure and 
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east of the south bound failure of the elevated roadway sections is a small housing 
development.  The north and south bound failures appear to be due to oversteepened 
embankments, and possibly  poorly compacted earth fill. A gray sandy fill overlaid by 
compacted clay fill was used in the elevated road embankment. The roadway elevation 
was approximately 10–15m above the valley area  At this site, Team C collected LIDAR 
data to archive the embankment damage. 
Figure 15.38. Plan view of route 160 embankment failures and neighboring community.  

One embankment failure is above the fork in the highway, and the second failure is on 

the lower right side of the merged highways. 
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Figure 15.39. Oblique view of route 160 east side embankment failure at the fork in the 

highway (note vehicle in slide for scale).
 
Figure 15.40. Oblique view of route 160 embankment failure along the west side of the 

merged highways. 
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Data set for the Hospital Provincial in Curanilahue, 37.47384°S, 73.34892°W 
Liquefaction-induced ground deformations affected the seismic performance of the new 
hospital facility built in the City of Curanilahue, which is about 80 km southwest of 
Concepción. The hospital facility was opened in 2008. The new hospital facility has 10 
structurally isolated wings with heights ranging from one to six stories, with the taller 
ones being amongst the tallest buildings in the city.  We performed one DCPT and two 
hand augers at the hospital, as well as SASW and LIDAR scans. In the only DCPT 
sounding that we could perform outside the hospital structure, we encountered medium 
dense sandy SILT near the level of the ground water table. We attempted three hand 
augers inside the structure (in a courtyard) and two hand augers outside the structure (in a 
planting area near the parking lot), but refused in gravelly fill at shallow depth.  
Figure 15.41. DCPT and hand auger logs from soundings performed at Hospital 

Curanilahue. The DCPT and hand augers were performed at (37.47384°S, 73.34892°W; 

26 March 2010; 09:00) and (37.47352°S, 73.34824°W; 26 March 2010; 11:00). 
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Figure 15.42. Shear wave velocity profile for the Provincial Hospital of Curanilahue by 

the SASW method 

Figure 15.43. Oblique view of the entire complex of buildings at the Provincial Hospital 

of Curanilahue, 37.47352°S, 73.34824°W.
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Figure 15.44. Oblique view of the north east side of Provincial Hospital of Curanilahue, 

37.47352°S, 73.34824°W. The SASW test was performed along the three light posts 

above the circle. 

Figure 15.45. Oblique view of the east courtyard of the Provincial Hospital of 

Curanilahue, 37.47352°S, 73.34824°W.  Liquefaction induced structural settlement is 

clearly evident along the courtyard perimeter. 
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Figure 15.46. Cross section through the east courtyard of the Provincial Hospital of 
Curanilahue, 37.47352°S, 73.34824°W.  Liquefaction induced structural settlement of 
165mm measured in the LIDAR data is clearly evident along the courtyard perimeter. 
Data set for the Route-5 Curved-Overpass Embankment S36.0347 , W71.7558 
A large embankment failure occurred on an overpass of Route 5, approximately 13 km
North of Parral (S36.0347, W71.7558). The overpass embankment was curved and the 
embankment failed over a length of about 80 m towards the outside of the curved section. 
The failure appeared to involve a shallow translational slide in the near surface 
foundation soils as evidenced by the intact failed soil mass and the mound of soil pushed 
up at the toe (Figure 9.52a). Foundation soils in the region appeared to be relatively 
competent suggesting possible elevated pore pressures in the foundation soils played a 
role in the observed failure with 3-D effects leading to failure to the outside of the curved 
embankment section as opposed to the inside of the embankment. The outside section of 
the slide mass remained largely intact.  We performed two DCPT soundings and hand 
augers at the site, along with LIDAR scanning. Both soundings and hand augers refused 
at shallow depth because of the high gravel content of the soils below the ground water 
table. 
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Figure 15.47. Oblique view of the Route 5 overpass embankment failure from the 

southeast side. The outside curve can be seen to have slid out laterally into the field.
 
Figure 15.48. Closeup of the Route 5 overpass embankment failure from the southeast 

side. The embankment along the outside curve can be seen to have slid out laterally 16m
 
into the field. 
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Figure 15.49. Oblique view of the Route 5 overpass embankment failure from the 

northwest side. Much of the roadbed slumped into the graben left behind as the outside 

slid out laterally to the southwest.
 
Figure 15.50. Cross-section view of the Route 5 overpass embankment failure from the 

east. The outside curve slid out laterally opening a large 16 meter graben. 

326 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.51. DCPT and hand auger logs from soundings performed at Ruta 5 Overpass 
Embankment. The DCPTs and hand augers were performed at (36.03459°S, 
71.75611°W; 27 March 2010; 18:30) and (36.03488°S, 71.75610°W; 27 March 2010; 
19:30). 
Data set for the Las Palmas Tailings Pond Failure, Talca (35.184679° S, 71.759410° 
W) 
We performed two DCPT soundings at the tailings dam site, as well as SASW above the
head scarp and LIDAR, but did not perform any hand augers at the site. At the time of the 
investigation, the tailings were relatively stiff, likely as a result of water draining out of
the tailings mass following the failure. Las Palmas mine was operated from the early 
1980’s until 1997. The mine was closed and the tailings area partially covered with a thin 
layer of gravelly material. Clear evidence of liquefaction of the tailings with sand boils 
and ejecta along cracks indicating some portion of the tailings was saturated. Tailings 
flowed 280-320 meters from the headscarp to the snout toe, and some highly fluidized 
debris ran out almost 0.5 kilometers. The site was visited by GEER personnel on March 
11, 2010 and then a follow-up visit was made on March 28, 2010 to collect data with 
LIDAR and DCPT.
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Figure 15.52. DCPT logs from soundings performed at Las Palmas Mine, Talca. The 

DCPTs were performed at (35.183884°S, 71.76110°W; 28 March 2010; 12:00) and 

(35.18629°S, 71.75771°W; 28 March 2010; 14:00). 

Figure 15.53. Shear wave velocity profile for the Las Palmas Tailings Dam by the SASW
 
method 
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 Figure 15.54 Oblique LIDAR view of the Las Palmas Tailings Pond Failure, Talca 

(35.184679° S, 71.759410° W).  The tailings pond head scarp is in the upper-left.  The te 

of the slide is in the line of trees at the bottom right. 

Figure 15.55 Detailed LIDAR view of the head scarp of the Las Palmas Tailings Pond 

(35.184679° S, 71.759410° W). 
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Figure 15.56 Cross-section LIDAR view of the Las Palmas Tailings Pond Failure, Talca 
(35.184679° S, 71.759410° W).  The distance from the tailings pond head scarp to the toe 
of the slide is between 280 and 320m. 
Data set from the Collapsed 14 story building, Concepcion (36.82779S, 73.060777W) 
Two adjacent structures, one 20-stories and intact, and another 14 stories and collapsed 
were inspected during reconnaissance close to the Llacolen bridge in downtown 
Concepción. The collapsed building was designed using Site Type II (Chilean design 
code) and the one that did not collapse using Site Type III, which implies different design 
spectra. While there is no evidence that the soil conditions are indeed different at the 
locations of the two structures (distance between approximately 20m) of the building.  
We collected an SASW profile at the site and based on the partial profile estimate that the 
site would classify as a NEHRP – D site. 
Figure 15.57. Collapsed 14 story building, Concepcion (36.82779S, 73.060777W) 
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Figure 15.58. Shear Wave velocity log using the SASW method for the14 story 
collapsed building, Concepcion. (36.82779S, 73.060777W) 
Data set from Santiago Ring Road (33.376159°S, 70.747742°W)
Team D performed SASW measurements at the location of two collapsed bridge 
overpasses in Santiago reportedly on soft soils. Figures 15.59 and 15.60 show the testing 
at Bridge Ring3. The SASW line was approximately half way between the two bridge 
bents along a traffic island transverse to the road.  Figure 15.61 and 15.62 show the test at 
Bridge Ring 2. The SASW line was about half way between the two bridge bents, 
transverse to the road.   
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Figure 15.59 Bridge Ring 3 “Lo Echevers” Bridge, Santiago, 33.376159°S, 70.747742°W 

Figure 15.60 SASW line and test, Bridge Ring 3 “Lo Echevers” Bridge, Santiago, 
33.376159°S, 70.747742°W, April 13, 2010 
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Figure 15.61 Bridge Ring 2, “Mira Flores” Bridge, Santiago, -33.394269°S,­
70.769402°W 

Figure 15.62 SASW Line and Test, Bridge Ring 2, “Mira Flores” Bridge, Santiago, ­
33.394269°,-70.769402°, April 13, 2010. 
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Data set at Puente Mataquito (35.050712°S,72.162258°W) 
This bridge crossed the Mataquito River close to the Pacific Ocean. Extensive 
liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred at the north and south abutments and in the 
adjacent fields. Figure 15.63 through 15.72 show photos of the bridge and the damage. 
The lateral spreading on the south abutment appears to be more confined due to the 
topography of the area. 
However, on the north side, and due to the large extent of the fields are around the bridge, 
extensive lateral spreading was observed going back almost 270 m from the river edge. 
The lateral spreading from the edge of the abutment wall to the first row of piers is about 
54 cm and the total lateral spreading from the edge of the abutment wall to the river’s 
edge is about 180cm (over a distance of about 65m). The approach embankment is about 
7.6m high, and settled about 70cm relative to the bridge deck. The approach   
embankment experienced outward transverse movement of about 60cm from the center 
line as manifested by cracking of the asphalt along a distance of about 200m.  This 
appears due to liquefaction and failure of the underlying soil and is evidenced by 
compression ridged in the field at the toe of the embankments.  
SASW measurements were made at about 3 m from the tow of the embankment on the 
northern side of the bridge. 
Figure 15.63 Puente Mataquito, looking north, 35.050712°S,72.162258°W, April 16, 

2010.
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 Figure 15.64 Lateral spreading on the south end of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, 

35.050712°S,72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 

Figure 15.65 Lateral spreading on the north end of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, 

35.050712°S,72.162258°W April 16, 2010. 
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Figure 15.66 Settlement of the north abutment of the bridge, 70 cm offset at the bridge 

deck, Puente Mataquito, 35.050712°S, 72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 

Figure 15.67 Cracking and transverse movement (60 cm on each side) of embankment 

due to liquefaction of underlying soil, north abutment of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, 

35.050712°S,72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 
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Figure 15.68 Compression ridges at toe of embankment, due to liquefaction of underlying 

soil and settlement of embankment, north abutment of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, 

35.050712°S, 72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 

Figure 15.69 Lateral Spreading towards the river, north abutment of the bridge, Puente 

Mataquito, 35.050712°S, 72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 
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 Figure 15.70 North abutment shoved into bridge deck due to lateral spreading, Puente 

Mataquito, 35.050712°S, 72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 

Figure 15.71 Shearing of bridge girder, North abutment of bridge, Puente Mataquito, 

35.050712°S, 72.162258°W , April 16, 2010. 
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Figure 15.72 SASW line, parallel to northern approach embankment, Puente Mataquito, 
35.050712°S,72.162258°W, April 16, 2010. 
Data set at Port Coronel (37.028874°S, 73.149768°W). 
Team D made SASW measurements in the Port of Coronel where lateral spreading was 
experience. Figure 15.73 through 17.78 show the corresponding photos. SASW
measurements were made along two lines parallel to the sheet pile wall. The first line is 
about 7 from the sheet pile wall in an area that experienced large lateral deformations 
while the second line was made 27m from the sheet pile wall in area that experienced 
limited deformations.  
339 
 The sheet pile wall was embedded about 4-6m below the ground surface and protruded 
about 15-2m above the ground surface. At waypoint 11 (see Figure 15.73) we measured 
outward movement of about 110cm, while port official report their survey gives about 
150cm, but the measurement extended all the way back to the ware houses. At waypoint 
12 we measured lateral displacements of about 40 cm, and at waypoint 13 we measured 
outward movement of 10cm.    
Figure 15.73 Port Coronel, area marked by GPS tracks along the coast experienced lateral 

spreading (37.028874°S, 73.149768°W). 
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Figure 15.74 SASW line 1, and lateral spreading looking north, Port Coronel, April 14, 

2010 (37.028874°S, 73.149768°W). 

Figure 15.75 SASW line 2, and lateral spreading looking north, Port Coronel, April 14, 

2010 (37.028874°S, 73.149768°W). 
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Figure 15.76 Lateral spreading looking south, Port Coronel, April 14, 2010  

(37.028874°S, 73.149768°W). 

Figure 1 Sand Ejecta, Lateral Spreading, Port Coronel, April 14, 2010  (37.028874°S, 

73.149768°W). 
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 Figure 15.78 Seaside view of the sheet pile wall that experienced lateral spreading, Port 
Coronel, April 14, 2010 (37.028874°S, 73.149768°W). 
Data set Roadway Embankment ~5km south of Parral (36.185671°S, 71.825415°W) 
Team D performed SASW test along a repaired roadway embankment as illustrated in 
Figure 15.79 through 15.81. The failed section was bounded by two streams Figure 
15.79 and it is likely that the failure of the embankment was due to loss of strength in the 
underlying soils (liquefaction) during shaking. 
343 
  
 
 
Figure 15.79 Roadway Embankment ~5km south of Parral, north is up,  Ruta 5 Sur 

(36.185671°S,71.825415°W)
 
Figure 15.80 North bound lane looking south, Repaired Roadway Embankment ~5km 

south of Parral, Ruta 5 Sur, April 15, 2010 (36.185671°S, 71.825415°W)
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  Figure 15.81 SASW line, North bound lane looking south, Roadway Embankment ~5km
south of Parral, Ruta 5 Sur, April 15, 2010 (-36.185671°S,-71.825415°W). 
Data set at Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill Overpass 
(36.051209°S , 71.768005°W). 
Team D performed SASW measurements on a damaged overpass embankment on the 
right side of the north bound lane of Ruta 5 sur (Figure 15.82 through 15.84). The 
damage of the embankment appears to be due to shaking and bulging of the embankment 
material. The underlying soil appeared to be intact with no evidence of loss of loss of 
strength. The embankment bulged laterally and settled. The overpass embankment to the 
left of the north bound lane does not show signs of damage. 
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Figure 15.82 Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, looking north, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill 

(36.051209°S, 71.768005°W). 
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 Figure 15.83 Damage to over padded embankment, Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, to 

Retiro at Tucapel Mill, April 15, 2010 (36.051209°S, 71.768005°W). 

Figure 15.84 SASW line, Ruta 5 Sur overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill, 

April 15, 2010 (36.051209°S, 71.768005°W). 
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